EN BANC CALENDAR

Before the Minnesota Supreme Court

April 2016

SUMMARY OF ISSUES

Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office

 

Monday, April 4, 2016

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

 

Robert Burks, Respondent, vs. Metropolitan Council, Appellant – Case No. A14-1651:  In November 2013, a Metro Transit bus driver employed by appellant Metropolitan Council informed respondent Robert Burks, a blind man and regular patron of the bus system, that the driver did not want Burks on the bus. Two Metro Transit officers arrived and escorted Burks off the bus. When Metro Transit did not respond to his complaint, Burks requested a copy of the video recording of the incident from the bus’s recording system under the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 13.01–.99 (2014). The Council denied the request on the ground that the video recording is private “personnel data” under Minn. Stat. § 13.43.

Burks then brought an action in district court, claiming that the Council had violated the Data Practices Act. The district court granted summary judgment to Burks and ordered the Council to release the video recording to him. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the video recording is public data under the Data Practices Act.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the video recording of the incident is private “personnel data” under Minn. Stat. § 13.43; and (2) whether Burks is entitled to the video recording as a subject of the data. (Hennepin County)

In the Matter of: KSTP-TV, Respondent, vs. Metro Transit, Respondent Below, Metropolitan Council, Appellant – Case No. A14-1957:  In July and September 2013, two Metro Transit bus drivers employed by appellant Metropolitan Council were involved in separate and unrelated incidents. Transit officials undertook investigations that included downloading portions of the video recordings from the recording systems on the buses. The Council determined that neither incident warranted discipline. Respondent KSTP-TV requested copies of the video recordings under the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 13.01–.99 (2014). The Council denied the requests, asserting that the portions of the video recordings that transit officials had downloaded and reviewed are private “personnel data” on the bus drivers under Minn. Stat. § 13.43.

KSTP-TV filed a data practices complaint with the Minnesota Office of Administrative Hearings. Following a hearing, the administrative law judge concluded that the video recordings are public data and ordered the Council to furnish the video recordings to KSTP-TV. The Council sought certiorari review, and the court of appeals affirmed.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the video recordings of the incidents are private “personnel data” under Minn. Stat. § 13.43. (Office of Administrative Hearings)

NOTE: The preceding cases have been consolidated for purposes of oral argument. There will be a total of 1 hour of oral argument in both cases.

Michael and Jean Antonello, Respondents, vs. Commissioner of Revenue, Relator – Case No. A15-1847:  During an audit of respondents Michael and Jean Antonello’s 2006 income tax return, the Minnesota Department of Revenue disallowed deductions claimed for charitable contributions. In an administrative appeal, relator Commissioner of Revenue allowed some of the claimed charitable deductions, disallowed others, and recalculated the Antonellos’ tax liability.

The Antonellos appealed to the tax court, challenging the disallowance of their 2006 charitable-contribution deductions. In her cross-motion for summary judgment, the commissioner asked the tax court to modify the commissioner’s order from the administrative appeal to correct the department’s miscalculation of the Antonellos’ tax liability. The tax court reversed the disallowance of charitable deductions, and denied the commissioner’s request to correct any errors made by the Department of Revenue. With respect to its refusal to make the requested corrections, the tax court held that its de novo standard of review does not expand the scope of review, which is limited to matters raised in the administrative proceedings below; an administrative agency cannot “appeal” from its own order, and the statute authorizing the taxpayer’s appeal, Minn. Stat. § 271.06, subd. 1 (2014), does not include the commissioner; the commissioner cannot assert counterclaims against a taxpayer in the taxpayer’s appeal; and the statute of limitations for a 2006 “assessment” had expired.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the tax court’s conclusion regarding the Antonellos’ additional income tax liability for 2006 is justified by the evidence and in conformity with the law; and (2) whether the tax court committed legal error in holding it was without authority to modify the commissioner’s order to reflect the correct amount of tax owed where the correct amount was higher than the amount stated in the commissioner’s order. (Minnesota Tax Court)

Tuesday, April 5, 2016

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

 

In the Matter of the Consolidated Hospital Surcharge Appeals of Gillette Children’s Specialty Healthcare, St. Luke’s Hospital, North Memorial Health Care, HealthEast Care System, Park Nicollet Health Services, Fairview Health Services, and Children’s Hospitals and Clinics of Minnesota – Case No. A14-1462:  In separate administrative appeals, Gillette Children’s Specialty Healthcare, St. Luke’s Hospital, North Memorial Health Care, HealthEast Care System, Park Nicollet Health Services, Fairview Health Services, and Children’s Hospitals and Clinics of Minnesota (the hospitals) challenged the 1.56 percent surcharge that Minnesota hospitals pay on “net patient revenues” under Minn. Stat. § 256.9657, subd. 2 (2014). The surcharge is assessed and collected by the Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS).

The hospitals assert that federal law preempts the imposition of the state surcharge on revenues received from federal “program carriers”—private insurance carriers that contract with the federal government to provide health care coverage to federal employees, active military personnel, and others under the Federal Employee Health Benefits Act (FEHBA), see generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901–14 (2012), and the TRICARE program, see generally 10 U.S.C. §§ 1071–1110b (2012). The hospitals contend that the surcharge is a tax that is imposed indirectly on the federal program carriers and is therefore preempted by 5 U.S.C. § 8909(f)(1), 10 U.S.C. § 1103, and federal regulations governing the FEHBA and TRICARE programs. After the appeals were consolidated, the parties filed cross-motions for summary disposition. The Commissioner of Human Services adopted the recommendation of the administrative law judge and dismissed the administrative appeals. The hospitals sought certiorari review of the final agency decision, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that Minn. Stat. § 256.9657, subd. 2, is not preempted by FEHBA or the statute authorizing the TRICARE program.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether federal law prohibits DHS from imposing a 1.56 percent surcharge on net patient revenues received by the hospitals from insurance carriers participating in the FEHBA and TRICARE programs; and (2) whether the hospitals have standing to challenge the surcharge. (Minnesota Department of Human Services)

State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Aloeng Kelly Vang, Appellant – Case Nos. A14-1574, A15-1692:  Appellant Aloeng Kelly Vang was charged by complaint with second-degree murder. Vang had previously admitted that he shot and killed the decedent, and he offered to plead guilty to the charged offense. The State declined the offer and eventually obtained a grand jury indictment charging Vang with first- and second-degree murder. Vang moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that it was not returned within the time period prescribed by the rules of criminal procedure. The district court denied the motion. Vang was found guilty by a jury and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of release.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented:  (1) whether Vang received effective assistance of counsel at his trial; (2) whether the district court erred by denying Vang’s motion to dismiss the indictment; and (3) whether the prosecutors committed prejudicial misconduct during pre-indictment proceedings. (Ramsey County)

Wednesday, April 6, 2016

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

 

County of Aiken, et al., Relators, vs. Blandin Paper Company, Respondent – Case No. A15-1666:  Respondent Blandin Paper Company owns more than 4,000 parcels of land, spread across four counties—Aitkin, Itasca, Koochiching, and St. Louis. On appeal from the counties’ assessments based on the estimated market value of the parcels, the tax court held Blandin’s parcels should be taxed “as a single unit for sustainable timber production,” rather than as individual parcels. Because Blandin’s parcels were spread across 78 separate taxing districts, and the parcels may or may not have been contiguous within a district, an allocation of the value of the property was made for each taxing district. Ultimately, the tax court reduced Blandin’s tax liability for 2010 from approximately $190 million to approximately $50 million, and for 2011 from approximately $189 million to approximately $25 million.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented:  (1) whether a unit rule-based methodology is consistent with the system of property taxation established by the Minnesota Legislature, which mandates taxation of a parcel based on that parcel’s fair market value, rather than an allocated or contributory value; (2) whether the unit rule-based methodology at issue in this case produces results that establish fair market values for individually listed tax parcels; (3) whether the tax court’s decision in this case is contrary to Theobald v. Cty. of Lake, 712 N.W.2d 180 (Minn. 2006), and Marlow Timberland LLC v. Cty. of Lake, 2010 WL 4868020 (Minn. Tx. Ct. 2010); (4) whether the tax court’s adoption of a new standard for valuation and taxation of a portfolio of commonly owned properties intrudes on the Legislature’s sole authority to establish the mode, form, and extent of property taxation in Minnesota; (5) whether the new standard for valuation adopted by the tax court complies with the tax uniformity requirement of Article X, Section 1, of the Minnesota Constitution; (6) whether the tax court erred in reducing value due to a conservation easement sold by Blandin to the State of Minnesota; and (7) whether the tax court erred in denying the counties’ motion to exclude Blandin’s expert reports, denying the counties’ motion to dismiss, and in its evidentiary rulings. (Minnesota Tax Court)

Non-oral: Jerome Emmanuel Davis, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A15-1401: Appellant Jerome Davis was convicted of aiding and abetting first-degree felony murder for the shooting death of Armando Calix. On his direct appeal, in which he was represented by counsel, the supreme court affirmed the conviction. State v. Davis, 820 N.W.2d 525 (Minn. 2012). In 2015, Davis filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief, asserting 15 claims. Of the 15 claims, 13 had been raised by Davis in his direct appeal. His two new claims involved the sufficiency of the evidence and the replaying of his calls from jail during the jury’s deliberations. The State moved to dismiss the petition as both time-barred and procedurally barred. The district court summarily dismissed the petition, concluding that Davis’ claims were either raised or should have been raised on direct appeal; there was no legal excuse for Davis’ failure to raise his two new claims on direct appeal; and all of his claims were procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 243 N.W.2d 737 (1976).

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the district court abused its discretion by summarily denying Davis’ postconviction claims under Knaffla. (Hennepin County)

Thursday, April 7, 2016

Lakeville North High School

 

State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. David Lee Haywood, Appellant – Case No. A14-1792: Following appellant David Haywood’s arrest in January 2013, police found a .177-caliber BB air pistol in the glove compartment of Haywood’s car. As a consequence of his earlier conviction of a “crime of violence,” as defined by Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 5 (2014), Haywood was prohibited from possessing a firearm under Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1a (2014).

The State charged Haywood with possession of a firearm by an ineligible person, Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1b(a) (2014). Haywood moved to dismiss the complaint on two grounds: (1) the BB gun was not a “firearm” for purposes of Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subds. 1a and 1(b), because it uses air, rather than gunpowder, to propel a projectile; and, (2) in the alternative, if the definition of a “firearm” found in Minn. Stat. § 97A.015 (2014), is applied, then Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1b(a), is unconstitutionally vague. The district court denied Haywood’s motion. At Haywood’s subsequent jury trial, the district court instructed the jury that “[a] BB gun is a firearm under Minnesota law.” The jury found Haywood guilty as charged.

The court of appeals affirmed Haywood’s conviction, finding that the BB pistol is a “firearm” notwithstanding the fact it did not use gunpowder as a propellant. It held that in State v. Seifert, 256 N.W.2d 87 (Minn. 1977), the supreme court held that a BB gun that uses CO2 as a propellant is a “firearm” within the definition of “dangerous weapon” in Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 6 (2014); that “Minnesota’s appellate courts have consistently interpreted the term ‘firearm’ as used within certain sections of chapter 609 to include BB guns”; that in Seifert, the court stated the “statutory purpose” required that the term “firearm” be “broadly defined”; and that the legislature’s failure to act in response to that case law indicates its presumptive agreement with the appellate courts’ interpretation.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are: (1) whether a BB gun is a “firearm” for purposes of Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1b; and (2) if a BB gun is a “firearm,” whether section 609.165 is void for vagueness. (Ramsey County)

Monday, April 11, 2016

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

 

Ferdinand Leo Gams, Jr., Respondent/Cross-Appellant, vs. Steven Ronald Houghton, Appellant/Cross-Respondent – Case No. A14-1747:  In March 2013 respondent/cross-appellant Ferdinand Gams commenced a personal injury action against appellant/cross-respondent Steven Houghton. Gams did not file the action until August 2014. The filing of the action was untimely under Minn. R. Civ. P. 5.04, as amended in 2013, which provides generally that “[a]ny action that is not filed with the court within one year of commencement against any party is deemed dismissed with prejudice.” The district court sua sponte ordered the action dismissed with prejudice, and judgment was entered.

Gams filed a motion for relief from the judgment under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 on the ground of excusable neglect. The district court denied the motion, concluding that “Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 does not apply to a Minn. R. Civ. P. 5.04 dismissal.” In the alternative, the district court concluded that Gams “did not prove all four elements in analyzing whether to grant relief in vacating a dismissal with prejudice pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02.” The court of appeals reversed and remanded, directing the district court “to evaluate whether relief from the judgment is appropriate under the circumstances of this case.”

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 applies to a case that is deemed dismissed by operation of Minn. R. Civ. P. 5.04; (2) whether the district court abused its discretion by denying the motion to vacate under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02; and (3) whether the dismissal of the lawsuit without notice and an opportunity to be heard violated the due process rights of Gams. (St. Louis County)

Jerry Wayne Cole, Respondent, vs. Alexander Allen Wutzke, Appellant – Case No. A15-0060: In June 2013 respondent Jerry Cole commenced a civil action by serving a summons and complaint on appellant Alexander Wutzke. Cole did not file the action until after July 1, 2014. Wutzke filed a motion to dismiss the action as untimely under Minn. R. Civ. P. 5.04, as amended in 2013, which provides generally that “[a]ny action that is not filed with the court within one year of commencement against any party is deemed dismissed with prejudice.” Cole filed a motion for relief from the judgment under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 on the ground of excusable neglect. The district court considered Cole’s motion for relief, but determined that ignorance of the law does not constitute excusable neglect. Therefore, the district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that “all of the rule-60.02 factors favor a grant of relief.”

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the case with prejudice and denying relief under Rule 60.02. (Anoka County)

Tuesday, April 12, 2016

University of St. Thomas Law School

 

First Baptist Church of St. Paul, et al., Appellants, vs. City of St. Paul, Respondent – Case No. A15-0015:  Appellants First Baptist Church of St. Paul and Church of St. Mary (“Churches”) are located in the City of St. Paul. Respondent City of St. Paul passed a resolution levying a “right-of-way maintenance” assessment for 2011 against all properties in the City. The assessment is used to fund services to maintain rights of way, including street maintenance, snow-related services, boulevard tree services, street lighting services, traffic sign services, pavement markings, litter pickup, ordinance enforcement, and emergency maintenance service. The money collected through the assessment goes into a designated right-of-way fund and is used to defray the City’s cost to maintain the public rights of way.

The Churches challenged the assessment against them. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, concluding the assessment is a fee for services collected under the City’s police power, rather than a tax on improvements collected pursuant to its taxing power. It therefore evaluated the legality of the assessment using the “reasonableness” test set out in American Bank of St. Paul v. City of Minneapolis, 802 N.W.2d 781, 786 (Minn. App. 2011), rather than the “special benefit test” set out in Carlson-Lang Realty Co. v. City of Windom, 240 N.W.2d 517, 518 (Minn. 1976). The court of appeals affirmed.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the City’s assessment is a fee for services rather than a tax on improvements subject to the “special benefit test.” (Ramsey County)

Wednesday, April 13, 2016

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

 

State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. August Latimothy Fleming, Appellant – Case No. A14-2187:  In connection with a shooting that occurred on a basketball court in a Minneapolis public park, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant August Fleming with second-degree assault and as a prohibited person in possession of a firearm. Fleming pleaded guilty to the charge of prohibited person in possession of a firearm. After waiving his right to a Blakely jury, Fleming admitted that firing the gun in a public park with children present made the risk to others greater than usual. The district court imposed an upward durational sentencing departure, observing that the manner in which Fleming possessed the firearm was more egregious than the typical case because he fired the gun six times in a public park, thereby placing a large number of potential victims in real and significant danger. In the court of appeals, Fleming argued the risk to others could not be used to support the upward departure because the risk was created by conduct underlying the charge of second-degree assault, not the charge of prohibited person in possession of a firearm. The court of appeals affirmed, explaining that the limitation proposed by Fleming was inconsistent with the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 244.10, subd. 5a(b) (2014).

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether Minn. Stat. § 244.10, subd. 5a(b), allows a court to impose an upward durational sentencing departure based on any aggravating factor arising from the same course of conduct. (Hennepin County)

Commissioner of Revenue, Relator, vs. Dahmes Stainless, Inc., Respondent – Case No. A15-1920:  The tax court ruled that relator Commissioner of Revenue erred in assessing respondent Dahmes Stainless, Inc., for additional sales and use tax on purchases of materials and parts used in the manufacture of industrial drying systems. The tax court reasoned that the drying systems “were not used to improve ‘real property’ ” within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 297A.61, subd. 4(d) (2014), which defines a “retail sale” to include sales of building materials, supplies, and equipment when they are used in the “improvement of real property.” The tax court further concluded that Dahmes’s application for attorney fees under the Minnesota Equal Access to Justice Act (MEAJA), Minn. Stat. § 15.472 (2014), was timely and that the commissioner’s position in the litigation was not substantially justified. Ultimately, the tax court awarded Dahmes attorney fees in the amount of $38,677.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented:  (1) whether the tax court lacked jurisdiction to award attorney fees under Minn. Stat. § 15.472 because Dahmes did not file or serve its motion for attorney fees, and did not file or serve an itemized statement from its attorney stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees were computed, until more than 30 days after the tax court filed its order for judgment; (2) whether the tax court abused its discretion by awarding Dahmes attorney fees despite the reasonable basis for the commissioner’s position; (3) whether the tax court erred by using the definition of “real property” in Minn. Stat. § 272.03 (2014) to determine what constituted an “alteration, repair, or improvement of real property” under Minn. Stat. § 297A.61, subd. 4(d), when the definition of “real property” as used in section 297A.61, subdivision 4(d), is defined by Minn. R. 8130.1200, subp. 1(B) (2015); (4) whether the tax court erred by holding that the Minnesota Legislature’s 1985 amendment to the definition of “tangible personal property” in chapter 297A, related to sales and use tax, did not supersede this court’s decision in Zimpro v. Commissioner of Revenue, 339 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1983), which interpreted the definition of tangible personal property for purposes of sales tax; and (5) whether the tax court erred by holding that the common law doctrine of trade fixtures applies to sales and use tax, and encompasses machinery and equipment used in business and production activities regardless of the identity of the parties to the dispute, when prior supreme court precedent has held otherwise. (Minnesota Tax Court)