EN BANC CALENDAR

Before the Minnesota Supreme Court

May 2016

SUMMARY OF ISSUES

Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office

Monday, May 2, 2016

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

 

State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Jacob Miles Solberg, Appellant – Case No. A15-0242: Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Jacob Solberg with third-degree criminal sexual conduct. After a jury trial had begun, Solberg entered a Norgaard guilty plea. The presumptive sentence for someone with Solberg’s criminal-history score of 1 was 53-74 months in prison. At sentencing, Solberg asked for a downward durational departure. The district court granted Solberg’s motion and sentenced him to 30 months in prison. The court’s stated reasons for the departure included Solberg’s remorse. The court of appeals reversed Solberg’s sentence and remanded for resentencing.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether a district court may impose a downward durational departure solely on the basis of the defendant’s remorse. (Polk County)

Nonoral: Mary Cocchiarella, Appellant, vs. Donald Driggs, Respondent – Case No. A14-1876: Appellant Mary Cocchiarella orally agreed with respondent Donald Driggs to rent an apartment from him, and paid him $1,200 each for a first month’s rent and a security deposit, but respondent never allowed her to move in. Appellant brought a petition for unlawful exclusion in the housing court under Minn. Stat. § 504B.375 (2014). The housing court referee dismissed her petition, finding that she was not a “residential tenant” eligible for relief under § 504B.375 because she had never taken physical possession of the premises. The court of appeals affirmed.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether a tenant who never takes actual physical possession of the dwelling in question can be a “residential tenant” under Minn. Stat. § 504B.001, subd. 12 (2014). (Hennepin County)

Tuesday, May 3, 2016

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

 

Jerry Expose, Jr., Respondent, vs. Thad Wilderson & Associates, P.A., Appellant, Nina Mattson, Appellant – Case No. A14-0413: While undergoing court-ordered therapy sessions, respondent Jerry Expose, Jr., made a threat against his child protection caseworker. Appellant Nina Mattson, his therapist, was an intern acting under supervision of appellant clinic Thad Wilderson & Associates, P.A. She was not yet a licensed psychologist but was training to become one. Mattson disclosed Expose’s threat to police and prosecutors, and testified in Expose’s eventual criminal trial for making terroristic threats. The jury found Expose guilty, but the court of appeals reversed, finding that Mattson’s testimony violated Expose’s confidentiality rights, including the psychologist-patient privilege. This court affirmed the court of appeals’ decision, but held that the privilege did not extend to third parties. State v. Expose, 872 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 2015).

In the current case, Expose sued Mattson and the clinic for disclosing his threat, based on theories of invasion of privacy and violation of the Minnesota Health Records Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 144.291-.298 (2014). The district court found that Mattson was entitled to statutory immunity under Minn. Stat. § 148.975 (2014), as well as judicial immunity, and that a “Client Rights and Responsibilities Form” that Expose signed when he began treatment at the clinic was a valid consent under the Minnesota Health Records Act. Although the court of appeals agreed that Mattson was entitled to judicial immunity for her in-court statements, it reversed on the other issues and remanded for trial.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented include: whether Mattson, who was not a licensed psychologist, and/or the clinic were eligible for immunity under Minn. Stat. § 148.975, which by its terms applies to “licensees”; whether Mattson was entitled to judicial immunity for her out-of-court statements; and whether the client rights form Expose signed was a valid consent under Minn. Stat. § 144.293, subd. 2 (2014). (Ramsey County)

Nonoral: Macy’s Retail Holdings, Inc., Relator, vs. County of Hennepin, Respondent – Case No. A16-0044: The parties disputed the value, for taxation purposes, of the property containing the downtown Minneapolis Macy’s department store. The only issue at trial was the fair market value of the subject property as of three dates, the second of January in 2008, 2009, and 2010.

Relator Macy’s and respondent Hennepin County submitted competing expert opinions regarding the value of the property. Prior to trial, Macy’s sought to subpoena Hennepin County’s expert’s work file. The tax court eventually ordered the parties to exchange their respective appraisers’ work files, containing all the information on which each expert relied in preparing his appraisal report, in order to allow each party time to prepare for cross-examination of the opposing expert. The tax court found that Hennepin County’s expert did not disclose the entire contents of his work file. The tax court denied Macy’s motions to strike portions of Hennepin County’s expert’s report for this failure to disclose.

Both experts agreed that under its highest and best use, the subject property would be torn down and redeveloped, but they disagreed about when the redevelopment would occur. Macy’s expert concluded the subject property would not be a candidate for redevelopment until 2013, and thus the value of the property would be based solely on land value less the costs of demolition. Hennepin County’s expert determined that construction could begin in late 2009. The tax court agreed with Hennepin County’s expert.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented include: whether the tax court’s decision that construction on the subject property could begin in late 2009 was reasonably supported by the evidence in the record, taken as a whole; whether the tax court’s failure to strike portions of Hennepin County’s expert report was erroneous; and whether the tax court erroneously failed to consider certain comparable sales in assessing the value of the subject land. (Minnesota Tax Court)

Wednesday, May 4, 2016

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

 

Prentis Cordell Jackson, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A14-2060: A jury found appellant Prentiss Jackson guilty of first-degree premeditated murder and second-degree murder, based in part on the testimony of Alfred Lamar, the only witness who testified he saw Jackson commit the crime. At the time the crime in question occurred, Jackson was 17 years old. The district court sentenced Jackson to a mandatory sentence of life in prison without possibility of release, and the supreme court affirmed. State v. Jackson, 746 N.W.2d 894 (Minn. 2008).

In 2012 the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012). Later in 2012, Lamar recanted his trial testimony. In 2013, Jackson filed a petition for postconviction relief, challenging his conviction on the grounds of false and recanted trial testimony and newly discovered evidence, and challenging his sentence under the rule in Miller. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied relief.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issues include: whether Lamar’s recantations entitle Jackson to a new trial; whether Miller applies retroactively; and if Miller applies retroactively, what remedy is available to Jackson. The court heard oral argument on August 31, 2015. Then on January 25, 2016, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), which addressed the retroactivity question. The supreme court called for supplemental briefing addressing the impact of Montgomery on the claims for relief and potential remedies in this case. (Hennepin County)

Nonoral: Kent Richard Jones, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A15-1973: In 2001, a jury found appellant Kent Jones guilty in connection with the 1992 rape and murder of Linda Jensen of first-degree murder while committing criminal sexual conduct, second-degree intentional murder, and first-degree criminal sexual conduct. The supreme court reversed Jones’ conviction due to evidentiary errors and ordered a new trial. After a second trial, the jury found Jones guilty of the same charges, and the supreme court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal.

In 2015 Jones filed a postconviction petition, alleging that scientific evidence regarding the state of the crime scene establishes that he is actually innocent. Although Jones admitted having consensual sex with Jensen on the date of her murder, he claimed that the evidence establishes that she was killed significantly later than the time they had sex. The district court denied the petition without a hearing.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issues include: whether the petition was untimely under the 2-year limitations period in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2014); whether the limitations period is an unconstitutional ex post facto law; whether the petition is procedurally barred under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2014) and the decision in State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 262, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976), because the claims could have been raised in Jones’s direct appeal; and whether Jones is entitled to relief on the basis that he established his actual innocence. (Sherburne County)

Tuesday, May 10, 2016

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

 

Junious Taylor, Jr., Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A14-1936: Appellant Junious Taylor, Jr., pleaded guilty to felony domestic assault. At the time of the plea, Taylor did not know that upon conviction he would be required to register as a predatory offender under Minn. Stat. § 243.167 (2012). Taylor’s attorney, the prosecutor, and the district court were also unaware of this consequence. Approximately three months after Taylor was sentenced, a county probation official notified the court of its failure to include the registration requirement as part of Taylor’s sentence. At a hearing a short time later, the court informed Taylor of the registration requirement.

Taylor moved to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that (1) his attorney was constitutionally ineffective when he failed to advise Taylor that registration would be a consequence of the plea; and (2) the plea was unintelligent in light of his ignorance of the registration requirement. The district court denied relief. The court of appeals affirmed the district court.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether Taylor’s guilty plea is invalid due to ineffective assistance of counsel where his attorney failed to advise him that by pleading guilty to felony domestic assault he would be required to register as a predatory offender. (Ramsey County)

City of Oronoco, Respondent, vs. Fitzpatrick Real Estate, LLC, et al., Respondents, vs. Whitney National Bank of New Orleans, Louisiana, Appellant – Case No. A15‑0055: Respondents Daniel Fitzpatrick and several of his associated entities obtained a money judgment for approximately $149,000 in damages against respondent the City of Oronoco. Respondent O’Brien & Wolf, L.L.P. represented Fitzpatrick in the litigation beginning in October of 2010, and claims an entitlement to approximately $38,000 in attorney fees. Previously, appellant Whitney National Bank had obtained a judgment against Fitzpatrick in an entirely separate matter in the amount of approximately $273,000. Whitney docketed its judgment in the Olmsted County district court in 2009.

Whitney and O’Brien each claim a superior right to any payment made by the City to Fitzpatrick. Whitney served a garnishment summons on the City on June 18, 2014, seeking to garnish the funds. O’Brien served a Notice of Attorney Lien on the City on June 30, 2014, and recorded a UCC Financing Statement with the Secretary of State on July 2, 2014. The district court determined that Whitney’s garnishment lien had been perfected on June 18, 2014, and was therefore superior to O’Brien’s attorney lien, which it determined was perfected, at the earliest, on June 30, 2014. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that under the attorney lien statute, Minn. Stat. § 481.13, subd. 1 (2014), a “cause of action” lien attached at the time O’Brien noticed its representation, and that lien took priority over Whitney’s subsequently perfected garnishment lien.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is when a “cause-of-action” attorney lien under Minn. Stat. § 481.13, subd. 1(a)(1), becomes effective. (Olmsted County)

Wednesday, May 11, 2016

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

 

State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Marlon Rashaad Robertson, Appellant – Case No. A14-2130: A jury found appellant Marlon Robertson guilty of first-degree murder in the shooting death of Kevin Braziel, and the district court sentenced Robertson to life in prison without the possibility of relief.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented include: whether the evidence was sufficient to support Robertson’s conviction; whether Robertson is entitled to a new trial because of the district court’s evidentiary rulings regarding the inadmissibility of the statement and the non-identification by a deceased eyewitness; whether Robertson was denied the right to effective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not attempt to interview a witness; and whether the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012), holding that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders, applies to Robertson, who was 22 at the time of the offense. (Hennepin County)

Nonoral: Lincoln Lamar Caldwell, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A15-1587: In 2008, a jury found appellant Lincoln Caldwell guilty of aiding and abetting first degree premeditated murder for the benefit of a gang. The supreme court affirmed Caldwell’s conviction, as well as the denial of his first two petitions for postconviction relief.

In 2012, Caldwell filed a third petition for post-conviction relief asserting that three of the State’s trial witnesses allegedly provided false material testimony at the 2008 trial. He supported the petition with recorded statements the three witnesses had given to an investigator. The district court denied the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. The supreme court reversed and remanded with instructions to hold a hearing on Caldwell’s claim of witness recantation.

At the hearing, Caldwell was unable to produce one of the alleged recanting witnesses, but sought to introduce a transcript of the recorded statement. The district court ruled that this hearsay statement was inadmissible. The district court heard the testimony of a second witness. At the outset of the testimony of the third witness, the court advised the witness, who was not represented by counsel, of his right to remain silent, and told the witness that the State had specifically mentioned the possibility of perjury charges if the witness testified differently than he had at trial. After the witness had testified for some time, he asked if he could “plead the Fifth or something like that.” The court elected to recess the hearing to allow the witness the opportunity to consult with counsel. When the hearing was reconvened, the witness invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to answer any more questions. Based on these circumstances, the court found that the witness had not made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights, and struck the witness’s testimony from the record. The district court denied the postconviction petition, finding Caldwell has not met his burden of showing he was entitled to a new trial.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the district court’s or the prosecutor’s conduct during the postconviction hearing was improper. (Hennepin County)