EN BANC CALENDAR

 

Before the Minnesota Supreme Court

 

October 2012

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES

 

Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office

 

Monday, October 1, 2012

Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol

 

Kenneth B. Mauer, Relator vs. Commissioner of Revenue, Respondent – Case No. A12-0499:  Relator Kenneth B. Mauer owned a home in Minnesota and purchased a home in Florida in 2003.  For the 2003 tax year, Mauer claimed to be a resident of Minnesota for only part of the year; for the 2004 tax year, Mauer did not file a Minnesota individual income tax return.  Applying the factors in Minn. R. 8001.0300, subp. 3 (the “residency rule”), the Commissioner of Revenue concluded that Mauer remained a Minnesota domiciliary during both 2003 and 2004; the Minnesota Tax Court affirmed.  On Mauer’s appeal to the supreme court, the issue is whether the tax court correctly applied the factors in the residency rule, particularly factor W (the percentage of time the taxpayer spent in Minnesota and in other jurisdictions), in determining that Mauer had not changed his domicile.  (Tax Court)

 

Non-Oral:     Michael Carrasco Sontoya, Petitioner, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A12-0170:  In 2009, appellant Michael Sontoya was convicted after a jury trial of first-degree murder.  The supreme court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal.  In September 2011, Sontoya filed a petition for postconviction relief, which the district court denied without an evidentiary hearing.  On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the district court erred in concluding that Sontoya’s conflict-of-interest claim was based on mere speculation.  (Ramsey County) 

Tuesday, October 2, 2012

Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol

 

            Andrew Thomas Hawes, Petitioner, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case Nos. A10-1351, A12-0212:  Appellant Andrew Hawes was convicted after a jury trial of aiding and abetting first-degree murder; his petition for postconviction relief was denied.  On appeal to the supreme court in these consolidated matters, the issues presented are (1) whether Hawes received ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to object to relationship evidence on hearsay and confrontation clause grounds; and (2) whether the admission of statements made by coconspirators in an attempt to conceal the murder violated the Confrontation Clause.  (Anoka County)

 

Living Word Bible Camp, Realtor vs. County of Itasca, Respondent – Case No. A12-0632:  Appellant Living Word Bible Camp operates summer bible camps for children on leased property in Aitkin County.  In 2000, Living Word purchased real property in Itasca County on which it planned to build and operate its summer bible camps, subject to its ability to obtain the necessary rezoning, permits and approvals.  The Itasca County property was initially exempt from property taxes.  Although the property was rezoned in 2004, Living Word has not obtained the required permits and approvals, and has not used the property as a summer bible camp.  In 2008, Itasca County reclassified the property as taxable because it was not being used by Living Word as a purely public charity.  The tax court affirmed.  On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are  (1) whether the tax court erred in not ruling on whether Living Word is an institution of purely public charity; (2) whether the tax court erred in precluding consideration of Living Word’s exempt activities in Aitkin County in determining whether the Itasca County property is exempt from property taxation; (3) whether the tax court erred in concluding that Living Word is legally unable to use the property for an exempt purpose; and (4) whether the tax court erred in allowing the County’s interference with Living Word’s use and development of the property as a basis to deny its exemption from property taxes.  (Itasca County)

 

Wednesday, October 3, 2012

William Mitchell College of Law

 

Marie Delores Green, Respondent vs. BMW of North America, LLC, a foreign limited liability company qualified to do business in the State of Minnesota, Appellant – Case No. A11-0581:  Respondent Marie Green brought an action against appellant BMW of North America, LLC, asserting violations of Minnesota’s Lemon Law, Minn. Stat. § 325F.665 (2010), as well as warranty claims.  Following a bench trial, the district court awarded Green $25,157 in damages and $221,499 in statutory attorney fees under the Lemon Law.  The court of appeals affirmed.  On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the district court abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees in an amount more than eight times the award of compensatory damages.  (Hennepin County)

 

Thursday, October 4, 2012

Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol

 

Patricia Ann Langston, Appellant vs. Wilson McShane Corporation, as Administrator for the Twin Cities Carpenters and Joiners Pension Fund, and the Twin Cities Carpenters and Joiners Pension Fund, Case Nos. A10-2219, A11-0683, and A11-0684:  Patricia and Gary Langston were married in 1964 and divorced in 1993.  During the marriage, Gary Langston participated in the Twin Cities Carpenters and Joiners Pension Fund.  The judgment and decree dissolving the Langstons’ marriage awarded Patricia a one-half interest in the marital share of all future pension payments to be received by Gary.  However, no qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) was entered.  Gary remarried in 2001 and retired in 2004.  In 2005, the district court issued a QDRO but it was rejected by the pension fund because upon his retirement, Gary had elected to receive his accrued benefits in the form of a joint and survivor annuity naming his second wife, Shelly James, as beneficiary.  Shortly after the QDRO was rejected by the pension fund, Gary Langston died. 

 

            The district court that had issued the QDRO ordered the pension fund to begin paying benefits to Patricia.  In a second order, the district court awarded Patricia attorney fees.  The court of appeals reversed, holding that benefits had irrevocably vested in Shelly James upon Gary’s retirement and the QDRO therefore required the plan to pay a benefit no longer available.  On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are (1) whether Patricia is entitled to benefit payments under the 1993 judgment and decree and 2005 QDRO; and (2) whether the district court abused its discretion in awarding Patricia her attorney fees and costs.  (Anoka County)

 

Non-Oral:     Jermaine Ferguson, Petitioner, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A12-0310:  In 2005, appellant Jermaine Ferguson was convicted after a jury trial of first-degree murder.  The supreme court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal.  In June 2009, Ferguson filed a petition for postconviction relief, which the district court denied without an evidentiary hearing.  The supreme court reversed the district court’s summary denial of postconviction relief and remanded for an evidentiary hearing.  After an evidentiary hearing, the district court again denied Ferguson’s petition for postconviction relief.  On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the district court erred in finding that the recantation of trial testimony was not corroborated by circumstances clearly indicating trustworthiness and that the recantation was not genuine.  (Hennepin County) 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Monday, October 8, 2012

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

 

In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Shana Gail Buchanan, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 327311 – Case No. A12-0163:  An attorney discipline case that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based upon the facts of the matter.

 

Jocelyn Dickhoff by her parents and natural guardians Joseph Dickhoff and Kayla Dickhoff, Respondents vs. Rachel Green, M.D., et al., Appellants – Case No. A11-0402:  Respondents Jocelyn Dickhoff and her parents Joseph and Kayla Dickhoff brought a medical malpractice claim against appellants Rachel Green, M.D., and Family Practice Medical Center of Willmar, P.A.  The plaintiffs allege that appellants failed to timely and appropriately diagnose and treat Jocelyn’s cancer.  The district court dismissed the medical malpractice claim on the basis that Minnesota courts do not recognize claims for “loss of chance of life.”  The court of appeals reversed, concluding that a medical malpractice claim is not barred when the alleged misdiagnosis resulted in a delay in treatment that makes it more likely than not that the patient will not survive the cancer. 

 

On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are (1) whether it was the plaintiffs’ burden to establish a prima facie case of causation with expert testimony showing that it is more probable than not that the alleged harm (the recurrence of cancer) resulted from something for which the defendant is responsible (an allegedly negligent delay in diagnosis) than from something for which the defendant is not responsible (the natural progression of the underlying cancer), and whether the district court was correct in ruling that the plaintiffs’ expert testimony failed to establish a prima facie case of causation; and (2) whether the district court was correct in ruling that the plaintiffs’ claim of damages for a diminished life expectancy is prohibited under Minnesota law as a claim for loss of chance.  (Kandiyohi County)

Tuesday, October 9, 2012

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

 

John and Deborah Billion, Relators vs. Commissioner of Revenue, Respondent – Court File No. A11-2337:  Relators John and Deborah Billion were South Dakota residents for tax years 2005, 2006, and 2007 but owned stock in Subchapter S corporations with Minnesota source income and therefore were required to file Minnesota tax returns.  For tax year 2005, one of the Subchapter S corporations incurred a loss.  On their federal tax returns, relators used the loss to offset income earned in passive activities in 2005, 2006, and 2007.  On their Minnesota tax returns for 2005, 2006, and 2007, relators used the loss to offset only passive income from Minnesota sources.  The amount of the loss used to offset passive income from Minnesota sources on relators’ 2007 Minnesota return was more than the amount of the loss used on relators’ 2007 federal return.  The Commissioner of Revenue denied the excess loss for tax year 2007; the tax court affirmed.  On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether relators’ treatment of the passive activity loss was proper, either under the statutory definitions of taxable income, taxable net income, and net income or because the passive loss is a net operating loss that Minn. R. 8002.0200 allows to be offset against Minnesota income.  (Tax Court)

 

In the Matter of the Application of Minnesota Power for Authority to Increase Rates for Electric Service in Minnesota – Case No. A11-0352:  Appellant ALLETE Inc. d/b/a Minnesota Power filed a notice of change in rates with the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, seeking approval of an $81 million rate increase.  Minnesota Power also filed a petition requesting approval to collect $73.3 million in interim rates.  The Commission issued an order setting interim rates at 60 percent of the final rate request based on “exigent circumstances” under Minn. Stat. § 216B.16, subd. 3 (2010).  By writ of certiorari, Minnesota Power challenged the order setting interim rates, and the court of appeals affirmed.

 

On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are (1) whether the Commission exceeded its statutory authority when it decided that circumstances unrelated to the utility’s cost of service qualified as “exigent circumstances” under Minn. Stat. § 216B.16, subd. 3; (2) whether the Commission may set interim rates at the level it predicts it may set final rates after a contested case hearing; and (3) whether the Commission must provide a remedy to recoup revenues lost as a result of an unlawful reduction in interim rates.  (Minnesota Public Utilities Commission)

 

Wednesday, October 10, 2012

Willmar High School

 

In the Matter of the Welfare of J.J.P. – A11-1146:  In 2002, when he was 17 years old, J.J.P. was adjudicated delinquent after he committed second-degree burglary and misdemeanor theft.  In 2007, the district court granted J.J.P.’s request for expungement of all judicial-branch records of his delinquency adjudication.  The court’s order specifically excluded records maintained by the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA).  In 2010, after the Department of Human Services notified J.J.P. that his prior delinquency adjudication barred him from obtaining licensure as a paramedic, J.J.P. petitioned the court for expungement of all records held by the BCA and other executive-branch agencies.  The district court denied the petition.  The court of appeals reversed the district court’s order.

 

On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are (1) whether the juvenile expungement statute authorizes expungement of records of delinquency held by executive-branch agencies; (2) whether construing the statute to reach executive-branch records violates the separation of powers doctrine; and (3) whether the standards that govern expungement of adult arrest and conviction records are relevant to a district court’s consideration of a petition under the juvenile expungement statute.  (Hennepin County)

 

Wednesday, October 17, 2012

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

 

            In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Jill Eleanor Clark, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 196988  – A12-0326:  The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility filed a petition for disciplinary action against respondent Jill Clark.  The matter was referred to a referee.  The referee recommended, among other things, that the supreme court transfer Clark to disability inactive status.

 

            The issues before the supreme court include: (1) whether Clark should be transferred to disability inactive status pursuant to Rule 28, Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility: (2) whether the disciplinary proceedings should be stayed until Clark is no longer disabled and is able to assist in her defense, and (3) whether the issues of Clark’s asserted disability and inability to assist in her defense should be referred to the referee for additional findings.