EN BANC CALENDAR

Before the Minnesota Supreme Court

June 2017

SUMMARY OF ISSUES

Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office

Monday, June 5, 2017

Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor

State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Juanel Anthony Mikulak, Appellant – Case No. A15-1701: Appellant Juanel Mikulak pleaded guilty to knowingly violating the predatory-offender registration statute, Minn. Stat. § 243.166 (2016). Mikulak appealed his conviction, arguing that his guilty plea was invalid because his factual basis failed to establish that he knew he was required to register within 24 hours of his arrival in Renville County. The court of appeals affirmed, explaining that although Mikulak was mistaken about how quickly he needed to register, he knew he was required to register.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the court of appeals misinterpreted the phrase “knowingly violates” as used in Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a). (Renville County)

Jamil Joshua Eason, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A16-1647: Appellant Jamil Eason was charged with second-degree intentional murder and indicted for first-degree felony murder in connection with the death of Jay Rosio. After failed plea negotiations, the case proceeded to a jury trial. The district court instructed the jury on first-degree felony murder and second-degree intentional murder. The jury acquitted Eason of second-degree intentional murder, but found him guilty of first-degree felony murder. Eason filed a notice of appeal with the supreme court and, through his attorney, filed a brief; Eason subsequently voluntarily dismissed the appeal.

In 2016, Eason filed a pro se postconviction petition and motion for the appointment of counsel. The postconviction court denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing and without appointing counsel. After Eason filed a pro se notice of appeal, the Chief Appellate Public Defender agreed to provide representation.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the postconviction court erred by not appointing an attorney to represent Eason; (2) whether the district court erred by not instructing the jury on requested lesser-included offenses; (3) whether the State abused its prosecutorial discretion in withdrawing a plea offer; and (4) whether Eason was denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. (Hennepin County)

 

Tuesday, June 6, 2017

Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor

State of Minnesota, Respondent/Cross-Appellant vs. Devon Derrick Parker, Appellant/Cross-Respondent – Case No. A15-1417: The State charged Devon Parker with several offenses, including second-degree intentional murder. During a pretrial press conference, the county attorney made several comments about the case, including a comment that described the victim as a “Good Samaritan.” Following the press conference, the media ran a number of stories that used the phrase “Good Samaritan.” Parker filed a motion to change venue, arguing that several of the comments made by the county attorney at the press conference were improper and the media coverage of the comments created a reasonable likelihood that a fair trial could not be held in Hennepin County. The district court denied the motion to change venue, and a jury later found Parker guilty of second-degree intentional murder. The court imposed a 480-month sentence, which was an upward durational sentencing departure. The court of appeals affirmed Parker’s conviction, but reversed his sentence.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the county attorney committed misconduct during the press conference; (2) whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Parker’s motion to change venue; and (3) whether the court of appeals erred when it reversed Parker’s sentence. (Hennepin County)

Daniel M. Ansello, Respondent vs. Wisconsin Central, Ltd. and Discover Re Acclaim Risk Management, Relators, and Essentia Health System, Intervenor – Case No. A17-0340: Respondent Daniel Ansello suffered a back injury in 2006 while working as a longshoreman in Duluth. He pursued a claim for benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901–950 (2012) (LHWCA). Ansello later filed a claim for benefits under the Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 176.001–.862 (2016), seeking medical expense benefits for a surgery in 2014 that he claimed arose from his work injury in 2006. The compensation judge dismissed Ansello’s claim for state benefits based on his “ability to be fully compensated” under the LHWCA. The compensation judge also dismissed the claim sua sponte under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reversed and remanded, concluding that Ansello’s claim under state law merely supplements the benefits available under the LHWCA. The WCCA also concluded that “[t]here is nothing inconvenient about trying the employee’s claim for Minnesota benefits in a Minnesota workers’ compensation forum rather than in the federal system.”

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the Office of Administrative Hearings is required to exercise jurisdiction over an employee’s claim for medical benefits where the employee has already claimed and received medical benefits under the LHWCA; (2) whether the compensation judge had discretion and authority to dismiss the employee’s claim under the doctrine of forum non conveniens; and (3) whether the employee may simultaneously litigate claims for benefits under state law and under the LHWCA. (Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals)

 

Wednesday, June 7, 2017

Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor 

In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Mpatanishi Syanaloli Tayari Garrett, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 0342075 – Case No. A15-1814: Respondent Mpatanishi Syanaloli Tayari Garrett was licensed to practice law in Minnesota in 2014. The supreme court indefinitely suspended respondent from the practice of law in July 2015, and she remains suspended.

On November 6, 2015, the Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility filed a petition for disciplinary action against respondent. The allegations in the petition relate to respondent’s actions in a bankruptcy proceeding in Texas and her failure to cooperate with a disciplinary investigation. After the Director presented evidence that respondent could not be found in the state to respond to the petition for disciplinary action, see Rule 12(c)(1), Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility, the supreme court gave respondent 1 year in which to file a motion for leave to answer the petition for disciplinary action. On December 1, 2016, the supreme court granted respondent’s motion for leave to answer the petition for disciplinary action. After the petition in this matter was filed, a disciplinary proceeding began in Texas related to respondent’s conduct in the Texas bankruptcy matter.

Presently before the supreme court is respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition for disciplinary action for lack of personal jurisdiction and objection to simultaneous prosecution of dual proceedings. The following issues are presented in the motion: (1) whether the supreme court lacks personal jurisdiction over respondent because she is a Texas resident and the misconduct alleged in the petition occurred in Texas; and (2) whether this case should be stayed until the Texas disciplinary proceeding has concluded.

State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Thomas Michael Luby, Appellant – Case No. A16-1213: Appellant Thomas Luby was charged with second-degree intentional murder and indicted for first-degree premeditated murder in connection with the stabbing death of Kelly Anderson. A jury trial took place. Luby did not dispute that he caused Anderson’s death, but he claimed that he had been on a drinking binge and was intoxicated at the time of his actions. During closing argument, Luby’s counsel told the jury, “We’re not really disputing the premeditation part,” stating that the “intent element is the one that’s in question here.” When the State began its rebuttal by indicating that the defense had conceded premeditation, Luby’s counsel immediately objected. The district court instructed the jury to “rely on their recollection of the arguments and the facts in the case.” The jury found Luby guilty of first-degree premeditated murder and second-degree intentional murder.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether Luby was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel because his counsel conceded the premeditation element. (Dakota County)

Thursday, June 8, 2017

Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor

State of Minnesota, Appellant vs. Quentin Todd Chute, Respondent – Case No. A15-2053: A citizen reported to police that he was driving on a public road when he saw his stolen camper trailer in someone else’s backyard. An officer arrived and confirmed the make and model of the trailer were the same as the stolen trailer. The officer and the citizen entered the property and walked down a dirt driveway toward the back of the lot, where the camper was parked. As they neared the trailer, the citizen visually confirmed the trailer was his. Upon reaching the camper, the officer inspected the VIN and determined it belonged to the citizen. The officer entered the trailer and found personal property belonging to the citizen. The officer located respondent Quentin Chute in an adjacent garage and arrested him after finding additional property belonging to the citizen in the garage.

After being charged with receiving stolen property, Chute moved to suppress the evidence as the fruit of an unlawful warrantless search and seizure. The district court denied the motion, holding that the trailer was in “plain view.” Chute was convicted as charged.

The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. Relying on Florida v. Jardines, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013), the court held that the plain-view doctrine did not apply because the incriminating nature of the camper was apparent only after the officer entered Chute’s property, the place from which the officer was able to confirm the camper was stolen was not impliedly open to the public, and the officer had no lawful right of access to the camper.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that Jardines limits the application of the plain-view exception; (2) whether the court of appeals’ interpretation of Jardines can be reconciled with this court’s decisions in State v. Crea, 233 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1975), and State v. Krech, 403 N.W.2d 634 (Minn. 1987); and (3) whether the citizen’s identification of the camper from the public road was sufficient to establish probable cause to believe the camper was evidence of a crime. (Ramsey County)

Nonoral: In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct in Panel File No. 41310 – Case No. A17-0160: Based on the instruction of a reviewing board member of the Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board (LPRB), see Rule 8(e)(3), Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility (RLPR), the Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility issued a private admonition against respondent for disclosing confidential information regarding a former client to an insurance adjustor, in violation of Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.9(c)(2). Respondent demanded that charges of unprofessional conduct be submitted to a panel of the LPRB. See Rule 8(d)(2)(iii), RLPR. Following a hearing, the panel affirmed the admonition.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the reviewing board member or the panel violated Rule 8(e), RLPR, by failing to adequately explain the basis for their decision; (2) whether the panel clearly erred in finding that respondent disclosed confidential information regarding a former client, in violation of Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.9(c)(2); and (3) whether the specific facts and circumstances of this case support a determination that discipline is not warranted even if respondent violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.9(c)(2).