EN BANC CALENDAR

Before the Minnesota Supreme Court

January 2016

SUMMARY OF ISSUES

Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office

Monday, January 4, 2016

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

 

State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Julian Sanchez-Sanchez, Appellant – Case No. A14-0584:  Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Julian Sanchez-Sanchez with a controlled-substance crime and provided him notice of its intent to seek an upward durational sentencing departure based on three aggravating factors.  After pleading guilty to the charged offense, appellant waived his right to a jury trial under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and the aggravating factor issue was tried to the district court.  At the Blakely court trial, an FBI agent testified about the circumstances surrounding the offense.  After finding the existence of three aggravating sentencing factors, the court imposed a 240-month sentence, which reflected an upward durational departure.  The court of appeals affirmed, concluding in part that the district court’s admission of hearsay testimony by the FBI agent did not constitute plain error because the Minnesota Rules of Evidence do not apply to Blakely court trials.  

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the Minnesota Rules of Evidence apply to Blakely court trials.  (Hennepin County)

State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Shavelle Oscar Chavez-Nelson, Appellant – Case No. A15-0251:  Following a jury trial, appellant Shavelle Chavez-Nelson was convicted of first-degree murder in connection with the shooting death of Palagor Jobi outside of Nina’s Grill in Burnsville, Minnesota.  On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented include the following: (1) whether the district court improperly denied Chavez-Nelson’s request to have advisory counsel assume representation of his case; (2) whether three evidentiary rulings, individually or taken as a whole, denied Chavez-Nelson a fair trial; and (3) whether the district court improperly denied Chavez-Nelson’s request for a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of first-degree manslaughter.  (Dakota County)

 

Tuesday, January 5, 2016

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

Nathan Kariniemi, et al., Appellants vs. City of Rockford, Respondent – Case No. A14-0796:  Appellants Nathan and Sanna Kariniemi resided in a home in respondent City of Rockford.  Acting as City Engineer, a contract engineering firm designed and approved storm-drainage improvements for a development near the Kariniemis’ property.  After their property experienced flooding, the Kariniemis asserted negligence and nuisance claims against the City.  Among other allegations, the Kariniemis claimed that the City had negligently designed and approved an inadequate storm-drainage system.  The district court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment on the negligent design claim based on official immunity and vicarious official immunity; however, the district court found that the City failed to timely raise an immunity defense with regard to the nuisance claim and denied summary judgment on that claim.  The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment on the negligent design claim, holding that “official immunity protects contractors when they are functioning as city officials,” but reversed the denial of summary judgment on the nuisance claim and remanded for dismissal.   

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether official immunity should be extended to a municipality’s contract engineering firm when the firm’s personnel were not employees of the municipality; (2) whether the court of appeals properly ordered dismissal of the nuisance claim, and (3) whether official immunity implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court and thus cannot be waived or forfeited by a municipal defendant.  (Wright County)

State of Minnesota, Appellant vs. Douglas John Olson, Respondent – Case No. A14-1482:  Appellant State of Minnesota charged respondent Douglas Olson with driving while impaired.  A jury trial was scheduled for January 23, 2014.  The day before trial, the prosecutor learned that the State’s sole witness, the state trooper who had stopped Olson, was in another state for a job interview and would be unable to appear at trial.  When the parties appeared for trial, the prosecutor informed the district court that the State’s sole witness was unavailable and asked for a continuance.  The prosecutor informed the court that if it denied the motion for a continuance, he would dismiss the case under Minn. R. Crim. P. 30.01 and then refile it.  Olson asked the district court to dismiss the case on its own motion.  The district court denied the motion for a continuance and Olson’s motion to dismiss.  The prosecutor then dismissed the charges.

          On February 5, 2014, the State refiled the charges.  Olson filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice, arguing that the prosecutor had acted in bad faith by dismissing and refiling the charges after the district court had denied the State’s motion for a continuance.  The district court denied the motion, concluding the prosecutor had not acted in bad faith in dismissing the charges and then refiling them.  Olson was later convicted of driving while impaired.  In a published decision, the court of appeals reversed Olson’s conviction. 

          On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the district court abused its discretion by finding the prosecutor did not act in bad faith when the prosecutor dismissed the charges pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 30.01 and then refiled them after the State’s motion for a continuance was denied.  (Hennepin County)

 

Wednesday, January 6, 2016

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

Virgenia M. Ryan, Respondent vs. Potlatch Corporation and Self-Insured/Comp Cost, Inc., Relators – Case No. A15-1404:  Respondent Virgenia Ryan sustained a low back injury in 2002 while working for relator Potlatch Corporation.  The parties entered into a stipulation for settlement in 2003, which recited that it constituted a full, final, and complete settlement of all claims for workers’ compensation benefits related to the 2002 injury, with the exception of future reasonable and necessary medical expenses. 

Ryan filed a new claim petition in 2013, alleging consequential depression as a result of her 2002 back injury and seeking permanent total disability benefits.  Potlatch moved to dismiss, arguing that the 2003 settlement precluded the claim.  Potlach also argued that Ryan had to move to vacate the 2003 settlement before she could proceed with the new claim petition.  The compensation judge denied Potlatch’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Ryan had developed a “consequential” injury that was not merely an extension of her psychological condition at the time of the 2002 injury, and therefore the settlement did not need to be vacated to pursue the current claim.  The workers’ compensation court of appeals (WCCA) affirmed.  

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the WCCA erred in its application of Sweep v. Hanson Silo Co., 391 N.W.2d 817 (Minn. 1986), holding that a stipulation for settlement resulting from arms-length negotiations is impermissibly broad where it forecloses claims for consequential injuries arising from the primary work injury, but not in dispute at the time of settlement; and (2) whether the WCCA decision bypasses and nullifies the procedures in Minn. Stat. § 176.521 (2014), creating an extra-statutory procedure through which the employee is not required to file a petition to vacate an award where she alleges post-settlement entitlement to benefits due to a change in her medical condition not reasonably foreseeable at the time of settlement.  (Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals)

Jedidiah Dean Troxel, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A15-1294:  A jury found appellant Jedidiah Troxel guilty of first-degree murder involving criminal sexual conduct in connection with the death of Tanya Kazmierczak.  The district court subsequently denied Troxel’s petition for postconviction relief. 

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the district court judge was disqualified from presiding over Troxel’s trial because the judge was actively negotiating for a job as a prosecutor in a neighboring county; (2) whether the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of second-degree intentional murder, and (3) whether the district court violated Troxel’s right to present a defense by prohibiting him from introducing evidence of an alternative perpetrator.  (Pennington County)

 

Thursday, January 7, 2016

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

Jennifer L. DeCook, et al., Respondents/Cross-Appellants vs. Olmsted Medical Center, Brenda J. Hanson, R.N., and Darlene M. Pratt, R.N., Appellants/Cross-Respondents, Kenneth M. Palmer, M.D., Jack F. Perrone, M.D., Kimberly McKeon, M.D., and Ashley Morrow, R.N., Cross-Respondents – Case No. A14-1180:  Members of the DeCook family sued Olmsted Medical Center, and medical professionals connected with it, on claims of medical malpractice.  The DeCooks mailed a summons and complaint to the Medical Center, and personally served two of the individual defendants.  The summons was signed by one of the DeCooks’ attorneys who at the time was not licensed to practice law in Minnesota.  The district court denied a motion to dismiss filed by the Medical Center and the two individual defendants based on the lack of a Minnesota attorney’s signature.  Instead, the district court found that the lack of a signature was not fatal, and it exercised its discretion under Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.07 to allow the summons to be amended.  The court of appeals affirmed.

The DeCooks did not personally serve the remaining individual defendants.  Instead, they e-mailed a copy of the summons and complaint to the Medical Center’s Compliance Officer, who signed and returned an acceptance of service and gave copies to the remaining individual defendants.  The Compliance Officer stated that she was “authorized to accept service” for certain defendants.  The district court granted these defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that there was inadequate support in the record for the proposition that these defendants authorized the Compliance Officer to accept service on their behalf, and finding that the Compliance Officer was not within the class of agents authorized by Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(a) to accept service.  The court of appeals affirmed.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented include the following: (1) whether a summons and complaint signed by an attorney not licensed to practice law in Minnesota is a legal nullity, or whether the lack of a Minnesota-licensed attorney’s signature is a curable defect; (2) if it is a curable defect, whether the test set out in Save Our Creeks v. City of Brooklyn Park, 699 N.W.2d 307 (Minn. 2005), governs whether leave to amend the summons should be granted; (3) whether the individual defendants were properly served, under common-law principles of agency, by service upon the Compliance Officer, or under a theory of consent, waiver, or estoppel; and (4) whether the DeCooks were entitled to further discovery regarding service-related issues.  (Olmsted County)

Nonoral:  Thomas Lee Fairbanks, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A15-1648:  A jury found appellant Thomas Fairbanks guilty of first-degree murder of a peace officer and a number of other felony offenses in connection with the shooting death of Mahnomen County Deputy Sheriff Christopher Lee Dewey.  On direct appeal, the supreme court affirmed the judgment of conviction, except for one first-degree assault conviction.  In 2015, Fairbanks filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief.  The postconviction court denied the petition in its entirety.  

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether Fairbanks’ claims are procedurally barred by Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2014), or State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976); (2) whether the postconviction court erred in concluding that Fairbanks’ ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim is meritless; and (3) whether Fairbanks’ other claims are deemed waived based on his failure to provide facts, discernible legal argument, or relevant legal authority for the claims.  (Mahnomen County)

 

Monday, January 11, 2016

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

 

Kimberly-Clark Corporation & Subsidiaries, Relators vs. Commissioner of Revenue, Respondent – Case No. A15-1322:  Relators Kimberly-Clark Corporation and Subsidiaries (collectively, Kimberly-Clark) filed corporate franchise tax refund claims for 2007, 2008, and 2009, which were based on the apportionment formula set forth in the Multistate Tax Compact, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 290.171, Articles III and IV (1986).  Respondent Commissioner of Revenue denied the refund claims on the ground that the Legislature had repealed the Compact election and apportionment formula in 1987.  On cross-motions for summary judgment, the tax court, sitting en banc, granted the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment and denied Kimberly-Clark’s motion for summary judgment.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the Multistate Tax Compact is a valid and binding interstate compact; (2) whether the Legislature’s repeal of Articles III and IV of the Compact violated the terms of the Compact; and (3) whether the Legislature’s repeal of Articles III and IV of the Compact violated the Contract Clause of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions.  (Minnesota Tax Court)

State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Marcus Michael Barshaw, Appellant – Case No. A15-0483:  A Stearns County grand jury indicted appellant Marcus Barshaw on four charges that included first-degree premeditated murder in connection with the death of Jeffery Schutz, and first-degree assault, use or attempted use of deadly force against Stearns County Deputy Sheriff Chad Meemken.  The district court found Barshaw guilty of all charges. 

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the State’s evidence failed to establish premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) whether the State’s evidence failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Barshaw attempted to use deadly force against Deputy Meemken.  (Stearns County)

 

Tuesday, January 12, 2016

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

State of Minnesota, Appellant vs. Tyler Thomas Devries Morse, Respondent – Case No. A14-1202:  Appellant State of Minnesota charged respondent Tyler Morse with second-degree driving while impaired (DWI).  Before trial, Morse moved to suppress the State’s evidence, arguing that the arresting officer lacked a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity when he stopped Morse’s vehicle.  The district court denied the suppression motion in part based on Morse’s violation of the wide-turn statute, Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 1(a) (2012).  Following a stipulated-facts trial, Morse was convicted of second-degree DWI.  The court of appeals reversed the denial of Morse’s motion to suppress, holding that the wide-turn statute must be narrowly construed to avoid the risk of unconstitutional vagueness and that when so construed, the arresting officer did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether it is proper for the court of appeals to question sua sponte the constitutionality of a statute; and (2) whether the court of appeals properly applied a narrowing construction to the wide-turn statute.  (Nobles County)

In re the Marriage of: Christine J. Curtis, Appellant vs. Gregory M. Curtis, Respondent – Case No. A14-1841:  The district court dissolved the parties’ 23-year marriage.  The parties stipulated to a division of assets, but reserved for trial the question of spousal maintenance under Minn. Stat. § 518.552 (2014).  The district court awarded no maintenance to the former wife, concluding that the assets allocated to her, if moved into higher-yielding investments, were capable of producing income in excess of her reasonable expenses.  The court of appeals affirmed. 

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether in determining if a party has demonstrated a need for spousal maintenance, the court should consider potential earnings that may be realized by reinvesting marital property apportioned to that party.  (Brown County)

 

Wednesday, January 13, 2016

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

Wayzata Nissan, LLC, Appellant vs. Nissan North America, Inc., Respondent, Stephen J. McDaniels, et al., Respondents – Case No. A14-1652:  In July 2014, appellant Wayzata Nissan, LLC, brought an action under the Minnesota Motor Vehicle Sale and Distribution Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 80E.01–.18 (2014), seeking to prevent respondent Nissan North America, Inc., from relocating a Bloomington Nissan dealership to Eden Prairie.  The district court denied Wayzata Nissan’s motion for a temporary restraining order and an expedited good-cause hearing, concluding that the planned relocation falls within the scope of the “existing dealer” exception in Minn. Stat. § 80E.14.  The court of appeals affirmed.   

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether a manufacturer’s formation of an intention to relocate or establish a dealership triggers the manufacturer’s obligation to provide notice of its intention under Minn. Stat. § 80E.14; and (2) whether the “existing dealer” exception in Minn. Stat. § 80E.14 applies only to dealers and not to dealerships.  (Hennepin County)

State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Anthony James Cox, Appellant – Case No. A15-0085:  A grand jury indicted appellant Anthony Cox on one count of first-degree premeditated murder and other charges in connection with the death of Aaron Moran.  The district court denied Cox’s motion to suppress a statement that he gave during a police interrogation after his arrest.  Following a jury trial, the district court adjudicated Cox guilty of all charges.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the district court erred by denying Cox’s motion to suppress his statement; and (2) whether the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to establish premeditation.  (Scott County)