EN BANC CALENDAR

Before the Minnesota Supreme Court

March 2014

SUMMARY OF ISSUES

Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office

Monday, March 3, 2014

Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol

Donald D. David, Respondent vs. Bartel Enterprises (Nitro Green) and SFM Mutual Insurance Company, Relators – Case No. A13-2141: Employee Donald David suffered a work injury. After the parties resolved a dispute regarding outstanding medical bills, David sought attorney fees in the amount of $36,810.90, which was calculated using the 25/20 formula of Minn. Stat. § 176.081 (2012). Concluding that an award of fees in excess of $13,000 was not warranted by the factors sets forth in Irwin v. Surdyk’s Liquor, 599 N.W.2d 132 (Minn. 1999), the compensation judge awarded David the $13,000 statutory maximum for a contingency fee. The judge did not consider whether an amount less than the statutory maximum would have been reasonable. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals affirmed.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the separation of powers doctrine is violated by an interpretation of Minn. Stat. § 176.081 that mandates an award of the statutory maximum for a contingency fee without consideration of whether an amount less than the statutory maximum is reasonable, and (2) whether all attorney fees must be reasonable in accordance with Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5. (Workers Compensation Court of Appeals)

Nonoral: Carol J. Kainz, Respondent vs Arrowhead Senior Living Community, Self-Insured, administered by Berkley Risk Administrators Co., Relator, and Iron Range Rehab Center, Orthopeadic Associates of Duluth, P.A., Intervenors – A13-0733: Employee Carol Kainz fractured her ankle on a stairway at the senior living center where she worked. The compensation judge made several factual findings, including a finding that the public was excluded from the stairway. Using the “increased risk” test, the judge concluded that the injury arose out of Kainz’s employment. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) affirmed, applying the “work connection test.”

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the WCCA erred when it failed to apply the “increased risk” test, (2) whether the compensation judge’s findings were supported by substantial evidence, and (3) whether the employee’s injuries arose out of her employment. (Workers Compensation Court of Appeals)

Wednesday, March 5, 2014

Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol

Nonoral: Thomas Daniel Rhodes, petitioner, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – A13-0560: In 1998, appellant Thomas Rhodes was convicted of first-degree murder. After his conviction was affirmed, Rhodes filed several postconviction petitions. His third petition, which was filed in November 2012, asserts a number of claims, including a claim of newly discovered evidence. The district court summarily denied the third postconviction petition, concluding that it was barred by State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 243 N.W.2d 737 (1976), and Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4 (2012).

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the district court erred when it summarily denied Rhodes’ third postconviction petition. (Kandiyohi County)

Thursday, March 6, 2014

Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol

Nonoral: Kim Thul Ouk, petitioner, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – A13-1959: In 1992, appellant Kim Ouk was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of release. On direct appeal, his conviction and sentence was affirmed. Nineteen years later, in June 2013, Ouk filed a pro se motion to correct his sentence arguing that the rule announced in Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), should be applied to his case retroactively. The district court denied Ouk’s motion, explaining that in Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311 (Minn. 2013), the court held that the Miller rule does not apply retroactively to sentences that became final before the rule was announced.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the court should revisit its decision in Chambers. (Ramsey County)

Monday, March 10, 2014

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

Lyon Financial Services, Incorporated, d/b/a US Bancorp Business Equipment Finance Group, Plaintiff-Appellant vs. Illinois Paper and Copier Company, Defendant-Appellee – A13-1944: Appellant Lyon Financial Services sued respondent Illinois Paper for breach of contract in federal district court. Under the parties’ contract, Illinois Paper represented and warranted that all lease transactions presented to Lyon for review were valid and fully enforceable agreements. Lyon alleged that Illinois Paper breached the parties’ contract by presenting a lease transaction that violated the Illinois Municipal Code. Illinois Paper moved for judgment on the pleading contending that the warranty involved a representation of law, and was therefore unenforceable. Applying Illinois law, the federal district court granted Illinois Paper’s motion. Lyon appealed. Concluding that Minnesota law applied, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit certified several questions to the Minnesota Supreme Court pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 480.065 (2012).

Before the supreme court, the following certified questions are presented: whether reliance is an element of a breach of express warranty claim? If so, what type of reliance is required: contract-like reliance or tort-like reliance? If tort like-reliance is required, is one contracting party entitled to rely on the other’s express contractual representation of law? If such reliance is not justified and the party’s warranty claim therefore fails, is a breach of contract action based on that same express contractual warranty also barred? (Certified Question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit)

James W. Stevens, Relator vs. S.T. Services and CAN Insurance Companies, Respondents – A13-1868: Employee James Stevens suffered a work injury in 1985. The parties stipulated that the injury rendered Stevens permanently and totally disabled. Once a year, Stevens met with an investigator to verify his ongoing condition. In 2011, the employer and insurer filed a petition to discontinue payment of the permanent total disability benefits based on evidence that Stevens had worked from 2008 to 2010. Finding that Stevens was no longer permanently and totally disabled, the compensation judge granted the petition to discontinue payments of the permanent total disability benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) affirmed.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are: (1) whether Minn. Stat. § 176.239 (2012) grants the WCCA jurisdiction to hear a petition to discontinue payment of permanent total disability benefits to an employee who has previously been adjudicated to be permanently and totally disabled, and (2) whether substantial evidence in the record supports the findings of the compensation judge. (Workers Compensation Court of Appeals)