

SECURITY FOR COURT INTERPRETERS



**National Association of
Judiciary Interpreters and Translators**



United States Marshals Service



National Center for State Courts

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SECURITY FOR COURT INTERPRETERS

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DISCLAIMER AND IMPORTANT NOTICE

Security for Court Interpreters is a general resource, reference and platform for training interpreters at the national, state and local levels on court security issues. Specifically, this manual will provide interpreters with general information on security principles, assist them in assessing their own security situation, as well as offer some professionally supported risk reduction techniques. Additionally, it's my hope that this manual will foster cooperation between court interpreters and court security professionals.

Information and opinions expressed in this manual do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Judiciary, the U.S. Department of Justice, the United States Marshals Service, the National Center for State Courts, NAJIT or the author.

There is no endorsement, expressed or implied, of commercial products represented in this manual.

This manual is not a substitute for specific planning based on individual situations and local risk assessments. Furthermore, this manual is not a comprehensive guide to every contingency and risk faced by the court interpreter across a range of possible situations. Always follow the instructions and policies of court security officers, law enforcement and other officials.

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***To members of the court family who gave
their lives in the service of justice.***

Photo Not Available in this Version

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This manual would not be possible without the hard work and dedication of numerous professionals throughout the United States.

The seed for the manual was planted in May 2005 – the result of a chance conversation on the topic of court security with two U.S. Marshals: Mr. Adrian Collins and Mr. Shannon Nash. And, although there are too many to name here, every U.S. Marshal and CSO offered encouragement for this project. Thanks to everyone at the Corpus Christi and Victoria Divisions for your help and assistance.

My advisors for this manual provided support every step of the way. The Chief Judge for the Southern District of Texas, the Honorable Hayden Head; the Honorable Janis Graham Jack and the Honorable John D. Rainey took time from their busy schedules to review the contents of this manual. It's a privilege to serve as an interpreter in their courtrooms and I'm thankful every day for that opportunity.

The U.S. Marshals Service provided valuable input and review of the contents of this manual for accuracy and completeness. Ms. Wanda Price and Mr. Carlos Trevizo spent their own time working on this project. I couldn't have completed this manual without them. Their dedication to keeping the court family safe is exemplary.

Mr. Timothy Fautsko, an expert on court security for the National Center for State Courts, lent a hand to review the contents of the manual from a state and local court point of view. He works with courts throughout the United States and the world and he's frequently featured in the media, including CNN. He offered valuable input on this project. I appreciate his comments, efforts, time and devotion.

Mr. Scott Henry, Photo Editor of the Marin Independent Journal, allowed the use of the Judge Haley photograph for this manual and for the court security training presentation. Understandably, it was a very difficult decision for him and their newspaper. I made an editorial decision to limit the use of the Judge Haley photograph to the court security presentation and to select versions of the manual out of respect for his memory and the survivors of that day in 1970.

I'm indebted to the following individuals from the U.S. Marshals Service for their direct or indirect support of this manual and security presentation: Ms. Lydia K. Blakey, Chief, Court Security Program, Judicial Security Division; Ms. Elizabeth Saenz, Chief Deputy; Mr. Don Hines and Ms. Mavis DeZulovich of the Office of Public Affairs and Mr. David Turk, Historian.

Several companies and individuals provided additional photographs for the manual. Mr. Jim Kroncke, Vice President of Marketing for Nova Technologies, provided photos of the RACC Stun Belt. Mr. Josh St. Alban of Stinger™ Systems allowed the

use of photos of the Band It™ stun device. Terri McGee of C & S Security, Inc. allowed the use of photos of their cuffs and security covers. Mr. Peter B. Gill of the Peerless® Handcuff Company provided photos of their security chain systems.

Mr. Jim Willet, Director of the Texas Prison Museum, took several photos of shanks and other improvised weapons on display at the museum. He even went back to take some extra photos on request. He is the former unit warden at Huntsville, Texas and is the co-author of *Warden: Prison Life and Death from the Inside Out*. He's been featured on C-SPAN, National Public Radio's *Morning Edition* and in the New York Times.

Ms. Carolyn Duncan and Mr. Sandeep Kaushik of King County, Seattle, Washington authorized the use of the amazing courthouse earthquake photos. Thanks!

Several government agencies were the source of photos and/or graphics for this manual: U.S. Geological Survey, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive.

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Public Information Officer Don Martin of the Tyler Police Department, Tyler, Texas provided some of the information and content that appears in this manual and in the court security presentation. I thank him for his time and efforts.

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I'd like to thank my husband Rick for his unlimited support of this manual. He often contacted agencies when I was unable to do so and didn't flinch as expenses for this project continued to mount. He always responded, "This is important!"

Since the inception of our nation many members of the immediate and extended court family gave their lives or suffered injuries from violent acts while serving in or supporting the judicial branch of government. We honor their sacrifices.

Lorena P. Martin
May 2006

PHOTOGRAPHS

San Quentin inmate James McClain leads Superior Court Judge Harold Haley with a shotgun taped around his neck. Both men were killed a short time later as inmates attempted escape with Haley and other hostages from the courtroom. (Used with permission of the Marin Independent Journal. All Rights Reserved. IJ photo/Jim Kean.).....ix

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INTRODUCTION



“...the madness in the shadows of modern life.”
(Lefkow 6)

Introduction

Anytime, Anyplace, Anyone

During lunchtime in June 2004, a SUV parked in front of a United States Courthouse. An individual emerged from the vehicle and pulled out a shotgun. After firing four shots, including two rounds aimed at the courthouse, a Court Security Officer (CSO) tackled the perpetrator as he attempted to reload.

The location of this event... Los Angeles? Chicago? New York? No. This incident took place in Corpus Christi, Texas. The perpetrator: 81 years old. When you think of a “typical” location and perpetrator for an act of courthouse violence, what occurred on that day in June would hardly fit. Risks to all the members of the court family, including the court interpreter, can happen anytime, anyplace, to anyone.

There is no “typical” demographic profile of an aggressor (Vossekuil). Perpetrators of courtroom violence range in age from juveniles to grandparents. The aggressor can be indigent or highly educated and affluent. Incidents of violence can affect judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, court reporters, clerks, court security personnel, jurors, witnesses, family members, spectators, people simply in the wrong place at the wrong time and interpreters.

Adrian Perez received the distinction of Court Security Officer of the Year by the U.S. Marshals Service for his actions in the line of duty on that June day (Above & Beyond the Call 3).

An act of violence can occur before the start of the workday in a parking lot, on a weekend at a shopping mall, in the middle of a child custody hearing, when a jury foreman reads a verdict, or when a judge dismisses a civil case.

“Fate” sometimes describes the events surrounding violent courthouse incidents. On August 5, 1993, Gary McKnight killed one court security officer, then wounded several other staff, including a deputy clerk of court and a bystander, at the Frank Carlson Federal Building in Kansas before committing suicide. McKnight got off the elevator on the “wrong floor” of his intended target (McNulty 30).

Violence against the court family and others can occur inside the courtroom, on sidewalks in front of the courthouse, or at home. The method could include something as simple as a fist to something as complex as a bomb delivered through the mail.

No one is immune to acts of aggression in the legal setting. Recently, Congress introduced legislation, the Secure Access to Justice and Court Protection Act of 2005 (H.R. 1751), to extend federal protection to all judges, court personnel, jurors, witnesses, and their families at all court levels. The proposed law will make it a federal crime for any perpetrator to commit acts of intimidation, threats or acts of violence against the judicial process. Nothing could be timelier, given the recent history of violence and aggression surrounding our nation’s court system.

Recent Incidents

★ **Van Nuys, California, October 31, 2003:** William Strier, 64 years old, opens fire on a probate attorney, Gerald Curry, in the vicinity of the Superior Courthouse. After emptying his weapon, Strier is tackled by a traffic court judge. Although hit by several of the rounds fired, Mr. Curry survived. The incident, videotaped, is widely distributed by the news media (Deutsch A1).

★ **Baton Rouge, Louisiana, October 6, 2004:** Barbette Williams, 48, attacks his defense attorney, Bert Garraway, in the courtroom with a razor blade, slashing his throat. Williams, on trial for abducting a kindergarten student, is now charged with Attempted Murder in the Second Degree (Man who slashed defense attorney convicted).

★ **Tyler, Texas, February 24, 2005:** David Hernandez Arroyo, in full body armor, opens fire with a MAK-90 killing his wife and a bystander outside the Smith County Courthouse. David Arroyo wounds eight others, including his son and five police officers. The case involves a child custody dispute. Arroyo is shot dead after a high-speed chase (Kent 15-16, Martin).

★ **Chicago, Illinois, February 28, 2005:** U.S. District Judge Joan H. Lefkow arrives at her residence to find her husband and mother slain. The alleged perpetrator, a former plaintiff in a civil rights case, commits suicide (Wilgoren, A1, A18).

★***Fulton County, Georgia, March 11, 2005:*** Defendant Brian Nichols allegedly seizes a weapon from a deputy sheriff while being escorted to a courtroom and shoots her in the face. It is alleged that he then fatally shoots Superior Court Judge Rowland Barnes, his court reporter, and another sheriff's deputy, and later kills an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agent before surrendering (Dewan, A1, A11).

★***Middletown, Connecticut, June 15, 2005:*** Michael Bochicchio Jr., a former state trooper, involved in a divorce and child custody dispute, opens fire in a parking garage next to the Middlesex Superior Court. He kills his wife, seriously injures her attorney, and then kills himself (Siegel, Zitka).

★***Seattle, Washington, June 21, 2005:*** Police shoot and kill 52-year-old Perry L. Manley after he enters the foyer of the U.S. District Courthouse and pulls a fake hand grenade out of his backpack. The event occurs in a newly constructed building (O'Hagan).

★***Kingston, Tennessee, August 9, 2005:*** Jennifer Hyatte allegedly aids in the escape of her husband, George Hyatte, during a hearing on a robbery charge at the Roane County Courthouse. Wayne Morgan, a corrections officer, is shot and killed during the escape (Samuel A18).

★***Salem, Oregon, November 12, 2005:*** Christopher Lee Millis, age 37, allegedly drives his pickup through the glass doors of the Marion County Courthouse, setting at least one fire in the building, and hides in the courthouse for three hours before his capture by police (Rico).

Rationale

It is an unfortunate fact that violence against the court family has been on the increase over the past several years and working in the corrections environment is one of the most dangerous jobs in the United States (Duhart 4). Incidents have not only affected those who work in the judiciary, but have also involved jurors, witnesses, and the general public. The adversarial nature of civil and criminal legal proceedings implies that courtrooms and their environs are, by their nature, places of conflict. Therefore, everyone who works with the court system needs to be aware of how to respond to and report security risks.

Court interpreters are especially vulnerable to acts of aggression or violence by defendants, yet a review of the literature on court security shows an absence of training material and information for court interpreters. The physical proximity to a defendant or inmate often required in proceedings and events makes an interpreter an easy and readily available target for a threat or attack. Additionally, interpreters work with defendants who are unfamiliar with the judicial system in the United States and may therefore lack a clear understanding of the interpreter's role as a neutral party during courtroom interactions. Defendants may perceive an interpreter as representing the prosecution and may mistakenly blame the interpreter for a negative outcome, considering them an appropriate object for their dissatisfaction and aggression.

Court interpreters, however, may not be the direct targets of violence; casualties due to incidents of courtroom aggression can be incidental, involving not only the

judges and attorneys, but also the support and security staff present during the event. Even jurors, spectators, and bystanders have sustained injury or death during an act of violence directed towards a judge or prosecuting attorney. A court interpreter's mere presence in a courtroom, or in any kind of legal interaction, automatically heightens the risk of involvement in an episode of confrontation.

Court interpreters can be left "out of the loop" when it comes to court security measures, as they often work as contractors and they typically work in a broad spectrum of environments that range from formal court settings to one-on-one interviews at an attorney's office. Interpreters who work on a freelance basis may serve multiple court facilities on a daily basis and may find themselves in unfamiliar terrain as they navigate from assignment to assignment. As a result, they may not be aware of security measures in place at the many locations in which they work, nor are they available to participate in the routine security drills and training typically available to other judiciary staff.

The security principles set forth in this manual are not unique to court interpreters and the same concepts may be applied to other members of the court family. Court reporters, attorneys, secretaries, and jurors, to name a few, could benefit from the content of this manual. Due to the nature of their work, however, interpreters come into close physical proximity of the defendants or prisoners at distances matched only by the defense counsel and court security officers.

Security training for court interpreters will benefit all members of the court family. With specific instruction, court interpreters, be they foreign language or American Sign Language (ASL), become a security asset in the judicial environment.

Interpreter education reduces or eliminates security-related errors in judgment that occur due to a lack of knowledge or understanding.

In an emergency, panic increases the risk of injury or death to everyone involved. A side benefit of training, of course, is personal confidence. In a crisis situation, the highly-trained and security-conscious court interpreter is more likely to maintain composure and calm and less likely to panic. The court interpreter becomes part of the solution, not part of the problem.

An article by Lisa Novak, public affairs specialist with the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AOUSC), noted that, “Informed and vigilant employees play an important role in the overall security of a court, but employee training is all too often overlooked as a security measure.” She also pointed out that one of the goals of the AOUSC was to “promote security awareness” in the area of court technology (Novak 24). This manual will address both important points.

On November 17, 2005, under sponsorship from the National Center for State Courts (NCSC), the first National Summit on Court Safety and Security took place in Alexandria, Virginia. The summit proposed a ten-element plan for courtroom safety and security planning.

I hope to address two areas of need identified in the Ten Element Plan put forth by the NCSC: (1.) Operational Security and (2.) Emergency Preparedness and Response.

Essential Ten Elements for Effective Courtroom Safety and Security Planning

1. Operational Security: Standard Operating Procedures

This is one of the most critical deficiencies in the state court system today. Standard Operating Procedures are not being followed and for full safety, there needs to be 100 percent compliance.

2. Facility Security Planning: The Self-Audit Survey of Court Facilities

This point emphasizes the need to know the strengths and weaknesses of the physical structure of the courtroom to best protect the people inside.

3. Emergency Preparedness and Response: Continuity of Operations

At any moment, courts can be affected by natural or unnatural disasters; however, they must continue to operate and serve the public in such an event. There needs to be a greater awareness and identification of command structure, protocols, and communication routes for such emergencies and responses.

4. Disaster Recovery: Essential Elements of a Plan

The point emphasizes the need to ensure that adequate procedures are in place to recover lost or vulnerable information in the event of an emergency.

5. Threat Assessment

The federal government currently has an effective threat assessment protocol in practice. However, for security and safety purposes, state courts need to begin identifying serious threats so they may prepare for the proper protective action.

6. Incident Reporting

States must develop an appropriate incident report form that allows for capturing data on items such as intelligence and funding needs.

7. Funding

This is another critical deficiency facing the court system today and for years past. Equipment can be bought at moderate costs but without the trained personnel, the equipment is of little use. In addition, many state court administrators are troubled by the lack of federal funds. While much money is appropriated to homeland security, very little is dedicated to state courts.

8. Security Equipment and Costs

State courts must have updated and readily available information on what technology is available to them and how much it costs.

9. Resources and Partnerships

Strong and effective partnerships among state courts, law enforcement and county commissioners must be developed to ensure successful security operations.

10. New Courthouse Design

As new courthouses are being constructed, this point emphasizes the opportunity to ensure that up-to-date physical safety measures are included in the design stage.

(National Center for State Courts)

MISSION STATEMENT

- ★ **To foster increased cooperation between interpreters and court security personnel.**
- ★ **To develop in interpreters an understanding of the primary roles of court security personnel.**
- ★ **To understand basic security principles and how they impact the court interpreter and others.**
- ★ **To reduce response times by the interpreter during emergencies.**
- ★ **To reduce the risk of work-related injury or death by court interpreters and other members of the court family.**
- ★ **To provide a safer working environment for the interpreter and the court family.**
- ★ **To increase the awareness of information management and its importance to the well-being of the court family.**

In encounters with dangerous and sometimes armed individuals there is no “second chance.” We, as court professionals, must provide the court interpreter and every member of the court family with the requisite skills to increase their survivability during fast-moving and violent events.

Using this Manual

This manual serves as a guided or self-study training tool and as a reference source. Many of the unit objectives, questions, activities and scenarios follow the Bloom’s Taxonomy model of analysis, synthesis and evaluation to promote higher-order thinking skills (Bloom). The scenarios at the end of each unit are springboards for further discussions and inquiries that are specific to each interpreter’s workplace situation.

Supervisory court security personnel are free to insert information in Unit 11 and the Appendixes to provide a useable training tool for their court interpreter staff.

I consider this manual to be a “work in progress.” Authorities in the field of court security are free to provide comments or suggestions in regards to the content in this manual.

I’ve elicited the review and input from a distinguished panel of experts in the field of court security and federal judges to assure both the accuracy and reliability of the content of this manual.

As you’ll discover, there are deliberate omissions in this manual, based on what is often referred to as “need to know” information. I will not report specific information or statistics that will place court personnel at a greater risk by public

disclosure. Sometimes this manual and court security personnel will not answer your questions. You, as a court interpreter, do not need to know the answer to these questions. The release of information that is too specific may jeopardize you, your colleagues and the court family.


The manual is not meant to be an all-inclusive study of security issues, to cover all security scenarios that could occur in and out of the workplace, or to be a final authority for court interpreters on security-related matters. Finally, and most importantly, this manual is not a replacement or substitute for the procedures and policies set forth by your local court security personnel. Always follow the policies, procedures and instructions of court security personnel, law enforcement officers and supervisory personnel.



Key Guideposts:




Unit Objectives



Food For Thought



Ethical Issues



For Further Information



Interpreter Alert



**Questions, Activities and
Scenarios**

Copyright Instructions

Security for Court Interpreters is a training tool developed for a wide range of situations both in and out of court. The copyright of this manual allows for the addition of local rules and policies in Unit 11 by local court security personnel in supervisory capacities. Local forms and emergency contact information may be placed in the Appendixes found at the end of the manual. The content of this Manual is available in Corel WordPerfect format to supervisory court security personnel on request.

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
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Please keep in mind: This manual is for the profession, not for profit.

UNIT 1

BASIC SECURITY CONCEPTS



“Opportunity makes a thief.”
(Sir Francis Bacon 99)

Unit 1



Target Objectives of this Unit Include:

- 1. Understanding the relationship of time and distance in the context of security.**
- 2. Familiarizing the interpreter with the effective ranges of common weapons.**
- 3. Integrating the concepts of time and distance using the “21-Foot Rule.”**
- 4. Identifying examples of hard and soft targets.**
- 5. Recognizing the concept of target hardening in the work environment.**
- 6. Identifying examples of physical and psychological barriers in the security setting.**
- 7. Understanding the concept and importance of security layering.**
- 8. Exposing the interpreter to the process of threat assessment and intelligence development.**
- 9. Acquainting the interpreter with the use of environmental design to prevent crime.**

Time and Distance

Although this is a very simple concept, **time** and **distance** are two of the most significant factors in the security environment. Essentially, the closer you are to the source of danger, the less time you, the interpreter, will have to react to a real or perceived danger. The greater the time you have to respond, and the greater the distance you are from the threat, the greater the likelihood that you'll survive an attack (see Figure 1).




Figure 1. Time and Distance: As these two factors converge, the greater the risk.



Proximity = Danger

On March 10, 2005, one day before the Atlanta courthouse shootings, it's reported that Judge Rowland Barnes meets with the two district attorneys assigned to the Brian Nichols case. Due to issues of "proximity," the primary security concern centers on the defense attorney (Fulton County 28).

As an interpreter you'll work at distances equal to that of a defense attorney. Be alert!

Maximum Effective Range of Weapons

Another important concept in security is the *maximum effective range (MER)* of weapons. As noted previously, time and distance from the threat are both the interpreter's friends. Distance from a weapon used by an assailant is a significant factor in survivability.

The greatest threat to the interpreter in the courtroom or secure facility environments will come from close-in physical attacks in the forms of hand-to-hand combat (*close combat*), sometimes combined with the use of weapons such as knives or improvised *edged weapons*. A close combat encounter with an assailant may not sound threatening, but the attack can come quickly, with fatal results.

Outside of the courtroom or secure facility, you could encounter any type of weapon, from close combat attacks, to handguns and explosives. There was even a recent incident in Oregon where an attacker used a car to drive through the front

of a court building, and then set the building ablaze. Since the incident occurred on a Saturday, it resulted in no injuries (Rico).

The MER of weapons ranges from a few feet in close combat to in excess of a thousand yards for high-powered rifles and explosives. An important factor to consider is that the assailant can move any weapon into your danger zone. In other words, if you are stationary and the assailant is moving in your direction, the danger zone is also moving in your direction. If you are out of range of the weapon and continue to keep your distance out of range, the weapon will not be effective and your survivability increases.

It is a common misperception that a weapon, such as a handgun or high-powered rifle pointed in your direction, is always lethal. Weapons are deadly if you are in or near the MER of the weapon. After months of combat, soldiers with piercing eyes have a “thousand yard stare.” The description comes from looking for threats in the distance – the soldiers are extremely cognizant of the range and killing zones of their enemies’ weapons.

Figure 2 outlines the common MER of various weapons. Keep in mind that this chart is for illustrative reference only. The MER’s of the noted weapons are for “point target” only. The “area target” MER’s of these weapons are higher (Air Base Defense 61, Fact File and The Stinger Handheld Projection Stun Device). MER’s of explosives, including the grenade listed in the chart, are highly dependent on the location of detonation and the surrounding environment.

Maximum Effective Range (MER) of Weapons




Figure 2. Maximum effective range of common weapons.

The “21- Foot Rule” and the Interpreter

A common rule of thumb in the law enforcement community that integrates time, distance, and maximum effective range of weapons is the **21-Foot Rule** (Surviving Edged Weapons). In brief, the rule states that the distance an individual, armed with an edged weapon, can travel, before a law enforcement officer can draw a weapon and fire two “body mass” shots to stop an assailant, is 21 feet. The average time is 1.5 seconds under ideal circumstances.

Although an interpreter is not concerned with drawing a weapon, there is a valuable lesson in the 21-foot rule. In a typical setting the court interpreter usually works within the 21-foot range (or less) from the defendant. If an assailant, 21 feet away from you, can be on top of you in an average of 1.5 seconds, you are a vulnerable target in the courtroom. Assailants can move a great distance in a short time and security situations can change quickly.

Fortunately for you, there is highly trained and professional court security staff that provides extra sets of eyes and ears to prevent and predict problems before they occur. Interpretation is a complex cognitive skill that requires intense concentration, so it may not always be possible to be on the lookout for dangers or threats to your safety while interpreting. In fact, everyone who works in the court setting – judges, attorneys, court reporters and case managers – focuses on fulfilling their duties and may not readily perceive the potential for trouble. Court security officers are aware of this fact and devote their full attention to the safety and security of everyone in the courtroom.



Go With the Flow...

Court security procedures can change on a moment's notice based on information or a threat. Always cooperate with court security personnel and maintain your flexibility in dealing with any new procedures.

Hard and Soft Targets

You only need to turn on the television news to hear the common security terms ***hard and soft targets***. The terms hard or soft refer to the levels of protection provided targets. Targets can be buildings, people or modes of transportation – anything an assailant wants to attack.

It's important to note that the status of a human target can change from setting to setting. For example, if you're working in a courtroom at a federal or state courthouse, surrounded by court security personnel, you're a "hard target." If you are on a sidewalk a mile away from the courthouse, on the way to lunch, you're now a "soft target."

As a court interpreter, it's important to become more aware of your surroundings as your security status changes.

Examples of Hard and Soft Targets

HARD	SOFT
The White House	Automobile
Baghdad's "Green Zone"	Public Street
Airport	Residence
Courthouse	School
Prison Facility	Places of Worship
Police Station	Restaurant
State Office Buildings	Parking Lot
Military Facility	Public Transportation

Target Hardening

The term target hardening describes the process of making it more difficult for an assailant to attack a potential target. It can be as complex as adding armor and bulletproof glass to a vehicle, or as simple as the installation of an auto alarm.

Other examples of target hardening range from road closures and concrete barriers near key office buildings to new checkpoints and restrictions at airports.

Physical and Psychological Barriers

Modern security barriers serve two important security functions - both physical and psychological (Royal Canadian Mounted Police 18, 21). Ideally, the psychological aspect of the security system is so powerful, it will eliminate the need for the security system to serve its physical function. Essentially, the psychological deterrence factor of the barriers is so strong the perpetrator decides against an attack, since the chance of success is so small that it's not worth the risk.

It's certainly easy to spot physical barriers at the courthouse, jail or prison, as they are all around us: locked doors, secure gates, walls and blast proof glass. But take a moment to think of the psychological aspect of these barriers. The psychological message the barriers give the potential assailant is: "Don't even think about it!"

Physical Barriers and their Psychological Message

Physical Barrier	Psychological Message
Doors	Is authorization required? You don't know what's on the other side. Is there an alarm?
Gates	We'll be looking at you and searching your vehicle.
Walls	The wall is too high to get over, so why try?
Checkpoints	Don't even try to get a weapon into this building.
Fences	Jump the fence and the security guards may come after you.
Alarm Systems	Anything can trigger an alarm, so don't touch.
Ballistic Glass	If you set off a bomb, we won't get hurt, so why bother?
Camera Systems	Smile for the camera! We are watching your every move.
Duress Alarms	We can call for help at any time without your knowledge.
Screening Procedures	We look at everyone.
Presence of Security Personnel	There is only one of you and a lot of us. The odds are in our favor.
Display of Weapons (Firepower)	If you try to hurt or kill us, we can do the same to you.



Soft Spots

Attacks often occur on streets, approaches to courthouses or in parking areas. Be alert to your surroundings and suspicious persons or activities. If you observe anything out of the ordinary, report it to the nearest court security officer. Your observations are a valuable tool to keep the court family safe.

Layering

As you approach any potential target, you'll notice the concept of security **layering** (Cosiol 18). Security layering provides three important functions. First, if an assailant eludes one security layer, the likelihood increases of apprehension at the next layer. Second, layering allows different levels of access to a building based on individual need; general public access is different from employee access. Third, layering can contain a security event to one area of a building or other location.

Near a courthouse, you may be totally unaware that visual surveillance of a building's perimeter may begin thousands of yards from the entrance. As you pass through the front door, you may find yourself in a foyer that is blast resistant. After you pass through yet another layer – a metal detector – you may be required to pass an identification checkpoint. Later, to access more secure (employee-only)

areas of the courthouse, you may be required to use an electronic **swipe card** or a **biometric device** to gain deeper access into the courthouse.



Respect Physical Limits

Many areas of a courthouse or other secure facility are off-limits to unauthorized employees and contractors (including interpreters). Know and respect the physical restrictions placed on your person. It's for your safety and the safety of others.

Threat Assessment and Protective Intelligence

As noted in the introduction it's impossible to "profile" a potential attacker based on demographic or past history (Vossekuil). Court security personnel use the threat assessment model to protect the court family from targeted violence.

Threat assessment includes the following three principles (Borum 329-330):


1. Targeted attacks include planning.
2. Targeted attacks occur by context and situation.
3. Targeted attacks involve behavioral preparations.

Threat assessment differentiates between those who "make threats" and those who "pose threats"; in targeted violence, those who commit these acts often do not make threats (Fein 14 and Fein 2).

Threat assessment and intelligence activities occur behind the scenes and rarely

involve the interpreter. You may, however, assist court security personnel by reporting suspicious persons or activities.

Keep in mind that the threat assessment model applies to targeted violence (assassinations). Perpetrators of random courtroom attacks may include grandfathers and individuals in the public trust who “snap” during a heated child custody battle.



Food for Thought:

One of the principles of threat assessment is the potential assailant’s knowledge of the person targeted (Borum 329). Don't provide information about a potential target's work, lifestyle, interests or travel. Report individuals who have unusual interests in a potential target. You could save a life.

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (Crowe 1-9) is the concept of using building architecture and landscaping to deter criminal activity and increase the security of buildings and other physical locations.


Examples of CPTED in the workplace include elevated buildings with multiple stair sets or well-placed planters to prevent an easy attack on an entryway with a car bomb, to security camera surveillance.

Some applications around the home include security lighting and trimming trees and shrubs near windows so a burglar can't use them for cover. I'll provide additional information and resources in Unit 7, Home and Community Security.



Practice Makes Perfect

Every member of the court family should participate in regularly scheduled group security scenarios, every three to six months. The topics may include prior incidents or hypothetical “what if” events. An important part of the sessions should include a detailed team discussion of what went right and what went wrong. When a security event occurs, roles and actions will be clear to all members of the court team, increasing the survivability of a security incident (Fautsko).



For Further Information

Force Science Research Center

109 Morris Hall
Minnesota State University
Mankato, MN 56001

www.forcescience.org

National Institute of Crime Prevention

PO Box 172745
Tampa FL 33672-0745

www.nicp.net



Questions, Activities and Scenarios

1. Three factors that influence the outcome of any attack are:

2. An assailant can travel 21 feet in approximately _____ seconds.

3. How does the 21-foot rule impact the interpreter in a courtroom or other location?

4. Activity:

With permission, use a tape measure to reference 21 feet in a courtroom or other workspace.

5. Activity:

With permission, use a tape measure to note the distance between your typical location in the courtroom while interpreting and the typical location of the defendant.

Note the distance here:


6. Provide two examples of soft targets and two examples of hard targets not noted in this Unit:

7. Scenario:

Using trained security personnel in the roles of defendant and interpreter, demonstrate the speed with which an attack can unfold in the courtroom.

UNIT 2

UNDERSTANDING AGGRESSION



“Beware the fury of a patient man.”
(Dryden)

Unit 2



Target Objectives of this Unit Include:

- 1. Examining the various stages of the cycle of aggression.**
- 2. Relating existing models of the aggression cycle to interpreter interactions in the workplace.**
- 3. Reducing response time in emergency situations by recognizing antecedents to aggressive behavior.**
- 4. Identifying body language that may indicate frustration and anger.**
- 5. Assessing verbal responses as possible indicators of impending physically aggressive behavior.**



Food for Thought:

You should consider taking a “hands-on” course on the topic of workplace violence. If not offered through your employer, or if you are a contract interpreter, an excellent program is Nonviolent Crisis Intervention®, offered through the National Crisis Prevention Institute, Inc. The Rape Aggression Defense System (R.A.D.) and Resisting Aggression with Defense are available at locations throughout the United States. Continuing education units may be available through your state’s certification agency; check prior to taking this or any course if your goal is re-certification credit. Please see the For Further Information section for details.

The Cycle of Aggression

Although there is considerable debate in the fields of psychology and psychiatry on the topic of aggression, I will limit my discussion of this topic to basic and practical principles based on two models of behavior. In fact, for clarity, I will modify a commonly used model of aggression to make it more applicable to the courtroom interpreter.

Several decades ago the famous psychologist B.F. Skinner (1904) developed a theory that would evolve into the ***Antecedent-Behavior-Consequence (ABC)*** model. Essentially, the model states that there is a situation or precursor to a behavior (the antecedent), the action (behavior), then what happens after the behavior (the consequence).

The “Assault Cycle” (Kaplin 339-345), proposes a five-phase behavior model for aggression:

1. Triggering Phase – something happens to create fear, anxiety or frustration.
2. Escalation Phase – increased adrenalin, verbally abusive, body language.
3. Crisis Phase – assaultive, threatening; others are at physical risk.
4. Recovery Phase – mood begins to return to normal while adrenalin continues to be active in the body for approximately 90 minutes.
5. Post-Crisis Depression Phase – remorse, shame and depression set in after inappropriate behavior.

The literature presents numerous models of the aggression cycle. Many are of little practical use for our objectives since they are too complex and analytical for our needs, or they address issues beyond our professional purview.

I propose that the following behavioral model of the aggression cycle may be the most descriptive for our use:

1. The antecedent (what is the situation that could cause an act of aggression – a sentencing or decision on a civil matter).
2. The nonverbal stage (physical signs of stress, agitation and aggression).
3. The verbal stage (an individual may respond with inappropriate language or may not respond to verbal requests from the judge or others).
4. The aggression stage (hostile physical movements and gestures, to physical assaults).

5. The aftermath (the aggressor is restrained and removed). *

Antecedents are one of the most important concepts in security for court interpreters. As discussed in Unit 1, increased time and distance are the interpreter's friends. Therefore, it becomes important for the interpreter to "read ahead" and be ready for an act of aggression before it occurs; it will reduce your response time in an emergency situation. And, perhaps most importantly, it will allow you to withdraw from a situation quickly so court security officials can do their job without hindrance.

Security personnel in and out of the court environment play a key role in observing the behavior of an individual for indicators of possible aggression against you, members of the court family and others. Security personnel receive extensive training in human behavior and aggression. In fact, most of the time, indicators should be of little concern to the interpreter in the court setting, but there are situations when the information presented here may be helpful.

Units 5 and 6 contain specific information on precursor situations that may occur in various settings. Although it's impossible to provide the interpreter with a complete list of key antecedents, it will make you aware of sensitive times and subjects in various contexts.

Always leave the final two stages, the aggressive behaviors that occur and their aftermaths, to the professionals.

It is common procedure to remove a defendant from the courtroom at the verbal stage, before physical aggression occurs.



Get Additional Training!

You may initially encounter an individual at any stage of the aggression cycle. Although it's outside of the scope of this manual, take some time to review the additional resources at the end of this unit for training that may help you survive a violent confrontation.

Body Language

Body language is the physical movements and gestures used to communicate. For the objectives of this unit, we will identify some common movements, gestures and other nonverbal physical indicators that may indicate frustration and anger (Givens).

Anger Indicators

Jaws tensed into a biting position

Hand behind head

Shoulders pulled back

Palm-down gestures

Hands on hips

Frowning

Head turned away to one side

Tense mouth expressions

Clenched fists

Staring

Verbal Indicators

Verbal indicators of aggression are usually easy to identify and they are important, since they usually occur one step away from physical aggression. Verbal precursors to aggressive behavior fall into three broad categories:


1. Growling – high volume.
2. Content – threats, foul language.
3. Silence – refusal to respond or answer questions.

As noted before, it is common for court security personnel to take action on an individual exhibiting inappropriate verbal responses in the courtroom by order of the presiding official. It is important to keep in mind, however, that the removal process can quickly escalate to a physical confrontation. Continue to interpret but keep your distance if security staff moves in to remove a defendant.

Cultural Factors

Since we are interpreters, it's likely that we've had a wide variety of living and working in foreign countries amidst different cultures. There are, of course, a wide range of non-verbal and verbal indicators of pending aggression dependent on culture. In many Asian cultures, for example, there may be few outward signs of an attack before it occurs. Blatant indicators of an imminent attack in one culture may be totally lacking or different in the next.

Training in cultural differences is common among court security personnel, especially in larger cities and the federal courts. At locations in small towns and in rural areas, however, this training may be limited or nonexistent.



For Further Information

USA Learning

Office of Personnel Management
1900 E Street NW
Washington, DC 20415-1000

www.usalearning.gov

888-661-2252

Training available to personnel with .gov or .mil
e-mail addresses.

Crisis Prevention Institute, Inc.

3315-K N 124th Street
Brookfield WI 53005

www.crisisprevention.com
info@crisisprevention.com

800-558-8976

Nonviolent Crisis Intervention® Program

R.A.D. Systems

23305 Hwy 16
Denham Springs, LA 70726

www.rad-systems.com
radinfo@rad-systems.com

225-791-4430

Programs include:

The Rape Aggression Defense System (Women's Program)
Resisting Aggression with Defense (Men's Program)



Questions, Activities and Scenarios

1. Why is it important for court interpreters to be aware of antecedents that may provoke physical aggression?

2. Provide three examples of verbal behavior that may be precursors of a violent act.

3. Think about a cultural group you work with and provide an example of a culturally-based precursor to aggression.

4. At the locations in which you work, find out what the local policy is regarding disruptive incidents in the courtroom and what procedures you should follow in the event of a major disruption. If you obtain a written policy, insert it in the back of this manual for future reference.

5. Scenario:

A non-English speaking defendant is sitting at the defense table during jury deliberations, awaiting his verdict at the end of a trial. He clenches his fists on the table, as he sits staring into space. At that moment, a bailiff brings in a jury note and announces that the jury has reached a verdict. The jury enters the courtroom and the jury foreman reads a guilty verdict to the judge. The defendant begins to pound the table with his fists, screaming, "No, no! I'm innocent! I didn't do this! It's not possible!" He then turns towards the gallery and starts to run towards the door. The security staff restrains the defendant and removes him from the courtroom.

a. What is the antecedent in this scenario?

b. Name the two body language indicators in this scenario.

UNIT 3

DEFENDANT AND INMATE MANAGEMENT



***“He must be brought to the bar without irons,
or any manner of shackles or bonds.”***

(Blackstone 4W)

Unit 3



Target Objectives of this Unit Include:

- 1. Analyzing the concept of presumption of innocence and its implications on defendant management.**
- 2. Identifying common restraints used to manage defendants and inmates and correlating the types of restraints to security risk levels.**
- 3. Describing the use of modern electronic devices on high-risk defendants during trials and penalty phases in the courtroom.**
- 4. Recognizing the importance of maintaining physical distance from prisoners and defendants.**
- 5. Explaining the two classification system for prisoner risk levels in correctional facilities.**

Presumption of Innocence

The concept of *presumption of innocence* (innocent until proven guilty) is one of the cornerstones of the judicial system in our country. The burden of proof, to demonstrate the guilt of the defendant, rests with the prosecution and not without due process of law (United States Constitution, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).

In numerous countries throughout the world, defendants find themselves in situations where there is a presumption of guilt. During a trial, for example, the defendant may be located in the courtroom, locked in a small cage and dressed in striped prison garb. In the United States, however, such a courtroom display would be unthinkable.

The issue of removing any possible prejudice on the part of the jury during the trial and penalty phase through the use of restraints continues to this day. Take, for example, these four excerpts from Justice Breyer in a recent Supreme Court Decision:

We hold that the Constitution forbids the use of visible shackles during the penalty phase, as it forbids their use during the guilt phase, unless that use is “justified by an essential state interest”- such as the interest in courtroom security - specific to the defendant on trial (*Deck v. Missouri* 1).

The use of restraints and presumption of innocence:

First, the criminal process presumes that the defendant is innocent until proven guilty. *Coffin v. United States*, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (presumption of innocence “lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law”). Visible shackling undermines the presumption of innocence and the related fairness of the factfinding process. Cf. *Estelle*, *supra*, at 503 (7).

The use of restraints during trial may affect the defendant's ability to communicate with counsel:

Second, the Constitution, in order to help the accused secure a meaningful defense, provides him with a right to counsel. See, e.g. *Amdt*; *Gideon v. Wainwright*, 372 U.S. 335, 340-341 (1963). The use of physical restraints diminishes that right. Shackles can interfere with the accused's "ability to communicate" with his lawyer. *Allen*, 397 U.S., at 344 (8).

Finally, the use of restraints impacts the "dignity" of the judicial process:

Third, judges must seek to maintain a judicial process that is a dignified process. The courtroom's formal dignity, which includes the respectful treatment of the defendants, reflects the importance of the matter at issue, guilt or innocence, and the gravity with which Americans consider any deprivation of an individual's liberty through criminal punishment (8).

The use of restraints in the penalty phase of Deck's capital murder trial resulted in a "reversed and remanded" decision by the High Court (12).

Due to the presumption of innocence, the judicial system in our country goes to great lengths to assure that there is no prejudice on the part of the state against a defendant during trial. This includes:

1. Allowing the defendant to dress in street clothing.
2. Prohibiting the use of visible restraints.



Trials and Sentencings = High Risk

Due to limits on the control of defendants during the trial and sentencing phases of due process, the risks for the interpreter, court family and others are greatly increased. In the Fulton County, Georgia incident of March 11, 2005, for example, the alleged assailant was in street clothes, awaiting transfer to a courtroom for an ongoing trial. Barbette Williams' attack on his attorney with a razor blade in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on October 6, 2004 also occurred during the trial phase. These are only two recent examples.

During other court appearances, such as initial appearances and pleas, the defendant is usually restrained and in full prison garb. The judge is highly skilled in law and presumption of innocence, so there is no bias. This may not be true for a group of jurors, so there is a marked change in the appearance and security procedures during trial.

There are, however, modern electronic devices that limit the defendant's movements while preventing prejudicing the jury during trial. They are invisible to the jurors. For example, Brian Nichols, accused of the courtroom killings during an escape in Atlanta, is currently using a RACC stun belt (Kroncke).

Restraints

Restraints used in the courtroom range from instruments that were first developed thousands of years ago to modern electronic devices of recent invention. The common restraints used in defendant and inmate management include the following two groups:

A. Standard Restraints

1. Handcuffs (restrain the arms at the wrists)
2. Leg Irons (restrain the legs at the ankles)
3. Transport Restraint (Handcuffs with Leg Irons)
4. "Martin Chains" (link handcuffs to leg irons)
5. Gang Chain (links prisoners together)
6. Waist Chain with Separated Cuffs (parallel arm or cross arm handcuffing)
7. Waist Chain with Front Handcuffs (often used in courtroom and processing situations)
8. C & S Handcuff Cover (plastic cover that prevents lock picking – high security)

B. Electronic Technologies

1. RACC Stun Belt, NOVA Technologies (used under the clothing around the waist – delivers a shock on remote command).
2. Band-It™ Electronic Prisoner Restraint, Stinger Systems (electronic stun device).

Typically, the use of high-security restraints on a prisoner indicates a greater security risk. Common high-security indicators include the use of C & S handcuff covers, waist chains with separated cuffs, the use of “Martin” chains, and high-security lock systems on handcuffs or leg irons. Electronic devices may be used on high-risk defendants during trial and penalty phases, and the use of these devices are invisible to the interpreter.

Standard Restraints



Chain Handcuffs



Leg Irons



Waist Chain – Front Handcuffs



Waist Chain – Front Handcuffs
High Security



Waist Chain – Side Handcuffs
High Security

(Photos Courtesy Peerless® Handcuff Company.)

Standard Restraints (Continued)



Gang Chain with Handcuffs



Gang Chain in Use



Security or "Martin" Chain
In Use - High Security



C & S Handcuff Cover
High Security



C & S Handcuff Cover in Use
High Security

(Photos Courtesy C & S Security, Inc.)

Electronic Technologies



RACC Stun Belt – Remote Activation – High Security
(Photo courtesy Mr. Jim Kroncke, NOVA Technologies.)



Band It™ Stun system for Arms or Legs – Automatic or Remote
Activation – High Security

(Photos courtesy Stinger™ Systems, Inc.)

Physical Distance

At any time you are in the physical presence of a defendant or a prisoner, there is an associated risk. The more defendants and prisoners, the greater the risk and the more complex procedures become, both in and out of the courtroom environment.

It is of primary importance that you keep your **physical distance** during any prisoner or defendant movement activities in any environment. Under no circumstances should you approach any defendant or prisoner unless it is absolutely necessary. These limited situations may be the result of equipment failure, or to adjust headsets and other equipment. Physically touching a prisoner or defendant is inappropriate under any circumstance.

The use of interpreting equipment is highly effective for maximizing your distance from a defendant. It allows you to interpret clearly without the need for proximity. Another useful technique is positioning yourself behind a table or near a piece of furniture that can serve as a physical barrier between you and the defendant.

Risk Levels

The risk levels of prisoners are usually determined under one of two classification systems (Austin 2-3):

1. Level I, II, III, IV system
2. Minimum, Medium, Close, Maximum system

The California State Department of Corrections, for example, uses the Level I, II, III, IV system. Level I and II are for low-level, low-risk offenders, while Level III and

IV are for high-risk, long-term offenders. In general, the corresponding levels for prisoners are as follows:

- ! Level I – Minimum
- ! Level II – Medium
- ! Level III – Close
- ! Level IV – Maximum

The criteria for placement in the two broad classification systems occur through a ***Prisoner Management Classification System (PMC)***. In general, the more severe and “aggravating” the circumstances of the crime, the higher level of security placed on the prisoner. Other factors in the classification system include ***recidivism*** (return offenders), gang involvement, age, sex, psychological factors, observed behavior during incarceration, etc. (Hardyman 4).

The interpreter can usually determine the general risk level involved for prison events by doing a quick Internet search using the facility name and location. The United States Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and most state correctional systems will list the security level(s) at each site.



For Further Information

National Institute of Corrections

320 First Street, NW
Washington DC 20534

www.nicic.org
800-995-6423

C & S Security, Inc.

134 Surfside DR
Roscommon MI 48653

www.cssecurity.com
css@ismi.net

989-821-5759
FAX: 989-821-8029

Nova Technologies

4421 Commons DR, STE 182
Destin FL 32541

www.nova-usa.com
info@nova-usa.com

1-800-830-4460

Peerless® Handcuff Company

95 State Street
Springfield MA 01103

www.peerless.net
info@peerless.net

413-732-2156
800-732-3705
Fax: 413-734-5467

Stinger™ Systems

2701 N Rocky Point DR STE 1130
Tampa FL 33607

www.stingersystems.com
info@stingersystems.com

866-788-6746
FAX: 813-288-9148



Questions, Activities and Scenarios

1. Summarize how the use of visible restraints can negatively impact the concept of presumption of innocence.

2. If a defendant is not wearing visible restraints, is it safe to assume that he is a low-risk offender? Explain.

3. How can interpreters maximize their physical distance from a defendant?

4. Activity:

Observe an arraignment and note the types of restraints used on the defendant and the risk level that may be present based on the restraints.

5. Scenario:

Apply the 21-foot rule to the following three defendants:

1. Wearing handcuffs, but no leg restraints
2. Wearing handcuffs and shackles
3. Wearing handcuffs, shackles and Martin chains

In an imaginary race, which assailant would reach a victim first? Why?

UNIT 4

BUILDING SECURITY



***“A sword is never a killer, it is a
tool in the killer's hands.”***

(Seneca)

Unit 4



Target Objectives of this Unit Include:

- 1. Acquainting interpreters with the roles and responsibilities of court security personnel.**
- 2. Fostering increased cooperation between interpreters and court security staff.**
- 3. Describing the functions of common building security equipment in the courthouse.**
- 4. Respecting restricted and off-limits areas of the courthouse.**
- 5. Providing examples of prohibited items and understanding the need for their exclusion from the court environment.**
- 6. Identifying items that could be used as improvised weapons and weapons of opportunity.**
- 7. Effectively using safety precautions in parking areas and in public areas near court facilities.**
- 8. Reporting suspicious activities and objects to court security personnel.**

Court Security Staff and Their Roles

Court security staff and their duties are as varied as the venue. At a large federal courthouse in a major city, for example, there may be a complete staff of general and specialized officers on duty. The security staff in a small rural court, however, may consist of a single police officer assigned to the court part-time.

Although the court or security environments may change, as may the staff, you must be cooperative and professional in your interactions with security staff at all times. If there is one officer or 100, their mission is to keep you, the court family and all visitors to the building safe at all times. It is an immense task and the consequences of a lapse in security can be catastrophic.

As noted before, and it can't be stressed enough, security situations can change from day to day and even minute to minute. Never argue or disagree with security staff, especially in public. If you feel you have a legitimate concern or question in regards to a security policy, talk to an officer discreetly and professionally. As you'll learn in Unit 5, sometimes they may not be able to answer your question, but remember that their mission is to keep everyone safe, not to needlessly harass you.

Cooperation with court security staff will not only assist the security staff in their goals and objectives, but will reflect positively on court interpreters as a profession.

Remember: Each venue is different and the position descriptions can vary immensely. The list, however, will give you a general idea of staff and their roles.



Order in the Court

The judge is the “captain” of the courtroom ship. The tighter and more structured the environment, the less likely a security incident will occur. Confusion and a lack of structure in the courtroom provide opportunities for an assailant to attack or flee (Fautsko).

State and Local Security Staff

- ! **Court Security Officer (CSO).** The CSO’s responsibilities may include perimeter security, screening operations, courtroom security duty, prisoner security and transportation, witness and juror management, electronic monitoring, crowd control, warrant service, judicial detail security, administrative assignments and other duties as assigned.
- ! **Bailiff.** A bailiff’s duties can be wide-ranging and reflect those of a CSO. Primarily, the bailiff’s duties include witness and juror management in the courtroom. The position of bailiff may be a full-time role or filled by sheriffs’ deputies or other law enforcement personnel.
- ! **Law Enforcement Officer.** Law enforcement officers (police, sheriff deputies, and state police) may serve the dual role as a court security officer in a small court facility, or serve at a larger court to augment the regular court security staff due to a specific threat or situation. Sometimes you may hear the

phrases “special court contingent” or “court detail” used to describe the assignment of additional law enforcement officers to the court facility. Common duties include crowd and traffic control, perimeter control, security screening, surveillance, and other duties as assigned.

! ***Building Security Officer/Chief of Building Security.*** Typically there will be a manager at the building level who oversees the court security process and supervises the building CSO’s. The position may have different titles and functions depending on the location. In larger facilities, a Deputy Chief of Building Security may be present. Some other duties may include conducting security and readiness reviews, recruiting and hiring staff, administering background check documents, conducting performance reviews, responding to public questions and complaints, conducting or assisting in threat assessments, coordinating special security operations and other duties as assigned.

! ***Court Security Director.*** The director of court security usually serves at the state level in the administrative office of the courts. Duties may include conducting security and readiness reviews, budget management, legislative, executive and court consultation, policy review and development, statistical collection and analysis, and other duties as assigned.

U.S. Marshals Service's Judicial Security Division (Judicial and Court Security)

- ! **Judicial Protective Services (JPS).** This group of personnel administers the **Court Security Officer program**, requests contract services, and provides support to Senior Inspectors and Senior Deputy Marshals at the district level.
- ! **Court Security Officer (CSO)** – (the acronym is also used for Contract Security Officer). The CSO's responsibilities may include perimeter security, screening operations, courtroom security duty, prisoner security and transportation, witness and juror management, electronic monitoring, crowd control, warrant service, judicial detail security, administrative assignments and other duties as assigned. Both regular U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) and Contract Security Officers are highly skilled and trained to keep you, the court family and the public safe in and around the federal courthouse.
- ! **Supervisory Deputy Marshal.** The Supervisory Deputy Marshal is responsible for the day-to-day operations at the court division (building) level in the federal court system. Primary duties include CSO staff management and evaluation, readiness and security review, special planning, incident reporting and integration with judiciary members and administrative court staff.
- ! **Senior Inspector.** The Senior Inspector is the district-level court security supervisor with a wide range of administrative and functional responsibilities. Duties include coordination of special courtroom events at divisions in the

district (high-profile cases) and review of operations at each courthouse and facility in the district. The Senior Inspector also plays a key role in the communication and needs assessment from the division to upper levels of management.

Security Equipment

Not long ago, court facilities were virtually unprotected from those with ill intent on the judicial family. In 1970 several firearms, including a sawed-off shotgun, were smuggled into the Marin County Courthouse in California. A defendant and accomplices took Judge Harold Haley (taping a shotgun to his head), Assistant District Attorney Gary Thomas and three jurors hostage. A gun battle resulted in the deaths of four persons, including Judge Haley and three of the hostage-takers (Judge and 3 Slain on Coast as Convicts Hold Up Court 1, 24). It is hard to imagine such an event occurring today with the array of security equipment found in the modern courthouse.

Some of the common building security equipment and their functions include (Conference of Chief Judges 5.1-5.4):

- ! ***Metal Detector (Wand)***. This device detects specific locations of excessive metal content on the body after a larger “walk-through” metal detector raises an alert.
- ! ***Magnetometer***. This is the large metal detector that you walk through to enter the court or other secure facility.
- ! ***Fluoroscope***. The x-ray machine that screens your purse, briefcase, etc.

- ! **Explosive Detection System (EDS).** Uncommon at most courthouses. These devices can detect trace elements of explosives through the use of a surface swab or by sampling the air around a person or object.
- ! **Closed Circuit Television (CCTV).** Camera monitoring (surveillance) systems that are in use in almost every court facility in the country. The CCTV systems monitor events inside and outside the building and long-range systems can monitor events thousands of yards or more from the courthouse. Many CCTV systems include audio monitoring and digital recording features.
- ! **Pin Pad Locks.** These locks require a combination to open the door.
- ! **Card Readers.** These locks permit access to restricted areas of a facility by swiping a magnetic card to open a door. Access to all or parts of a facility is possible through selective programming. This type of lock is in routine use at most hotel chains.
- ! **Biometric Systems.** These devices use your fingerprints or retina pattern for access to secure sections of a facility. You place your fingers on a scanner pad or look into a retina scanner to allow entry to a restricted area. Use of biometrics is a new technology, but expect it to become commonplace in the near future.
- ! **Electric Locks.** The use of electric locks is common in prisons, jails and holding areas. The system requires a visual confirmation that you are authorized entry to a restricted area; then you are “buzzed through” a series of doors.

! **Alarm Systems (*Panic Buttons or Duress Alarm*)**. These buttons are typically strategically located throughout the courtroom and in other locations throughout the facility. The button sends a signal to a central location to alert security staff to an incident in progress at a given location.

Magnetometer Surprises



Lipstick Knife



Pen Knife

(Photos courtesy Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration – TSA.)

Restricted Areas

Courthouses, prisons and jails all have restricted access areas. In addition, a staff interpreter may have more access to a facility than a contract interpreter. When in doubt about the access level of a room, hallway, stairway or elevator, ask. If you become lost, which is totally possible considering the mazes in larger facilities, ask for directions.

In the event of a major emergency, personnel may not be looking for you in a location where you are not supposed to be in the first place. In addition, you may put other members of the court family at risk if they are required to rescue you from an unauthorized area of a facility.

Not only is roaming through unauthorized areas a security risk, it reflects poorly on you as a professional interpreter. Since most interpreters work on a contract basis for the courts, consider yourself as a guest in someone's home.

Some notable areas of a court facility that are off-limits to staff and contract interpreters without specific authorization include, but are not limited to:

1. Judges' Chambers (never go into a judge's chambers for any reason unless it's authorized).
2. Hallways, stairways and elevators reserved for judges' use.
3. Hallways, stairways, elevators and sallyports used for prisoner transport.
4. Secure parking areas used by judges and administrators.

In addition, the following areas may be off-limits to the contract interpreter:

1. Employee parking facilities.

2. Employee restrooms.
3. Employee lunchrooms and lounges.
4. Conference and meeting rooms.

It is common practice, in many secure facilities, to issue employees, contractors and visitors ID badges. If the security department issues you an ID badge, keep it secure and wear it in a visible location at all times while you are in the building or on facility grounds.

Make sure you return any ID badges issued to you once you end your term of employment with the court. If you have received a visitor's pass while working as a contractor in a court facility, make sure you turn it in to security personnel before leaving the building.

Prohibited Items

Due to the special security situation found in our nation's courts, jails and prisons, you'll need to take special precautions with almost everything imaginable in this environment. No explanation is necessary for most of the items on the prohibited items list:

Firearms (including toys)	Stun Guns
Ammunition	Phasers
Explosives	Cameras (including in cell phones)
Flammable Items	Recording Devices (all devices)
Mace or Muzzle	Razors
Knives	Tools



It's for Your Safety and the Safety of Others...

If a CSO confiscates any item on entry, do not argue with the security staff. There is a rationale behind security policy. Be professional!

Makeshift Weapons and the Interpreter

The court interpreter may work in many venues during their career - a court, jail or prison. In all settings you, members of the court family and the general public are at risk from makeshift weapons. Makeshift weapons fall into two categories:

1. Improvised Weapons - weapons created from common objects.
2. Weapons of Opportunity - common objects used as weapons.


Both weapon categories are of great concern in the judicial and corrections environments and both are deadly.

Improvised weapons created by inmates in the criminal justice system are both incredible and imaginative. Inmates, with plenty of time on their hands, can turn an everyday object into a deadly weapon. Take, for example, some of the following improvised weapons seized from inmates by the Texas Department of Corrections:

Improvised Weapons




Gavel with a surprise!



The paintball is as hard as a rock. Placed in a sock it becomes a dangerous weapon.



Pen with pick enclosed.



Scissors



Shower slide blade – sandal conceals a deadly blade.



Shanks made from wood, a deer's antler and even a bone from a t-bone steak.



The roll of toilet paper hides a “stinger” – used to boil water. The boiled water becomes the weapon. Note: The boot in the background also has a hidden compartment and was seized from Charles Harrelson, convicted of the murder-for-hire of U.S. District Judge John H. Wood Jr. in San Antonio, Texas.

(Improvised weapons photos provided courtesy Mr. Jim Willett, Director, Texas Prison Museum.)

Weapons of opportunity are all around us. They could be as basic as a rock picked up off the ground. Here is a list of some items that could become weapons of opportunity in the courtroom or other settings:

Weapons of Opportunity in the Courtroom

Microphones	Keys
Cords	Fingernail Files
Name Plates	Tweezers
Staplers	Safety Pins
Staple Remover	Purses/Straps
Thumbtacks	Straight Pins
Tape Dispenser	Hair Clips
Briefcases	Hot Coffee or Tea
Telephones	Book
Trash Cans	Binders
Scissors	Clipboard
Letter Openers	Ruler
Eyeglasses/Frames	Laptop Computer
Water Pitcher	Cell Phone
Water Glasses	Tie Pin/Clip
Hole Puncher	Tie
Pens	Earrings
Pencils	Pocket Mirrors
Credit Cards	Soft Drink Bottles
Perfume and Cologne	Umbrellas
Hair Spray	Knitting Needles
ID Cards	Hair Comb
Chairs	Hair Brush
Tables	ANY Evidence,
Steno Machine/Stand	Demonstration
Glass Table Protectors	or Props
Utensils (Metal or Plastic)	



Interpreter tools can become weapons of opportunity. (Photo by the author.)



Pens and Pencils Can Kill!

Pens and pencils as weapons are no joke. Reportedly, Brian Nichols, the alleged killer of a judge and court reporter in Atlanta, Georgia, attempted to keep pens on March 9, 2005 (Fulton County 28). The incident occurred two days before the alleged escape and killings.



Food for Thought:

Interpreters need to account for and secure ordinary objects that can serve as weapons of opportunity. For instance, if you are using a pen and a clipboard when you visit a holding cell, make sure you have those two items with you upon exit. Also, don't forget to keep track of your pen cap – it can also serve as a weapon of opportunity!

Parking Areas

Parking areas for the court or other facility can range from general public parking to parking within the secure compound. Unless you are a staff interpreter and have authorization to park in an employees-only area, you'll be parking in an area designated for the general public.



Use Caution in Parking Lots!

The Middletown, Connecticut shooting incident of June 15, 2005 occurred in a parking garage next to the Middlesex Superior Court. A woman was murdered, her attorney seriously injured, and the perpetrator, her husband, then committed suicide (Siegel, Zitka). Brian Nichols, the suspect in the Atlanta courthouse shootings of March 11, 2005, allegedly carjacked a vehicle from a newspaper reporter in a public parking garage during his getaway (Riley).

As discussed in a previous unit, the farther away you are from the “hard target” (courthouse or other secure facility), the more vulnerable you become. Public parking areas are often outside of the patrolled perimeter security offered the courthouse. In some cases parking lots have television surveillance, other times they will not. Parking lots in the vicinity of courthouses and other security facilities are locations of concern.

Parking lots designated for the general public rarely have the security controls of the compound parking areas. Unless the parking lot is close to the secure building, security checks may be totally absent. The court interpreter may be particularly vulnerable in parking lots near secure facilities.

Parking lots are high-risk areas, especially at night, for rapes, abductions, carjackings and other criminal activity. Multi-level parking garages have unique hazards and using escorts, especially at night, is highly advised. Be aware of your surroundings in parking lots and avoid tasks that may be distractions such as reading notes, talking on the cell phone, etc.



Don't Misjudge Time and Distance

If followed in a parking lot, never make a run for your car! Run to the closest group of people or back to the building. Toss your keys. Remember the 21-foot rule and the speed at which an assailant can close in on you. In the time it takes you to reach your car, get your keys out and open the door, the aggressor will be on top of you. Your assailant now has you, your keys and a means of escape. Tragically, surveillance cameras of a major department store chain recorded this scenario in real life; police found the victim's body two days later (Barnes A13).

The following are common-sense precautions when in a parking lot near a secure facility (Joint Chiefs of Staff 11-12):

1. Park the shortest distance to the building.
2. Park near a lighting system.
3. Keep valuables out of sight.
4. Enter and exit the building with others.
5. Walk straight to the entry area of the building.
6. Avoid occupied parked cars.
7. If followed, quickly return to the building – do not go to your car.
8. If alone, ask for an escort.
9. Take note of suspect objects near or under your vehicle.

10. Approach from the rear and check the inside of the vehicle.
11. Look for any damage to the lock and handle before opening the door.
12. Once inside your vehicle, lock the door.
13. Report any suspicious activity to security personnel.
14. Never put your address or license plate numbers on your key chain.
15. Keep separate key chains for your car and home.

Public Areas

As is the case with parking lots, public areas around the courthouse or other secure facility are more vulnerable to hazards. Perimeter security and video surveillance may be sparse to nonexistent. The courthouse, in many cities, consists of designated floors of a multipurpose county or city building; therefore, security screening may take place well inside the building structure, sometimes on a different floor of the building.

Until you have cleared the physical security checkpoint layer, you are at increased risk. Outside of the security checkpoint, it is possible to carry firearms and other weapons undetected. The names of fatalities as a result of attacks that have occurred in public areas near courthouses before and after divorce and child custody hearings would fill pages of this manual.

Unfortunately, victims of attacks in public areas near courthouses and other facilities are essentially “wrong place at the wrong time” casualties. Although there is no way to completely protect yourself, it’s always important to be alert to your

surroundings. If an emergency situation unfolds, your alertness will buy you enough time to retreat to a safe position.

If you ever find yourself in a public area where a verbal confrontation is occurring – retreat. Then report the incident to the nearest security official. Don't stick around or get in the middle of a verbal or physical confrontation.



Public Areas Near Courts are Dangerous

If you've had the opportunity to view the video, I doubt you'll soon forget the incident that took place on a walkway outside the Van Nuys Superior Courthouse on October 31, 2003. An assailant opens fire on a probate attorney and shoots him several times while he attempts to take cover behind a tree. The attorney survives the attack (Deutsch). Likewise, the attack on the U.S. Courthouse in Corpus Christi in June 2004 came from a public area (sidewalk) in front of the building.

Reporting Suspicious Activities and Objects

Always report any suspicious activities to the nearest security officer. If it doesn't look right or it doesn't feel right, report it. If the incident occurs while you are leaving the building or parking area, report it to 911. There is no such thing as a "stupid" report.

Always Report the Following to Security Personnel:

- ! Suspicious packages, backpacks and other items left unattended in public areas.**
- ! Suspicious trucks, vans or other vehicles that appear overloaded on the axles.**
- ! Individuals photographing, videotaping, or sketching a courthouse, jail or prison.**
- ! Individuals conducting surveillance of a courthouse, jail or prison (using binoculars, etc.)**
- ! If you observe the same individual loitering (in public areas or in vehicles) in the vicinity of the courthouse, jail or prison for several days.**
- ! If someone asks you questions about building security or security personnel.**
- ! If you detect an individual is carrying a concealed weapon (sometimes they will be law enforcement officers or individuals with lawful permits, but it could be something else).**
- ! Verbal or physical altercations in progress (no matter how minor).**
- ! Any threats against any person or property.**



Food for Thought

Common objects can be used to pick handcuff locks. Always inventory and secure:

Paper Clips

Bobby Pins

Earrings

Wire Objects



For Further Information

United States Marshals Service

Department of Justice
Crystal Square Building 3
1735 Jefferson-Davis Hwy.
Arlington VA 22202

www.usmarshals.gov
us.marshals@usdoj.gov

New York State Unified Court System Courts in the Aftermath of 9-11

9-11 Summit
25 Beaver Street, Room 975
New York NY 10004

www.9-11summit.org/materials.html

Points of Contact
Wendy Deer or Chester Mount

800-695-8767
212-428-2990
212-428-2148

Mount Pleasant Police Department

100 Ann Edwards Lane
Mount Pleasant SC 29464

www.mppolice.com

843-884-4176

The Mount Pleasant Police Department has a detailed section on parking lot safety on their website.



Questions, Activities and Scenarios

1. Why are both cameras and recording devices prohibited items in a court facility?

2. Activity:

During your next visit to a courthouse, observe the security equipment used for screening visitors. Identify the various types of equipment used and their purpose.

3. Activity:

For the next five minutes, make a list of every item in the room you're in right now that could serve as either an improvised weapon or a weapon of opportunity.

4. Now, for the next five minutes, make a list of every item in the room you're in right now that qualifies as a prohibited item in a court facility.

5. Scenario:

You have brought a recording device into a courthouse during an interpreting assignment. In the hallway, a court security officer stops you and informs you that recording devices are prohibited items in court, and proceeds to temporarily confiscate the device until you are ready to leave the building. How do you respond?

UNIT 5

INFORMATION SECURITY AND CLEARANCES



“Loose lips sink ships.”
(Anonymous)

Unit 5



Target Objectives of this Unit Include:

- 1. Applying operational security procedures (OPSEC) and the “need to know” principle in the interpreter’s workplace.**
- 2. Implementing protective measures to safeguard computer and electronic communications.**
- 3. Reinforcing the importance of protecting documents.**
- 4. Examining the various types of fingerprint and background checks required of interpreters.**
- 5. Eliciting the interpreter’s full cooperation with the background check process.**
- 6. Heightening awareness of the need for nondisclosure of information in sealed hearings and documents.**
- 7. Understanding the Classified Information Procedures Act and its implications for interpreters.**
- 8. Developing strategies, based on ethical considerations, for dealing with the media.**

Operations Security (OPSEC)

If you've had any military or U.S. Government experience, **Operations Security (OPSEC)** is a daily fact of life. In general, OPSEC refers to the procedures and methods used to secure critical information and prevent its release to unauthorized parties, particularly our adversaries (Joint Chiefs of Staff I-1). For those of you in government service who handle classified documents and information, a set policy is no doubt in place. This manual cannot discuss or disclose those policies.

A critical aspect of OPSEC, important to both the staff and contract interpreter, is the security of unclassified "everyday" information. You go to work each day in the same building, or perhaps you work as a contractor at many locations. You see things and you hear things. Coworkers and colleagues become your friends and they share work-related information with you. The information is not "secret" and it's not "classified." Nonetheless, this is "operational information" that should not be discussed outside your place of work.



Elicitation:

The collection of information in bits and pieces in casual conversation without the intent being obvious (Personal Protection Measures Against the Terrorist Threat 2).

A passing comment about a seemingly innocent topic could, in the wrong hands, have tragic consequences. Perhaps a municipal court judge has informed you, as a colleague, that she works out at the gym every Saturday morning. Place that information in the wrong hands and an assailant can put the judge in a time and place.

At all levels of OPSEC there is the concept of information management called **need to know**. The basis for access to any information is an individual's need to know that information to complete their operational task. A translator, for example, working on wiretaps for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), would not need to know the schedule for surveillance flights over Colombia. Both sets of information may have the same classification level, but the translator's work has nothing to do with scheduling DEA surveillance flights.

If we put the concepts of need to know together with operational security, you can see how critical it is to keep what you see and hear in a courtroom or other secure facilities to yourself. Your coworkers, colleagues and even judges or court officials may mention operational or personal information to you in the course of your assignment. The best rule of thumb is this:


If they want someone else to know, they'll tell them.

Gossip is not only unprofessional, it can result in serious breaches of operational security. Stop and think before you pass any operational information inside or outside a courthouse, jail, prison or other secure facility.

*America will never be destroyed from the outside.
If we falter and lose our freedoms,
it will be because we destroyed ourselves.
— Abraham Lincoln*

*Endorse and Apply the
“Need to Know” Principle.*

*Office of the
National Counterintelligence
Executive*



www.ncix.gov

The “Need to Know Principle” – Abraham Lincoln
(Courtesy Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive)

Operational information on judges, staff members and attorneys that should always be held in personal confidence includes:

1. Schedules.
2. Hobbies and special interests.
3. Travel (including locations, times, places of arrival and departure).
4. Home addresses, phone numbers and e-mail addresses.
5. Favorite restaurants, movie theaters, hair salons.
6. Vehicle information.
7. Information on family members (schools, locations, etc.).
8. Any information that could give an assailant a time and place.

Operational information on the facility that should be guarded includes:

1. Staff numbers and locations.
2. Information on any members of the security group attending training.
3. Location and types of security devices.
4. Physical layout of any building.
5. Information on shift changes.
6. Home addresses, phone numbers and e-mail addresses of security staff.
7. Types of weapons held by security personnel.
8. Any information on security equipment, procedures or personnel.
9. Information on security scenarios and outcomes.



OPSEC in Action – Be the Village Idiot

In an interview a spokesman for the U.S. Marshals Service declined to answer any questions related to court security, even things that may seem trivial to outsiders. In fact, he commented that his inability to answer anything related to security might make him look like the “village idiot” (Lyman A18).

Computer and Electronic Communications

Elaborate antivirus and anti-intrusion (*firewall*) systems protect government computers. If you're a staff interpreter at the federal, state or local level, you'll receive information on computer procedures, including an acceptable use policy from your immediate supervisor or the information technology (IT) department. Policies on the use of the Internet, e-mail, attachments and files protect the network from compromises that could place confidential and classified information at risk due to unauthorized disclosure. Always review and follow your employer's policy and report any unusual computer activity to your IT department or supervisor.

Contract court interpreters, however, usually work from home and may have a portable laptop that they take from assignment to assignment. The contract interpreter may access the Internet from home via a dial-up modem, high-speed DSL connection, or a wireless connection at a hotel. Some Internet service providers (ISP's) may offer a complete range of network protection, including

antivirus, firewall and website services, while other companies offer the connection and additional services at your expense.

Every computer in your home, including laptop systems, should have the following protection to prevent compromise of your computer systems:

1. Antivirus Software
2. Spyware Detection Software
3. Firewall
4. Antiphishing
5. Spam Protection

Antiphishing protection offers protection from Internet fraud schemes that seek to steal personal information for criminal use. Perhaps you've received an e-mail from a bank requesting that you "update your personal information" via a website link. When you click on the link, it looks just like your bank's website. More often than not it's an elaborate hoax to steal your name, Social Security Number, driver's license number, bank and credit card numbers. With this information, crooks can change your address, get new credit cards (in your name) and steal thousands of dollars before you have any idea what happened. This is ***phishing***.



ID Theft is a Major Problem

Identity theft is a significant problem in the United States (National and State Trends in Fraud and Identity Theft January – December 2004 5). Phishing is the newest way for thieves to get your personal information.

Currently, several major companies offer all-in-one Internet security “suites” that are easy to use and configure, which update themselves automatically. These suites are inexpensive if you consider the price of purchasing each program separately.

Next, you’ll need to consider the use and protection of passwords. As a general rule:

1. Never use names for passwords.
2. Mix numbers and letters and change the case of letters.
3. Change your passwords on a regular basis.
4. Never give your passwords to third parties.
5. Change “default” passwords as soon as possible.
6. If you write passwords down, keep them in a secure area.

The hard drive is the heart of your computer. It keeps all information and backs up critical data for reuse or if a system failure occurs. Since we’ve discussed operation security, we need to touch on the subject of file deletion.

As a contract interpreter you may, from time to time, work with private information on your laptop or home computer. The information is not classified, but still needs protection. Delete files when their need has expired, using one of the following **Government Wipe** procedures:

1. Use a three-pass U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) approved wipe system.
2. Use a seven-pass National Security Agency (NSA) approved wipe system.

Simply “deleting” a file on your computer does not eliminate it from the hard drive. Wipe systems use “passes” to erase files by overwriting them with random 1’s and 0’s several times. Use a wipe system on your hard drive before you sell or donate your computer to prevent personal data from falling into the wrong hands. Several programs are available on the market to securely delete files and wipe your hard drive of data.

Don’t discuss computer information or security features with unauthorized persons. A common way for hackers to gain access through networks is through **social engineering**. Casual conversation on the right topic can give a professional hacker all the information required to break into a secure computer network (McDowell).



Loose “Lists” Can Sink Ships...

Use caution with e-mail, chatrooms, blogs and computer “lists.” If you have problems related to your work or contract assignments, discuss the problem with your supervisor or directly with someone who can help you. Complaining about your employer or a client in public forums is bad protocol. Disclosure of case information is not only unprofessional, it’s a violation of your professional ethics. Posting case information to a list or blog is “public comment.” Discussion of operational information is poor OPSEC and may result in a security incident resulting in injury or death.



Food for Thought:

I’m sure everyone has had the experience of overhearing the “life story” of a person in front of you, due to a loud cell phone conversation as you wait in a supermarket checkout line.

Never discuss case or OPSEC related information on a cell phone in public. If you receive an urgent call and there is no other option, be discreet and move to a secluded area of the room or, if outside, excuse yourself and move to an area away from other people. Keep a low voice.

Document Security

As a court interpreter, as part of your preparation for cases and as part of your daily work, you'll come into the possession of various types of court documents, including dockets, complaints, indictments, pre-sentence investigation reports and plea agreements. Some of this information is public record, but much of it is private and not intended for the eyes of the general public. Many of these documents list personal information, such as a defendant's alien registration number, Social Security Number, driver's license number, criminal history, or medical conditions. Therefore, it is incumbent upon you to ensure that all court documents and contents remain private.

To protect court documents from unauthorized use:

1. Don't leave documents lying around public areas of the courthouse. If you bring a document into a public area, take it with you when you leave.
2. Return (or destroy) documents after they have served their objectives.
3. Place documents in folders or envelopes to keep them safe from prying eyes.
4. Don't discuss the contents of court documents with unauthorized persons.

Document and Note Destruction

Destroy all court-related documents that do not require retention, including interpreter notes once they have served their useful purpose. Many courthouses and other secure facilities use internal or contract document destruction services. Ask the court security supervisor or the clerk of court for specific policy and locations of receptacles for document destruction.

If you are a contract interpreter and there is no set method of document destruction at the venue, request the use of a paper shredder. Most courts and jails have shredding devices in at least one office.

Although it's a last resort, shred the documents at home. In this age of identity theft, it's a good idea for everyone to have at least one shredder (preferably **cross-cut**) at home to destroy old bank and credit card statements, as well as any personal correspondence.



Dumpster Diving:

The practice of looking through someone's trash, or through the trash of a company, for personal information (ID Theft: When Bad Things Happen to Your Good Name 3).

Fingerprinting and Background Checks

Fingerprinting and background checks are commonplace for both staff and contract interpreters. At the federal level, processing of these checks is through the U.S. Marshals Service, the United States Office of Personnel Management and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, on behalf of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.

The Judicial Conference of September 24, 2002 authorized background checks on employees of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (Report of the

Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 52-53). This policy also extends to contractors and volunteers in a policy statement of May 16, 2005 (Fingerprinting Contract Court Interpreters 9).

In general, the background checks include the following (HHS Personal Security/Suitability Handbook 8):

1. National Agency Check (NAC). For contract interpreters.
2. National Agency Check and Inquiries (NACI). This check is required for all new Federal employees, including staff interpreters.
3. National Agency Check, Inquiries and Credit (NACIC)
4. Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI)
5. Single Scope Background Investigation - Periodic Reinvestigation (SSBI-PR)

You may question the need for a credit check, or may feel that it's an invasion of privacy. The first question you may ask is, "What does my credit have to do with a background check?" Unfortunately, individuals working in positions of trust have sold out their country for money to pay off their debts. An individual in serious debt may be a security risk. The credit check is only one factor in a background check for security positions.

If your role, as contract interpreter, requires visits to Bureau of Prisons (BOP) sites, be advised that you'll be required to complete a form BP-A660, **National Crime Information Center (NCIC)** check. NCIC clearance is required before you enter a BOP site (Visitor Background Checks General Information).

At the state and local levels, checks occur at the time of certification through the state's criminal identification center, with national checks through the Federal

Bureau of Investigation.

Recently there has been some controversy over the issue of background checks for the interpreter community. In a perfect world, professionals, such as interpreters, attorneys, teachers and even law enforcement personnel would all do the right thing all the time. Sadly, this is not the case.

Imagine a federally certified contract interpreter, with a background of drug smuggling convictions, interpreting for a defendant in a similar case. This could represent an incredible security risk to the court family, as well as raise questions about that interpreter's impartiality. Personally, I fully support the background checks to keep our courts, jails and prisons secure.

Cooperate fully with the background check process and keep in mind it's to protect you, the court family and the general public. Not a sign of distrust, or something to "hassle" you.



It's More Than Pants on Fire...

Never lie about past criminal convictions on any government questionnaire; false information is a felony or serious misdemeanor. Everybody makes mistakes, sometimes big mistakes. In most cases, security staff considers the type of offense, how long ago it occurred, your rehabilitation and other factors before denying certification.

Security Clearance Levels

The U.S. Government interpreter background checks correspond to the following security clearance levels (HHS Personal Security/Suitability Handbook 21):

1. Non-Sensitive Positions “Non-Sensitive” access: NAC
2. Sensitive Positions “Confidential” and “Secret” access: NACI
3. Sensitive Positions “Confidential” and “Secret” access: NACIC
4. Sensitive (High Risk) “Top Secret” access: SSBI with SSBI-PR

Sealed Hearings and Documents

You’ll be well advised to take extraordinary precautions to secure information when any of the following keywords are heard in court.

1. Gag Order
2. Closed Hearing
3. Sealed
4. In Camera (Chambers)
5. Suppressed
6. Protective Order

If you violate prohibitions on disclosure of information in any of these instances, it is more than a breach of interpreter ethics. Violations of court orders may result in fines or incarceration.



OPSEC is Forever

If you decide to change locations or employers, retire or trade your court interpreting career for something new, keep operational information to yourself. Willful or accidental disclosure of a piece of the puzzle to the wrong person may have an impact long after your current assignment or employment. Keep your former court family safe by safeguarding information.

The Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA)

The odds that any interpreter will work with a case that is adjudicated under the ***Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA)*** is remote, but worth noting since these cases have been increasing in frequency since the events of 9-11.

In the past it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to provide for due process under the law while, at the same time, protecting our nation's secrets. To strike a balance, Congress passed, and President Carter signed into law, the Classified Information Procedures Act of 1980 (PL96-456) – commonly referred to by its acronym: “CIPA.”

If you are providing services under the CIPA, and exposed to classified documents and information at the Confidential, Secret or Top Secret levels, you'll need to have background checks of Sensitive or Sensitive (High Risk). There may

be cases, however, where documents and information could go beyond the Top Secret level. In those instances your clearance investigation would be required to match the classification levels of the documents and information.

Staff or contract interpreters, without proper clearances, cannot attend any proceeding sealed under CIPA. In fact, it would be necessary to bring in a staff or contract interpreter from another city with the correct clearances. The basic background investigation for exposure to Top Secret information is the Single Scope Background Investigation; this process can take several months and cost thousands of dollars. An interpreter with the clearance, or prior clearances (military experience, etc.), can save the government time and money. It's not that they don't "trust" you.

The CIPA process is complex. It involves the designation of a "Court Security Officer" specifically assigned to assure the security of documents, process security clearances, set up facilities for secure communication, as well as other tasks.

It's important to note: The Court Security Officer for CIPA is not the same as the CSO's assigned to regular duty protecting the court. Under CIPA, security agencies and the Attorney General or the Justice Security Officer recommend personnel for this important position. In fact, the CSO under CIPA may not be a member of the United States Marshals Service.

The Media

A member of the media may approach you, especially if they recognize you from court. Under no circumstances are you to talk to the media. If you feel pressured to say something, refer them to the clerk of court, the public information officer (PIO) or court spokesperson. A "no comment" as you rush to your car is also very

effective.

One exception to the ban on talking to the media is questions related to interpreting as a career. Questions related to interpreter training programs, certification programs and professional organizations are appropriate. If the topic drifts to specific cases, terminate the interview. Even in this one area of exception, seek the permission of supervisory court personnel before the interview. Contractors, as a professional courtesy, should follow the same procedure before talking to the media. Be professional and follow the supervisor's decision.



CODE OF ETHICS:

Your code of ethics may prohibit you from talking to the media! For example:

Canon 6: Restriction on Public Comment

Interpreters shall not publicly discuss, report or offer an opinion concerning a matter in which they are or have been engaged, even when that information is not privileged or required by law to be confidential (Hewitt 206).

Canon 7

Official Court Interpreters shall refrain from speaking to any representative of the news media, while in the performance of his or her official duties, and avoid any appearance of impropriety at all times when approached by a representative of the news media (Code of Professional Ethics and Protocol for Court Interpreters 1).



For Further Information

The Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO)

The National Archives and Records Administration
8601 Adelphi Road
College Park MD 20740-6001

<http://www.archives.gov/isoo/>

866-272-6272

Federal Investigative Services

Office of Personnel Management
1900 E Street NW
Washington, DC 20415-1000

www.opm.gov/extra/investigate/

202-606-1800

Interagency OPSEC Support Staff (IOSS)

6411 Ivy Lane Ste 400
Greenbelt MD 20770

www.iooss.gov
iooss@radium.ncsc.mil

443-479-4650 (secure line)
443-479-4700 (unclassified line)

National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX)

CS5, Room 300
Washington DC 20505

www.ncix.gov

703-682-4500

**National Institute of Standards
and Technology, Computer Security
Division, Computer Security
Resource Center**

100 Bureau Drive, Stop 1070
Gaithersburg MD 20899-1070

<http://csrc.nist.gov/ATE/>
sectraining-info@nist.gov

301-975-6478

United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team

US-CERT Security Operations Center
Mail Stop 8500
245 Murray Lane, SW, Building 410
Washington DC 20528

www.us-cert.gov
info@us-cert.gov

The Classified Information Procedures Act

Government Printing Office Online

http://www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/title18a/18a_3_.html



Questions, Activities and Scenarios

1. Define the following concepts in your own words.

a. OPSEC: _____

b. Elicitation: _____

c. "Need to know": _____

2. Why is it important to safeguard the operational and personal information you have access to during the course of your duties as an interpreter?

3. Provide three examples of operational information on judges, attorneys or staff that interpreters should keep in confidence at all times.

4. Provide three examples of operational information on court facilities that interpreters should always safeguard.

5. When you take notes during the course of an interpretation, much of what you write may be totally unintelligible to others. Explain why it is still important to destroy notes after an interpretation session.

6. Assess the value and importance of background and fingerprint checks for court interpreters.

7. Prepare a short phrase that you can readily use to respond to a member of the media regarding comments about your work on a court case.

8. Activity:

Perform an inventory of the software on your home computer and/or laptop to ensure that you have the necessary protection against viruses, spam, phishing, spyware, and hackers. Make a list of additional items you may need to increase your equipment's security. Prioritize the items according to the level of security they provide.

9. Scenario:

Two interpreters, working as a team during a jury trial, are at a restaurant near the courthouse during their lunch break. They discuss the case among themselves and speculate as to the outcome of the trial. Even though they are not discussing this information with any third parties, why is this bad OPSEC?

What could the consequences of this conversation be if:

a. A juror is sitting at a nearby table, out of sight of the interpreters, but within earshot.

b. A defendant is sitting nearby, also out of sight of the interpreters and within earshot.

c. A local news reporter is in the booth directly behind the interpreters.

UNIT 6

IN-COURT PROCEEDINGS



“None love the messenger who brings bad news.”
(Sophocles)

Unit 6



Target Objectives of this Unit Include:

- 1. Locating and identifying physical hazards in court facilities, both outside and inside the courthouse.**
- 2. Categorizing biological hazards in the courtroom according to modes of transmission of disease.**
- 3. Implementing methods for preventing the spread of contagious diseases.**
- 4. Devising appropriate responses to emergency scenarios in court facilities, such as fires, bomb threats, suspicious packages, medical emergencies, courtroom disturbances, gunfire, and hostage situations.**
- 5. Promoting alertness by identifying moments of increased tension in civil and criminal proceedings.**
- 6. Assessing the unique risks in the family court environment and taking adequate precautions when working as an interpreter in this setting.**
- 7. Increasing awareness and alertness when interpreting in holding cells and/or conference areas.**

Definition

For our use we will define an in-court proceeding as any event occurring in a building or facility that hosts a permanent or temporary courtroom. Included in this definition are holding cells, and any other location at the site where an interpreter may be called upon to provide services.

Physical Hazards

As noted in Unit 4, physical hazards are present well before you reach the courthouse. You must be especially alert in public parking lots, access paths to the courthouse and all public areas outside the initial security screening area.

Of special concern are public areas around a “funnel” that directs courthouse visitors through a single security checkpoint. If there is only one way in and one way out of a courthouse, this may be a prime location for an assailant to ambush an ex-spouse, attorney, or civil litigant. Avoid lingering around security screening areas; go through the checkpoint and stay clear of this area until you need to leave the courthouse.

Federal courthouses, in most cases, have the security checkpoint and screening area as close to the public access entryway as possible. This helps to contain any security event to the immediate area around the checkpoint, usually in a foyer. Well before visitors arrive at the entryway, CSO's monitor and scrutinize their approach.

State and local courts, on the other hand, may have the first security checkpoint and screening area well inside the building - sometimes on a different floor. Multipurpose state, county and city office buildings often house courtrooms. Take

special precautions in these instances and proceed to and clear the security checkpoint and screening area as soon as possible. Since there are no checks for weapons prior to the first screening area, you and everyone around you are vulnerable to an attack.

States with large rural areas often have temporary or multiuse court buildings. A visiting judge may “travel the circuit” to several different venues. Security screening may be complete, by hand wand or nonexistent.

Of special concern are court facilities without any security screening devices or checkpoints. These situations are a roll of the dice for you and everyone in that environment. If you opt to work in these environments, do so at your own risk and stay alert.

At all venues, report objects and activities that are suspect to the nearest court security officer.



Food for Thought:

On your way to a state, county or municipal court assignment? Be aware and alert! Due to budget problems, 50 percent of state courts may lack the necessary security staff or equipment needed to keep those venues completely safe (Tavernise A11).

Courthouse Approaches are Dangerous Areas



In this surveillance camera frame it's business as usual at the Smith County Courthouse, Texas on February 24, 2005 (courtesy Tyler Police Department).



Moments later the courthouse security screening area becomes a battle zone with CSO's seeking concealment behind security equipment. Although the event lasted a little over two minutes, authorities recovered 70 bullets in the courthouse alone (courtesy Tyler Police Department).



Secure and Limit Weapons of Opportunity

I cannot stress enough the importance of securing potential weapons of opportunity, possible material for improvised weapons and lock picking material. Take the following example:

January 20, 2006: A co-defendant in a murder trial allegedly stabs his attorney with an improvised weapon made of plastic (similar to the material found in an interpreter's clipboard) during a hearing. The other co-defendant attempts to take the sidearm of a CSO in the confusion. A witness allegedly observed a nonverbal exchange of "winks" between the defendants prior to the attack (Ginsberg, Schmetterer).

Biological Hazards

Biological hazards in the courtroom may come from five sources (Spread of Infection):

1. **Airborne** – Contagious diseases that range from common colds and flu to pneumonia and tuberculosis.
2. **Direct Contact** – These diseases involve physical contact by touching or by contact with bodily fluids, and include bacterial and viral diseases, such as impetigo, chicken pox and meningitis.

3. **Indirect Contact** – Bacterial, viral and fungal diseases can also be spread by contact with an infected surface, such as a tabletop, a handrail, or office equipment. Some diseases commonly spread by indirect contact include ringworm and conjunctivitis.
4. **Droplet** – Diseases transmitted by the infected droplets from coughing, sneezing or talking include respiratory infections, such as bronchitis.
5. **Common Vehicle Transmission** - These illnesses occur through ingestion and include cholera and hepatitis.

Transmission of vector-borne diseases (through mosquitoes, flies, etc.) is remote in the courtroom or correctional environment.

Clearly, the most common biological threats in the courtroom arise from airborne, droplet and indirect contact transmission. It's important to point out, however, that you, as well as other members of the court family, are at risk through direct contact as a result of assaults, including bites and spitting.

A major problem in the corrections environment is the spread of **methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA)** – a type of staph infection resistant to most antibiotics. MRSA infections often appear as mild skin infections, but can quickly develop into very serious infections that can lead to tissue necrosis or gangrene and may require surgery or amputation. If left untreated, these infections are deadly. MRSA can also manifest itself as a respiratory infection. Modes of transmission include direct contact, indirect contact and droplet contact. People with compromised immune systems are especially susceptible to MRSA, but it can and does affect otherwise healthy people. The Bureau of Prisons has identified

hand washing as “the simplest and most important infection control measure” to prevent the spread of MRSA (Federal Bureau of Prisons 1-38).

Defendants receive medical care in the prison setting, but the fact that they are in confinement and in close contact with other prisoners makes them especially prone to contagious diseases. If a defendant is wearing a facemask, disease transmission may be a concern. Maintaining physical distance from defendants is not only a good physical security strategy, it is also good disease prevention.

Since court interpreters regularly handle equipment, such as headsets, microphones and transmitters, they may be susceptible to diseases spread by indirect contact. If possible, you should reserve one headset and one microphone “for personal use only.” Make it a habit to disinfect equipment after each use, especially headsets worn by defendants. There are several commercially available antibacterial wipes on the market well suited for this purpose. (Isopropyl alcohol 70 percent and a paper towel make an adequate and inexpensive substitute.)

Use antibacterial hand lotions after handling equipment and wash your hands frequently. Avoid biting your fingernails or placing your hands in the vicinity of your mouth and face.

Court interpreters would be well advised to contact their family physicians and/or their local public health department to inquire about vaccinations against common contagious diseases including flu, hepatitis A and B, and pneumonia.



Food for Thought:

Assemble a “health safety” kit to protect yourself against disease transmission. Include antibacterial wipes, alcohol wipes, and antibacterial lotion. Place these items in a Ziploc bag and carry them in your handbag or briefcase. This way, you will always have them handy, no matter where you’re working. But remember to keep them out of sight and out of reach – they can be weapons of opportunity!

Emergency Procedures

As is the case with any public building, the courthouse has a variety of emergency and evacuation procedures in place for an array of contingencies including: fires, bomb threats, bombings, escapes and escape attempts, shots fired, hostage(s) taken, to name a few.

If you are a staff interpreter you may receive monthly briefings and have frequent drills based on various scenarios. Contract interpreters, however, may be out of the loop. If you find yourself in unfamiliar security terrain the best thing to do is ask a CSO what to do, “If...” Don’t wait until it’s too late to find out how to evacuate the courtroom or another part of the building.

As cited in Unit 5, some information on emergency procedures is public knowledge, and other information is “need to know.” For example, in case of a fire, the courtroom has a set plan of evacuation, usually in a conspicuous place on the wall. In the case of a hostage situation, however, prior knowledge of the security

response becomes an operational security issue. You, in your position, do not need to know how security will respond.

As noted in the disclaimer, it's impossible to create scenarios for every possible situation in the courtroom and the environs of the court building. Believe it or not, CSO's spend time creatively developing situations where things go wrong to practice their response, and then improve their response. If something can go wrong, it will go wrong, and court security personnel spend significant portions of time training for situations that may never occur. If something happens, they'll be ready to keep you and the court family safe.

Events and Responses

Fires

Follow posted evacuation procedures noted in the building. Before opening any closed door, feel for heat. If heat is present, attempt to seek an alternative exit. During fire emergencies, use the stairs marked as fire exits. It is particularly important, if you are unfamiliar with the building, to follow the directions of CSO's. They know the layout of the building and are familiar with alternative exits.

Bombs, Suspected Bombs and Bomb Threats

Follow the courthouse policy in case of any bomb threat. If you're a staff interpreter and receive a bomb threat, use the call procedure guidelines from the court; it's a good idea to have this policy next to your phone at all times.

Both staff interpreters and contract interpreters should make themselves aware of bomb threat policies at each venue. CSO's will advise the court personnel and

public if a partial or complete building evacuation is necessary. Follow the prescribed evacuation routes.

Once outside the building, it's important to avoid areas that could contain a secondary explosive device. Bombers sometimes use two or three bombs to target people evacuating a building and first responders like police and fire personnel.


In the unlikely event that a hand grenade or small explosive is about to be detonated in your vicinity, immediately drop to the ground, pointing the soles of your shoes in the direction of the explosive, with your legs held tightly together for protection. In this position, most of the deadly force and shrapnel should pass over your body (Joint Chiefs of Staff 17).

Mail Security and Safety

If you receive a package with any of the following indicators, beware! Take all suspect packages seriously. A mail bomb sent to the Birmingham, Alabama home of the Honorable U.S. Appellate Judge Robert Smith Vance exploded, killing him and injuring his wife in 1989 (Roth 9).



WARNING! Suspect Letter and Package Indicators



FOR MORE INFORMATION ON BOMB SECURITY OR BOMB THREATS, CONTACT YOUR LOCAL ATF OFFICE.
ATF I 3324.1 (6/95)

(Courtesy Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives)



Follow Courthouse Mail Procedures

If you are a staff interpreter or contractor with mail privileges, never open an unscreened parcel. In the U.S. Courts, the U.S. Marshals Service will stamp all screened parcels. State and local courts may have different procedures – check with the CSO's if you have any questions.

If you observe any abandoned package or suspicious object, report it immediately to CSO's in person. In addition, parked vehicles that appear overloaded or have other indicators such as visible and hanging wires, possible timers, etc. are cause for immediate concern. Never touch or approach a suspect object or vehicle. Never use a cell phone to call 911 in the immediate vicinity of a suspected explosive device. Radio waves, including the frequency of waves used in cell phones, can detonate explosives.

Medical Emergencies

The judge, defendant or juror appears to have a heart attack. You have your Red Cross CPR card and you rush to the aid of the person in distress. Wrong! In this situation you need to fight your altruistic nature to help and quickly withdraw to a safe area. CSO's are usually highly trained in emergency medical procedures.

A defendant may exploit the moment of confusion surrounding a medical emergency in the courtroom. The defendant could be feigning a heart attack. You'll lean over to help and suddenly a pen is in your face and an arm around your throat. It takes only a second. Now you and the CSO's have a real problem.

In most major cities CSO's speak Spanish – enough to converse in a medical emergency with the defendant. If they need your interpreting assistance to communicate with the defendant, they'll ask you. If they don't ask, stay away. If you are off the side in a safe place, you're just one less person they'll need to worry about.

Courtroom Disturbance

Anytime you see or hear anything out of the ordinary, withdraw to a safe area of the courtroom or depart via a predestinated exit if possible. Courtroom disturbances can range from verbal altercations to close combat and edged weapons attacks.

Get and stay out of the way! The longer you remain in the vicinity of the disturbance, the greater the likelihood that you'll become part of the event. Interpreters and other court staff, in the way of CSO's, make it more difficult and dangerous for them to carry out their duties.

Each courtroom and courthouse may have a different strategy for dealing with disturbances. The time to ask the CSO's about procedures is now, not when the defendant is charging the witness stand with a pen in hand.

Outside Courtroom Disturbance

If you hear a disturbance occurring in the hallway or another part of the courthouse, increase your distance from the defendant(s). A defendant may use the distraction for an escape attempt or to take a hostage. Position yourself in a relatively secure place in the courtroom.

Do not leave the courtroom unless instructed to do so by court security staff. It is common practice to have a ***lock down*** to secure the building during a disturbance. In the courtroom, behind a locked door, with CSO's you're safe. Step into the hallway and you don't know what you'll be getting into. Many times the safest place is where you are.

Shots Fired Inside the Courtroom

With modern security screening procedures at most courthouses this is a highly unlikely event. When you hear shots or see a firearm in the wrong hands, however, drop immediately to the floor and lie flat. Make yourself a “small target.” If possible, and if it’s safe to do so, creep to cover but stay flat.

The longer you’re standing during an exchange of gunfire, the greater the likelihood that you’ll become a casualty or fatality. Injury or death from a ricochet is another possibility. In the confusion you could also become a victim of ***friendly fire***.

CSO’s are highly trained in the use of firearms in close quarters (like courtrooms). In fact, some of their training takes place in actual courtrooms or in realistic mockups. A courtroom gunfight will take place on the CSO’s “home turf” and they’ll have the advantage. If you are moving around or standing up you’ll become a distraction, provide possible cover for the aggressor or become a hostage.

Stay down until security officials “clear” the room. Understandably, after a shootout everyone is a foe until proven otherwise. And, understandably, everyone will be nervous. Stay calm and follow instructions (Personal Security Guidelines for the American Business Traveler Overseas 48).

Shots Fired Outside the Courtroom

If you hear shots fired outside the courtroom, distance yourself from the defendant(s) and allow CSO’s to secure the situation in your courtroom. Remember, any unplanned confusion presents an opportunity for an escape attempt or hostage crisis. Don’t become part of the problem!

Typically, the CSO's immediately lock down the courtroom, secure the defendant(s), and then execute emergency evacuation procedures. Modern courthouses are often equipped with super-secure "safe rooms." It's possible that the judge and other high-level staff will be placed in the safe room while you, other court staff, the jury, and gallery are evacuated through alternative exits.

Follow the instructions of CSO's. Don't panic and don't run for the nearest exit. The security staff is in touch with the command center and they'll be monitoring the location of the gunfire. The command staff will advise the CSO's in each courtroom how to proceed.

Hostage Situation

In the unlikely event you are taken hostage in the courtroom (Safe Travel Begins with You 23):

1. Remain calm and alert and do not attract attention to yourself.
2. Comply with your captors' directions and do not complain.
3. Be non-threatening – do not argue or threaten your captors.
4. Avoid physical violence.
5. Try to "humanize" the event. If you need something, ask for it in a low, non-threatening voice.
6. Rely on your internal resources and be positive.

At the sound of gunfire or small explosions and flashes, follow the procedures for shots fired in the courtroom.

Attempting to escape your captors is an individual decision and you'll need to weigh the probability of success, along with the risks to the other hostages.

Civil Proceedings

It may seem odd, but many acts of court-related violence arise from civil cases. Civil proceedings are often hotly contested and winning or losing could mean the difference between walking away with a million-dollar jury settlement, or having your case dismissed without merit by a judge.

Another important aspect of civil cases is property forfeiture. Defendants convicted of drug and financial crimes have their property seized and forfeited through the civil process.

You may work on a civil case for the plaintiff or for the court system when asset forfeiture to the government is at issue. Other times you may work for the plaintiff or defendant, providing services for non-English speaking witnesses.

Interpreters should be on the alert at the following times in civil cases:

1. Decisions on any motions.
2. Findings
3. Verdicts
4. Awards

Never take the consequences of civil cases lightly. In fact, problems can develop anywhere – perhaps it's a case down the hall that has nothing to do with your assignment. Things can get out of hand quickly or fester for months or years.



Civil Cases are Dangerous

Bart Ross, despondent over the dismissal of a civil rights lawsuit by United States District Judge Joan Lefkowitz, broke into her home and murdered her mother and husband. When pulled over by police, Ross committed suicide. His car contained a hit list with the names of other judges (Wilgoren A1, A18).

Criminal Proceedings

By and large the criminal event is the most common setting for our work. Charges in criminal court may range from loitering to mass murder. As the United States becomes more linguistically diverse, the odds increase that events will require the use of interpreters.

Keep in mind during courtroom events, the hazard is not limited to the non-English speaker. Multiple prisoners brought before the judge may pose an increased risk. Any one of them, English speaker or not, may attack you or another member of the court family without warning.

Caution should be observed at all times, but particularly during the following periods of a criminal proceeding:

Initial appearance

Trial testimony

Verdict

Sentencing

At any time someone could say the wrong thing that will act as an antecedent for a violent and dangerous outburst.



All in the Family

Avoid interactions with family members in the gallery or outside of the courtroom. Not only is this an ethical issue, it is also a good security practice. Family members may not understand your role as a neutral party and may blame you for negative outcomes, or see you as an easy target for anger and resentment. Avoid public elevators and restrooms if the family members of a defendant are using them – take the stairs and use a restroom on a different floor instead.

Stay safe during criminal proceedings with these safety tips:

1. If possible have the CSO's distribute headsets or other communication devices.
2. If you are required to distribute headsets, leave all weapons of opportunity behind you. A pen behind your ear can turn deadly in seconds. Hand the equipment out with outstretched arms with a slight shift of weight on your "getaway leg."
3. Allow CSO's to collect the equipment; if this is not possible collect the devices in the same manner distributed. Never fumble with or "organize" the equipment near the prisoners. Keep 90 percent of your attention on the body language of the prisoners.

4. During consecutive interpreting take extra precautions when your writing hand is located closest to the witness box. A quick grab from the witness stand can give the defendant a pen or other weapon of opportunity. If possible, take an extra step away from the witness if you find yourself in this position.
5. If you sense increased tension on the part of the prisoner or defendant based on verbal or nonverbal cues, slowly increase your physical distance. If a barrier is in the immediate vicinity, such as a podium or desk, slowly move to that area.
6. Learn to recognize extra security precautions. If the security staff has taken extra steps to keep the court secure, then you should heighten your environmental awareness.
7. Never give a prisoner or defendant a weapon of opportunity. Ignore requests for pens, pencils, etc. The CSO should supervise any required signatures.
8. If you need to increase physical distance due a perceived threat it is absolutely necessary that you maintain a professional and calm demeanor. Maintain a flat affect and don't exhibit outward signs of fear. Continue to interpret. Do not make sudden movements. If nothing happens, you could prejudice a jury through your outward expressions of fear. Always remember that there are highly trained CSO's nearby to keep you safe. You're not on your own in these situations.

Family Court

Family court is perhaps one of the most violent environments in the court system. In fact, most judges killed over the past 35 years practiced in family court (Cameron). Staff at one family court in Kentucky describes the environment as: “Hate Court, and Demonic Relations” (Finkel A9).

A 1995 task force in California found that 60-65 percent of family court litigants were representing themselves without the support of legal counsel or advice. A participant of the task force, Family Court Commissioner H. George Taylor , noted that most judges in family court were appointed with little or no experience – they essentially learned on the job (Niven).

In Unit 1 we noted that there is no “profile” of a typical perpetrator of violence in the judicial setting. Family law and courts are a poster child for this point:

→**July 1, 1992:** George Lott calmly opens his briefcase in a Fort Worth, Texas, courtroom, pulls out a 9-mm pistol and opens fire, killing two attorneys and wounding two judges. Lott, a computer programmer, was upset over a child custody ruling (Tinsley and Blaney A5).

→**September 1, 1995:** Eileen Zelig and her daughter Dana meet their husband and father Harry Zelig at the Central Civil Courthouse in Los Angeles for a child support hearing. In a stairwell of the building, Harry pulls a pistol and fatally kills Eileen in front of their daughter. Harry – Dr. Harry Zelig – a practicing physician in the nearby

The Honorable Judge and Family Court Commissioner H. George Taylor and his wife Lynda were ambushed and murdered on March 18, 1999. There is a \$25,000.00 reward for the arrest and conviction of the killer(s), offered through the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (Penrod).

San Fernando Valley, receives a sentence of 25 years to life (Sebok).

→**April 26, 2003:** Two months after their separation, Tacoma, Washington Police Chief David Brame fatally shoots his wife in front of their two kids, and then commits suicide (Kamb).

→**June 15, 2005:** former Connecticut State Trooper Michael Bochicchio Jr. opens fire, killing his wife and wounding her attorney at a parking garage next to the Middlesex Superior Court, Middletown, Connecticut. Bochicchio then commits suicide. The Bochicchios were at court for a custody settlement hearing (Siegel, Zitka).

Make no mistake about it, family court is a dangerous work environment and you, as well as every member of the court family, need to practice extreme caution at and around this venue. Be alert! In or near a family court is no place for daydreaming.

In a nutshell, there is no event in family court that should not be cause for concern. Be extremely careful in parking areas, public walkways and any areas outside a security checkpoint and screening area. Do not hang around public areas outside the checkpoint. Arrive at the courthouse, proceed through security, complete your assignment, and then depart the courthouse.

Common events in family court include:

1. Divorces
2. Custody Cases
3. Restraining Orders
4. Domestic Violence

5. Harassment Complaints

You'll note that three of the events raise the possibility of physical violence by context. Respect family court as an emotionally-charged environment where anything can (and does) happen.

Juvenile Court

Juvenile court events can range from truancy to multiple homicides. Unfortunately, in our modern society, it's sometimes impossible to differentiate the types of offenses found in the juvenile court system from those in the adult system. Only the ages are different. In fact, juveniles are sometimes "certified" as adults, then adjudicated in the adult justice system. In 2002 juvenile courts processed more than 1.6 million cases (OJJDP Statistical Briefing Book).

Juvenile delinquency may be an indicator of family problems or a total lack of family involvement and supervision. Juvenile court, therefore, may have the feel of a family court environment. It's also common for the juvenile court to be an annex of the juvenile detention facility. For the juvenile offender, a court appearance usually means a walk down a hallway rather than a ride to a downtown facility.

Although it may not seem like it after reading a newspaper or watching the local television news, violent crimes accounted for only 12 percent of the total juvenile arrests in 2002. Overall, all crimes committed by juveniles are in decline (Snyder 1).

Due to restrictions on juvenile cases, access to court information is limited and protected. Don't share any names or other information on juvenile cases with outsiders.

Your interpreting assignment in a juvenile justice setting may reflect the complete spectrum of crimes found in the adult setting. Some statutory crimes based on age, such as truancy and curfew violations, are unique to the juvenile court environment.

You may have a tendency to think that the youth in the juvenile justice system are “just children” or “kids.” In many cases that’s true. But don’t let your guard down. The same things that happen in adult courts can happen in juvenile court settings. Be alert and use the same precautions you’d use for adult events.

Holding Cells and Conference Areas

You may provide services in any one of a number of areas inside the court facility. These areas include holding cells, conference areas and sometimes a hallway. Your risk in these situations is dependent on the client served, as well as the physical security situation around you. The contractor of your services (court, defendant or prosecutor) will greatly influence the physical situations you’ll encounter .

Many courthouses have modern holding cells monitored with CCTV; meetings with prisoners or defendants take place with close CSO supervision. In other courthouses, however, these security features may be limited.

Court interpreters are required to limit their contacts based on the contracting party. If paid by the court you are an “officer of the court”; outside contact with litigants, their families and other parties are both unethical and unprofessional.



Safety First!

Never go into a holding cell without the presence of a court security officer. Learn the locations of duress alarms in holding cells, so that you can use them at a moment's notice. Don't disclose the locations of these alarms to anyone. With this information, an assailant can thwart your ability to reach the alarm during an emergency.

Conferences covered under attorney-client privilege rules prohibit CSO's and other personnel from monitoring the conversation. Therefore, the security staff response time in an emergency is substantially increased. Ideally, the courthouse will have conference areas that place the prisoner or defendant on one side of a secure barrier (e.g., glass booths) and you and the defense attorney on the other side.

Services provided in a secluded area of a hallway during a court recess for a defendant out on bail is not an ideal situation, but it does occur. Use extra care in these situations and consider the emotional content of the exchange as you proceed.

As a rule, be alert and aware of your surroundings in the following situations:

1. Holding cell events with limited or no security present and events that require close proximity with the prisoner or defendant.
2. Holding cells that have multiple defendants and very few CSO's present.

3. Meetings held under attorney-client privilege where there are no physical barriers and the CSO is “right outside the door.”
4. Events that contain emotionally-charged content or “bad news.”



Limit Weapons of Opportunity

If asked to interpret for events in a holding cell or conference area take the minimum materials with you. A pencil, paper and perhaps a clipboard are all you need at these events. Check your purse, bag, briefcase, etc. with the security office. Limit the weapons of opportunity you bring to an interpreting event! Never provide a prisoner or defendant a weapon of opportunity or material for an improvised weapon.

Administrative Hearings

As of this date approximately 30 states in the United States have special administrative hearings courts as part of an **office of administrative hearings (OAH)** (Central Panel States). Typically these hearings cover complaints or appeals related to state agencies. Here is an example of some common topics related to administrative hearings at the state level:

1. Department of Social Services
2. Workers' Compensation
3. State Employment

4. Taxes

5. Professional Licensure

At the federal level, administrative hearings are conducted by several agencies including:

1. Department of Labor (DOL)

2. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)

3. Social Security Administration (SSA)

4. Office of Civil Rights, U.S. Department of Education (OCR)

5. Office of Personnel Management (OPM)

6. National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)

7. Federal Labor Relations Board (FLRB)

8. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)

The security afforded the proceeding is dependent on the venue. In many cases, administrative hearings for the federal government occur in state or county facilities. If called upon to interpret for an administrative hearing event, know the venue and govern your actions based on security levels.

Don't let the term "administrative hearings" fool you into allowing you to drop your guard. The revocation of an electrical contractor's license, for example, is serious business. The revocation of a license affects the individual's livelihood and economic well-being. Tax disputes may result in assessments and fines of thousands of dollars. Alleged violations of EEO and other civil rights issues are points of emotional conflict.

Administrative hearings may contain socially loaded content. The determination

on the use or misuse of deadly force by a law enforcement officer may be determined through the administrative hearing process. Decisions may have an impact well beyond those in the hearing room.


If called upon to interpret at an administrative hearing event, use caution and consider the hearing content and the gravity of possible outcomes related to the available security precautions.



Administrative Hearings

Think that you're immune from risks if you work in an administrative hearings court? Think again! Take note of this incident that took place on February 23, 2006 in Phoenix, Arizona:

It's alleged that George L. Curran IV, heavily armed, held the Honorable Jay Pollock, a federal administrative hearing judge, as well as a court reporter, two lawyers and five others hostage in the hearing room of the Phoenix, Arizona office of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The possible motive: He felt the firing of his wife by the TSA was unfair (Conrad).



For Further Information

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
810 Seventh Street NW.
Washington DC 20531

www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org

202-307-5911

***National Council of Juvenile and
Family Court Judges***
PO Box 8970
Reno NV 89507-8970

www.ncjfcj.org
staff@ncjfcj.org

775-784-6012

National Association of Administrative Law Judges
at the University of Baltimore School of Law
1420 North Charles Street
Baltimore MD 21201-5779

www.naalj.org
naalj@naalj.org

410-837-6830

National Institutes of Health
9000 Rockville Pike
Bethesda MD 20892

health.nih.gov
nihinfo@od.nih.gov

301-496-4000

Security for Personnel in Rural Courts

By Marsha Holiman

Court Executive Development Program

Institute for Court Management

National Center for State Courts

300 Newport Avenue, Williamsburg, VA 23815-4147

Online at:

<http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Education/CtSecuGuide.htm>



Questions, Activities and Scenarios

1. In your own words, define an in-court proceeding and provide three examples.

2. Which disease transmission modes cause the greatest threats to a courtroom interpreter?

3. Name three things you can do to reduce the risk of biological hazards in the courtroom.

4. During a sentencing, a defendant suddenly falls to the ground, clutching her chest, and then seems to lose consciousness. You are familiar with first aid and CPR procedures. How should you react?

5. What is the importance of keeping your pen or pencil away from a defendant or prisoner at all times during a proceeding?

6. What is the most important thing to do during a courtroom disturbance? Why?

7. Activity:

Think about the location where you regularly work. Identify and make a list of the physical hazards you encounter:

a. Upon approaching the facility

b. Upon entering the facility

c. Upon exiting the facility

Now, think of possible strategies to avoid or minimize the physical hazards noted on your list.

8. Activity:

Observe a civil or criminal proceeding. Note the type of proceeding, and try to identify the periods during the proceeding which would require extra caution if you were serving as the interpreter.

9. Activity:

Visit a family court. Again, observe a proceeding, making a note of the type and the moments in the proceeding which would represent a heightened risk for an interpreter.

10. Scenario:

You accompany a pre-trial services officer into a holding cell to take a financial affidavit from a defendant. In the middle of the affidavit, a fight breaks out between two prisoners. What should you do and why?

11. Scenario:

As you approach the courthouse, you notice a stranger dropping off a package on the stairs leading to the public entrance and then leaving in his car. What should you do? What should you avoid doing?

UNIT 7

OUT-OF-COURT PROCEEDINGS



“Alert Today. Alive Tomorrow.”
(Anonymous)

Unit 7



Target Objectives of this Unit Include:

- 1. Recognizing the physical hazards inherent to out-of-court proceedings.**
- 2. Analyzing the possibility of exposure to biological hazards in out-of-court settings and implementing preventive measures to minimize exposure to infections and contagious diseases.**
- 3. Developing strategies for dealing with emergency situations in out-of-court proceedings, such as fires, medical emergencies, gunfire and bomb threats.**
- 4. Exploring the potential risks for interpreters working in jails and correctional facilities and exploring measures to minimize or eliminate hazards.**
- 5. Fostering increased security awareness when interpreting during assignments in attorneys' offices or community settings.**

Definition

Out-of-court proceedings include all events that occur outside the court building or complex. Venues include, but are not limited to, jails, prisons, attorneys' offices and home visits.

Physical Hazards

Due to the diverse venues for out-of-court interpreting events, exposure to a wide range of physical hazards is possible, both in the building or facility and at the public approaches. Correctional facilities, for example, may have the entire complex, including approaches and parking lots, within the scope of security supervision. A deposition at an attorney's office, on the other hand, often takes place without any security beyond that afforded a typical office building.

The physical hazards you'll face in out-of-court proceedings are the same as those for in-court proceedings. There are a few additional risks that occur with greater frequency in jails and correctional facilities. Events in the community setting may require a different response, depending on the situation.

Biological Hazards

Although this information is "gross," it's also a reality of working in correctional environments. On occasion, inmates hurl containers of human feces and urine at correctional officers in an act called ***gassing*** or ***chunking***. At some facilities correctional officers use goggles and protective clothing to protect themselves from these assaults (Seigenthaler).

Urine and feces are hosts to numerous diseases and any contact with human waste is a serious event.

It's unlikely that you'll be in a situation where a human waste attack occurs. An assault of this nature, however, is always possible in any corrections environment. If led down any corridors that house temporary or permanent inmates, use extreme caution. If attacked, seek immediate attention from security and medical staff. Always report incidents in writing in case there are long-term complications from the assault.

Assaults that include spitting are serious. Contact with any bodily fluid should be reported at once to security and medical personnel.

Finally, due to the fact that sterilization of the correctional environment is virtually impossible, airborne, droplet and indirect contact diseases are a frequent problem. In the case of methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* (MRSA), the staph infection resistant to most antibiotics, the U.S. Bureau of Prisons recently issued new clinical guidelines to prevent the continued spread of this dangerous disease (Federal Bureau of Prisons 1-38).

Keep you immunizations up to date. Wash your hands frequently if visiting a correctional environment. Use disinfectant creams and wipes. Above all, keep your hands away from your mouth.

Emergency Procedures

Fires

During community and office interpreting events, you can usually find fire evacuation plans and procedures posted in each room. To review major points, never use the elevator, make sure no heat is present before you open a door and if you can't escape, indicate your position through an open window. Most importantly, know the escape plan before you need to use it and assume every alarm is the real thing!

Fires and fire alarms in a jail or correctional institution can be a scary thing. Security personnel are in charge of keeping everyone safe, while assuring the proper management of the inmate population. Don't panic, especially if you're in an area you can't escape. It's probable that you'll be behind one or more locked doors, but remember that there are procedures to evacuate all areas of the facility.

After your arrival at the facility, or on your way to the meeting area, it never hurts to ask, "What do I do if...?"

Medical Emergencies

Medical procedures in jail and correctional facilities are the same as in court. Fight your altruistic nature and retreat. Alert security staff if they are not in the immediate area. Don't become a hostage.

At attorneys' offices and in the community it's appropriate to use all skills in your possession to save a life. Since the event is taking place in an office building or other community setting, it's safe to assume that there's no secondary motive

(escape or hostage taking) on the part of the victim or others in the area. Call or direct another person to call 911.

Shots Fired

If you hear shots fired in a jail or correctional facility, follow the same procedures as you would in the courtroom. Drop to the floor and lie flat, and make yourself a small target. If the shooting is outside or in a hallway and you have the opportunity, without endangering yourself, lock and/or barricade the door.

If you're located in a locked room, don't panic, as you may be there a while. It's common practice to lock down a jail or prison at the first sign of any trouble. This isolates an event to a specific area of the jail or institution and secures other parts of the building not involved in the incident.

It's important to stress again that in any shooting incident everyone is a suspect until proven otherwise. As the security teams go room by room to clear the building, maintain a nonthreatening posture. Lie flat with arms outstretched or behind your head. If you panic and run or make quick movements, you may become a victim of friendly fire.

At the first sounds of shots fired in a building or in a community setting immediately take cover or secure and barricade your location. Contact 911 and provide them with information on the incident, including your location and the location, description and the weapon used by the shooter (if known).

If you can see the shooter, remember the MER of weapons. A rifle is effective at substantially longer distances than a handgun or a shotgun. The MER should be a significant factor in any decision to "make a run for it." If you are safe in place,

stay there and wait for assistance!

Bombs, Suspected Bombs and Bomb Threats

In general, follow the same procedures as you would for in-court events. Since jails and correctional facilities are unique environments, ask about their policies before you need them. Ask for a photocopy of this and all other emergency procedures for every facility you visit and keep a copy at the back of this manual. Review them frequently and participate in drills if you have the opportunity.

Jails

City or county operated jails are often close to or connected to the court facility, or they may be isolated miles away from the city or superior court building. Depending on the population of the jurisdiction, a jail may equal the size of a prison, or consist of a single jail cell.

As a staff or contract interpreter, you may assist in any number of events including pretrial and probation interviews. Before you accept an assignment, make sure you have proper clearances to enter the facility and have an escort (a probation officer, for example) available on your arrival.

Leave all unnecessary equipment and supplies at home or locked in your car. Minimize the weapons of opportunity in your possession. The fewer items you take to the event, the fewer items you'll have to keep track of and inventory at the end of the assignment. If you take a "handful" of pens to the visiting or conference area, you'll have no idea if you're missing a pen.

As you approach the jail, follow the same precautions and levels of alert as you would approaching a courthouse. Criminals may perceive the jail facility as a softer target to execute an attempted breakout, over a high-security correctional facility. Avoid prisoner transfers at all times in or near any jail facility.

Once inside the facility, proceed through security checkpoints as quickly as possible and report to your contact. Guide your actions according to the physical arrangement of the event. If the prisoner is on the other side of a secure barrier, your risk is minimal. If you are in the same room, your risk increases. Meetings covered by client-attorney privilege are especially hazardous when conducted in a room without barriers, since security staff cannot be present.

At any time a physical barrier is not present, keep your physical distance and apply procedures to limit access to weapons of opportunity and potential lock picks. Inventory items before you leave the room and, if anything is missing, alert security personnel to the discrepancy.

Correctional Facilities

As noted in Unit 3, correctional facilities have security levels that range from maximum to minimum. The correctional process, however, extends beyond the secure walls and fences of the prison. Other placements include work farms, halfway houses and community centers, to name a few.

As in the case of jail assignments, leave all unnecessary items at home or locked in your car.

Keep in mind that your interpreter certification is not an instant “ticket” to access

secure correctional facilities. As noted before, if you'll be visiting a U.S. Government BOP facility, you'll need to have your NCIC clearance before entry. Complete Form BP-A660 well in advance of any planned assignment. If you are a staff interpreter with the U.S. Courts, make sure your government identification is sufficient for access to BOP sites. The U.S. Department of Justice operates BOP sites, not the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.

Security around the correctional facility environment usually reflects the inmate classification levels found in Unit 3. Perimeter security and observation often extend out a mile or more from the first fence you'll encounter. A correctional facility is definitely a "hard target."

As you travel to and from the correctional facility, never stop your car for hitchhikers or others on the side of the road. Avoid vehicles parked on the side of the road for mechanical problems. Report events near correctional facilities to 911. In most cases these are innocent situations. It's important to note, however, that the person on the side of the road may have walked away from a work detail and the car with mechanical problems may be a stolen vehicle used in an escape. Many states have laws prohibiting drivers from stopping in "prison zones."

Once you arrive at the visitor reception area, you'll pass through security screening. Comply with all directives and don't argue if they take something away that you think you need. Be professional and recognize that the correctional staff has extensive training and experience on the "secondary uses" of almost everything imaginable.

Depending on the security level of the correctional facility and inmate, the event

may take place in a structured secure isolation room or a relaxed conference room. Adjust your security response to the situation, but don't let your guard down in "minimum security" environments. Correctional officers have been seriously injured and killed in all correctional settings.

Attorney-client privilege may cover meetings in correctional facilities. As in the case of jail events, use extreme caution when there is no separation from the inmate.

If an inmate asks for a pen, pencil or other weapon of opportunity, defer the request to security personnel or the attorney. In many facilities, depending on the security classification, inmates may possess pens and pencils. Don't take an unnecessary risk by unknowingly supplying a contraband item; err on the side of caution.

Make a note of everything you've brought into the room and facility and take an inventory when you depart. Immediately report any discrepancies to security personnel. Don't feel "dumb" if you've lost something like a pen or pencil. Imagine how you'll feel if that lost pen kills a correctional officer.



A Friend in Need?

Correctional center inmates and other prisoners can be masters of manipulation. Do not write to or otherwise “befriend” inmates. Never violate the policies set forth by the correctional facility. Smuggling contraband to incarcerated individuals is unprofessional, unethical and a crime. You may be putting your life and the lives of others in danger by your actions. If you engage in any of these activities you’ll not only lose your certification and career, you may end up sharing a cell with your “friend.”

Attorneys’ Offices and Community Venues

Although most attacks against attorneys occur in and around the courthouse, offices are not immune from violent acts. Overall, most attacks appear to be related to family and criminal court cases (Kelson).

You may, at first, think it’s odd that most attorney-related attacks occur in or near the courthouse, but if we review some of the information in prior units, the reasons become obvious. First of all, attorneys are in close proximity to the defendant during court procedures. Next, court dockets give an assailant a “time and place” for an attack.

Anecdotal information from the media, however, indicates that attacks (including murders) of attorneys also occur at or near their offices. As noted earlier in this unit, family law is a dangerous environment. For example, Mike McCurley, Dallas


attorney and former president of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, has been shot at twice and found to be on a list for “assassination” (Mckee).

A family law attorney stated, on the issue of violence surrounding the profession of family law, "I don't walk out of the building without canvassing the parking lot... I am aware of what's going on around me at all times" (Mckee).

This is good advice for you in and around law offices as well as every other community setting. It's unlikely that you, as an interpreter, will be the target of a violent incident. But keep in mind that in attacks on attorneys and judges, others around them are also injured and killed.

Keep your eyes and ears open for something that is out of place or unusual. Don't do other tasks, daydream or cut off your senses by listening to a portable music device. If a violent situation appears to be developing, withdraw and call 911. Don't wait for a heated verbal exchange to come to blows before you call for help. A quick response may avert a greater tragedy.

In the community, practice the principles found in prior and subsequent units of this manual. As noted, the security principles in this manual apply to many situations in and out of the professional working environment.



For Further Information

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)

1600 Clifton RD
Atlanta GA 30333

www.cdc.gov

800-311-3435

Office of the Illinois State Fire Marshal

1035 Stevenson Dr
Springfield IL 62703

[http://www.state.il.us/osfm/
info@sfm.state.il.us](http://www.state.il.us/osfm/info@sfm.state.il.us)

217-785-0969

Government of the United Kingdom MI5 Security Service

Bombs and Bomb Threat Procedures

<http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/Page41.html>



Questions, Activities and Scenarios

1. In your own words, define an out-of-court proceeding and provide three examples.

2. What are some of the biological hazards you may encounter in out-of-court settings?

3. Activity:

The next time you have an interpreting assignment:

- a. Locate the fire evacuation plan in the room in which you are working. Examine it and become familiar with it.
- b. Request a photocopy of the emergency procedures plan at your place of work and insert it in the back of this manual for future reference.

4. Activity:

Think about the location where you work most frequently. Identify and make a list of the physical hazards you encounter:

- a. Upon approaching the facility

- b. Upon entering the facility

- c. Upon exiting the facility

5. During an attorney-client interview in an attorney's office, a fire alarm sounds. You aren't sure if it's a practice drill or a real fire. How do you respond? What precautions should you take?

6. Scenario:

A defendant in a correctional facility is about to sign a waiver, and asks you to let him borrow a pen. How do you respond? Why?

UNIT 8

HOME AND COMMUNITY SECURITY



***“He who does not prevent a crime
when he can, encourages it.”***

(Seneca 291)

Unit 8



Target Objectives of this Unit Include:

- 1. Examining security weaknesses in the home and implementing strategies to reduce or eliminate vulnerabilities.**
- 2. Applying the concepts of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) to improve security in and around the home.**
- 3. Exploring the use of psychological and physical barriers to deter intruders and secure homes.**
- 4. Applying security principles to community settings.**
- 5. Recognizing situations of heightened risk in the community and reducing or eliminating the risks by proper preparation.**
- 6. Familiarizing interpreters with additional community resources that promote safety and security.**

Home Security

You are vulnerable to a wide range of criminal acts and other emergencies in the home environment. The odds that any criminal act would be the direct result of employment in a court-related profession are extremely remote. The risk of random violence and other crime, however, is a fact of modern life.

It's important to note that the homeowner has greater latitude in making changes and improvements in the security environment. In apartment buildings, owners and management have the final word on security modifications. Before you select an apartment do a "security inventory" on the building and surrounding area. It's good practice to visit the complex at night and on a weekend before you sign a lease.

Practical home security techniques integrate many of the concepts and principles discussed in prior units of this manual. Of particular use to the homeowner or apartment dweller are Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED), physical and psychological barriers, target hardening and information security.

In Unit 1 I briefly touched on the concept of CPTED. There are many practical tips you can use to reduce or eliminate security weakness around any residence. One of the activities at the end of this unit is to develop a list around your own home or apartment, but here are a few to head you in the right direction:

1. Install security lighting in dark or secluded areas of your residence.
2. Trim or remove thick shrubbery from window areas.
3. Plant shrubs that have thorns, like roses, near windows.

4. Trim or remove trees that may provide access to upper floor windows or balconies.

5. Remove trees and shrubs that block a clear view of entries and windows from the street.

This is a small sample of suggested environmental changes to improve the security of the home's occupants and contents. These five simple steps will serve to increase the visibility of potential intruders and deny them easy access to entry points of the home or apartment.

The expense of CPTED can be as inexpensive as trimming an overgrown hedge, to more costly projects such as the installation of complete security lighting and CCTV systems around the home. If you can't afford major improvements, do what you can. Every improvement, no matter how minor, helps secure your home.

The application of physical and psychological barriers in home and apartment security is all around us. Doors, walls, fences and gates are the most common physical barriers in the residential environment. In many cases, however, the barriers are of limited use due to poor planning or design (Hardening the Target 1-39).

A fence around a home would appear to be an excellent security investment. A fence that is easily bolted with little or no lighting on the other side provides great cover for a burglar to open windows and doors and enter your home undetected. Make sure physical barriers do not become a liability in protecting your home.

The average homeowner purchases extra locks and devices to secure doors and windows. Before spending money, call your local police department and request a

security inspection of your home. Although you may need to wait a few weeks, most police departments offer this service through their community outreach division. If you purchase expensive lock systems and place them on a paper-thin door, they won't serve their purpose.



Locks and Keys

If you purchase a new home or move into an apartment, replace or re-key all locks. You don't know who has received the key from prior owners or tenants. Breaking into your residence could be as simple as a turn of the key.

Securing a home or apartment through barriers is costly, sometimes ineffective and possibly unsightly, depending on the environment. As noted in Unit 1, some of the most powerful barriers are psychological. Things that say to the potential intruder, "Breaking into this house is a big risk; go somewhere else!"

A few things that carry a powerful message to a potential intruder include:

1. Barking dogs inside or outside the residence.
2. Lights inside and outside the home.
3. Visible CCTV cameras.
4. Alarm company signs in the yard.
5. Neighborhood Watch signs.

Many homes and apartments have very few, if any, psychological messages to cause intruders to rethink their actions. In fact, many homes carry the message, “Come and get it!”

In addition to the suggestions noted here, you have access to a wide range of private home security companies that provide everything from burglar alarms to complete 24-7 security monitoring that includes fire, medical alert and CCTV. Some cable-DSL providers offer security services through their wireless networks. Ensure the company is reputable; ask for references and check with your local Better Business Bureau.

Security improvements that address environmental factors, as well as physical and psychological barriers, make your residence a harder target for the potential intruder. Some of the improvements cost very little money and are worth the effort.

If you work late and frequently return home after dark, it’s a good idea to invest in a good lighting system, as well as an electric gate and garage door opener. They limit your exposure outside the vehicle when you return home, preventing an assailant from ambushing you and taking you and your car.

As you pass through each layer of your security system, make sure you close gates and doors behind you before you enter the next layer. Make sure nobody has sneaked past an open door or gate before you get out of your vehicle. If you see somebody, sound your horn and call 911. Keep your doors locked.



Food for Thought:

Many law enforcement offices keep statistics on crime rates by zip code. Some have detailed information on crimes reported by specific buildings or apartment complexes. If you're considering a move, do some checking on the Internet or call the police department in the relocation area. It may save you a lot of future headaches!

Don't forget smoke detectors and carbon monoxide detectors for your home. They are inexpensive and they'll save your life! Change the batteries of these devices frequently; when you reset your clocks in the spring or fall is the preferred time.

Most fire departments have a similar program as the police department. A fire prevention specialist will visit your home or apartment for a free inspection on request. They'll advise you on the best types of alarms and sensors to purchase. Alarms are smoke or heat activated and each works best in specific locations; hallway alarms have small lights to help in an evacuation event.

In the Community

This manual has covered many of the security principles that you should apply in all community settings. Perhaps the most important rule is to always be aware of your surroundings. All of the other precautions you take will be worthless if you stroll down a street, music blaring through the headphones over your ears, while you're thinking about your vacation next year in Hawaii. Keep the 21-foot rule in

mind. Events can occur quickly and without warning and an assailant several feet away from you can be on top of you in a few seconds.

Situations in the community that are of particular security concern include (California Department of Justice):

1. Nighttime activities
2. Out alone – especially at night.
3. Poorly lit areas.
4. Walking near alleyways or shrubs.
5. In parking lots.
6. Waiting for public transportation.
7. Working late at buildings.
8. Roadside emergencies.

In every situation noted you could eliminate or reduce the risks posed by proper preparation. Don't wait to become a victim of crime before you assess your personal security situation.

If you're out at night, make arrangements to be around others. If that's not possible, ask for escorts to and from critical areas like parking lots, public transportation areas and between buildings.

If you walk to and from work or for your health, take notes of any unsafe areas that could provide cover for an ambush. If areas are not safe, alter your route or take public or personal transportation.

You can avoid most roadside emergencies by making sure vehicles are in good working order and properly serviced. Get frequent tune-ups and have regular mechanical inspections performed at your local authorized dealership.

Please take the opportunity to visit some of the links found in the For Further Information section of this unit. There's a wealth of information and brochures to keep you safe at home, work and in the community.



Security Staff are Happy to Help

Don't forget the security expertise of the court security staff! Make an appointment and have them help you assess your personal security situation. Keeping you safe is their profession and they'll be happy to assist you in that goal.



For Further Information

National Crime Prevention Council

1000 Connecticut Avenue NW
13th Floor
Washington DC 20036

www.ncpr.org

202-466-6272

Los Angeles Police Department

Crime Prevention

Parker Center
150 N Los Angeles St
Los Angeles CA 90012

http://www.lapdonline.org/bldg_safer_comms/prevention_main.htm
questions@lapdonline.org

877-275-5273

National Association of State Fire Marshals

1319 F Street NW Ste 301
Washington DC 20004

www.firemarshals.org
info@firemarshals.org
govtaffairs@firemarshals.org

202-737-1226

877-996-2736

Site provides multilingual resources.

***National Sheriffs' Association
Neighborhood Watch Program***

1450 Duke Street
Alexandria VA 22314-3490

www.usaonwatch.org
info@usaonwatch.org

703-836-7827



Questions, Activities and Scenarios

1. What are some of the security concepts covered in this unit that serve as “target hardening” for your home or apartment?

2. How can proper lighting around the home serve as a security tool?

3. Provide three examples of how advance preparation can prevent security risks in and around the home.

4. Activity:

Take a security inventory of your home or apartment. What can you do to “harden” your residence and reduce weaknesses?

5. Activity:

Locate the phone number of the community outreach division of your local police department and make an appointment for a security inspection of your home. Additionally, call your local fire department and ask a fire prevention specialist to conduct an inspection of your home.

6. Scenario:

You have been interpreting for a trial and jury deliberations extended into the evening hours. You are therefore leaving the building late and heading home in the darkness of night.

a. What security measures can you take upon leaving the court facility to ensure that you reach your parked car safely?

b. What precautions can you take on the trip home?

c. What precautions can you take when you exit your vehicle, once you have reached your home or apartment?

UNIT 9

TRAVEL



“The world is a book, and those who do not travel, read only a page.”
(Augustine)

Unit 9



Target Objectives of this Unit Include:

- 1. Practicing prevention as a means of increasing security while commuting to the workplace.**
- 2. Increasing awareness of safety measures to reduce the risk of carjackings.**
- 3. Practicing safety and vigilance when traveling to work by means of public transportation.**
- 4. Developing heightened awareness during domestic travel and using preventive measures to avoid theft or attacks.**
- 5. Assessing international travel risks through research and by applying security principles.**
- 6. Learning about online resources that can provide country-specific information for overseas travelers, including travel advisories and warnings.**
- 7. Maintaining a low profile and taking security precautions when traveling overseas.**

Commuting to Your Workplace

If you are a staff interpreter, your place of work may be one courthouse or several facilities throughout a geographic area. Typically, if you are a contract interpreter, you are free to travel to various sites, limited only by issues of certification and personal preference. Basic security principles apply to all interpreters regardless of employment status.

As noted in prior units, preventing problems before they occur is always the best course of action. Since you may travel frequently between assignments, reliable transportation is a must. Keep your vehicle on a preventive maintenance schedule offered through your local dealership. Have your vehicle mechanically inspected on a regular basis. Check gas, oil and other fluid levels before you depart.

In the event of an accident or roadside problem, keep automobile club information in the car and emergency phone numbers programmed in your cell phone. If you have an emergency on the road, never leave your vehicle. Keep your doors locked and call for emergency assistance.

You should strongly consider taking a Defensive Driving Course (DDC) offered through the National Safety Council. In some cases, this course is required for staff interpreters as a prerequisite for using government vehicles. Some insurance companies offer discounts for those who complete a DDC program. A Spanish language course is also available.

DDC is offered at various community locations or online at the National Safety Council site. There is nothing more that this manual could offer on the subject of

day-to-day driving skills not covered in the DDC program. Take the course and apply the principles each time you're behind the wheel.

Carjacking is an often-violent crime that has the possibility of fatal consequences for the victim. In some instances, vehicles are carjacked with young children or infants in the back seat.

The San Francisco Police Department offers some excellent tips to reduce the risk of carjacking (Vehicle Safety Tips and Carjacking Don't Be a Victim):

1. Be aware of your surroundings and trust your instincts, if you think something is wrong. Drive to a safer location if something doesn't seem right.
2. Park in busy and well-lighted parking areas and if it's valet parking, give them only the ignition key.
3. Enter and exit your vehicle quickly.
4. Keep your doors locked and windows rolled up. Sixty percent of carjackers enter the vehicle through an unlocked door.
5. Be especially alert at stop signs and red lights. Be cautious if anyone appears to be approaching your vehicle.
6. Keep valuables out of sight and under the seat to prevent "smash and grab" thefts.
7. Whenever you stop at a sign or light don't get "boxed in" by other vehicles. Allow some room for escape.
8. Watch out for carjackers working in pairs. One person distracts you while the other gains entry to your vehicle.
9. Take extra care if you are using a rental car, as thieves often target tourists.

10. If you are carjacked at the end of a firearm or other weapon, surrender your vehicle, and then report the incident to authorities.

An additional recommendation is to keep track of the current vehicles of interest to thieves. If you own a high-demand vehicle, use extra caution.

Another variation of carjacking is “bump-and-run.” A car will pull up behind you and tap your rear bumper. When you get out to check the damage, a second person gets in your car and drives off. If you suspect that a minor accident is a set-up, stay in your car and call 911. You’ll know soon enough if the fender bender was a scam.

A vehicle following or “tailing” you should be a concern, but it’s not a time for panic. Likewise, if someone ever pulls alongside your vehicle to point out a “problem” with your car, follow these common-sense procedures (Vehicle Safety Tips):

1. Don’t stop! Drive to a well-lighted populated safe area, police or fire station.
2. Try to get a license plate number and other vehicle identification information.
3. If a driver attempts to force you to stop, flash your lights and honk your horn.
4. Keep your vehicle maintained and the gas tank full.
5. Be aware of your environment and don’t be distracted.

Remember: If followed, never drive home. You don’t know the intent of the other driver. If you drive home, they’ll know where you live and that may be their immediate intent.

In major urban areas, you may frequently travel with the use of commuter trains, subways and buses. Take extra precautions and be especially aware of your surroundings in both crowded and solitary environments. Pickpockets, sometimes

working in teams, can steal your wallet, including your government identification card.

It's a sad reality that public transportation systems, including buses and subways, have been the targets of terrorist activities. Security screenings, including random checks, have been instituted in some cities. If stopped, cooperate fully with law enforcement officers. The faster they do their job, the faster you'll be on your way to work or your assignment.

Report any suspicious package, purse, luggage, backpack, or container, including abandoned items, to transportation security or law enforcement in person. As noted in bomb and bomb threat safety, never touch or inspect a suspicious object. An unattended purse may be something lost by the owner, or a device containing high explosives. Besides, if the owner returns, you'll have some explaining to do if your hand is inside their purse.

An interpreter being the direct target of any attack is remote, but not impossible. If your assignments at work, or as a contractor, frequently include "high-profile" cases that involve organized drug smugglers and kingpins or terrorists, review your personal security situation. Criminals unfamiliar with the U.S. justice system may not understand your role in the judicial process or, as in the case of terrorist organizations, they may consider any government employee "fair game."

Even if you don't work with high-profile cases on a regular basis, you may find yourself working on a case that may require some extra personal precautions. Review your personal security based your current interpreting assignment; then, you may reevaluate your situation after the trial is over.

Some activities to reduce your vulnerability to attack during commuting include (Kidnapping and Hostage Survival Guidelines):

1. Changing your route to work.
2. Changing your times of travel.
3. Changing the vehicles you use to travel.

It's interesting to note that most planned attacks on commuters take place in the morning. We go back to the concept of time and place – the attacker has a better idea of your departure time than your return time. If you think about your own day, you'll usually find that you have your alarm set to one time every morning, you'll take the same route to work and you'll arrive at your place of work within a 10-20 minute time frame every day (Overseas Security Advisory Council 14).

In the afternoon, however, you may complete an assignment early. Someone may call a last-minute meeting that goes an hour past your regular departure time. You may stop at the dry cleaner's on the way home. The morning commute is much more predictable for a potential assailant.

Domestic Travel

Frequently, interpreters travel to different jurisdictions in other states for assignments. Additionally, many interpreters travel to conferences and educational seminars held throughout the United States. This section provides some useful security tips for the traveling interpreter.

Having covered information security, it's imperative to stress the importance of keeping your personal documents secure. Keep items like tickets out of sight until

they are required to clear a checkpoint. A thief can easily grab or lift your important documents if placed in an outer pocket or held in your hand.

A recurring theme in this manual is awareness. Travel situations are one of those times when it's easy to be distracted. Perhaps you're checking on a flight or train... You may think to yourself, "Did I forget something before I left this morning?" For these reasons it's important to pay attention to everything that's going on around you. Since everyone at airports is traveling to different destinations, a thief can take your property and end up in another state or country within hours.

Since theft is an increased risk while you are traveling away from home, take only the documents necessary for your trip. If you have five credit cards, take only one and keep the others at home or in a safe deposit box. Follow the same procedure with security swipe cards and other building passes. If the travel is domestic, a passport is an unnecessary document.

On the topic of theft, it's always a good idea to keep some important numbers programmed into your phone or on a piece of paper separate from your other documents. Three important numbers would be the personnel office where you work, credit card companies (don't keep the card numbers on the paper) and the state Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) office that issued your license.

Immediately report any loss or theft to the personnel or government security office that issued any government documents and swipe cards, to prevent a security breach. Credit card companies can reference your accounts using your Social Security Number, birth date and some other personal information. The state DMV

can cancel a license number – a police officer checking the license number will get a red flag on the computer system.

If you plan to travel with a laptop computer, take extra precautions to assure its security, especially if it contains case-related or other OPSEC content. Some laptops feature recovery systems that can track a thief down as soon as the laptop accesses the Internet. If your laptop has the Windows XP Professional version, it's possible to password-encrypt folders. If you are using another operating system, there are several encryption programs on the market that will protect information in case of theft.

Frequently you'll travel interstate via air. Before you depart your home, make sure you have not packed any restricted items. Some items are restricted in carry-ons, while other items are restricted in both carry-on and checked luggage. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) keeps an up-to-date list of restricted items. (Please see the For Further Information section for TSA's website address.) If you still have questions, call the TSA office at your point of embarkation.

If you're a staff interpreter, it's not a good idea to "advertise" your employer by using your business card as a luggage tag. Try to hide your home address from plain view on tags or use a P.O. Box address. Personally, I place my travel flight itinerary, hotel and other contact information on a sheet placed inside each checked bag just in case the outside luggage tags are lost.

A recently introduced "gadget," helpful to the traveling interpreter, is the TSA-approved luggage lock. The keyed or combination locks are especially made to permit TSA security staff to unlock, inspect, and then relock your luggage. Prior

to the new locks, TSA would cut your locks and that was the end of it. Some luggage companies also make lines of hard-sided and soft-sided luggage with TSA-approved locking systems. More information on the locks is located on the TSA website.

Upon your arrival and check-in at any United States airport, the best advice is the same as with any court building. Proceed through the first security checkpoint as quickly as possible. People at airports, like courthouses and other government buildings, are most vulnerable to attacks before the first checkpoint and security screening. At the Los Angeles International Airport, on July 4, 2002, for example, a shootout between Hesham Mohamed Hadayet and security officers took place near the check-in area for El Al Airlines (Shooting at Los Angeles Airport).

After passing through the security screening areas, you may assume that the passengers around you are unarmed. Unfortunately, perhaps due to “flight jitters,” some people spend a little too much time at the airport bar. Verbal and physical altercations are always possibilities. Surprisingly, the removal of unruly passengers from flights is not as uncommon as you’d think. Increase your distance at the first sign of any potential conflict and report it to airport security.

You may use the train for regional travel, particularly in the northeastern corridors of the United States. If you plan on using the trains for domestic travel make sure you check with AMTRAK in advance of your trip. As of this writing, increased security screening and policies are under review.

When traveling by rail, take a common-sense approach to your personal security by applying the principles you’ve learned in other units and sections of this manual.



Heavy Drinking and Travel: A Dangerous Cocktail

When you travel, don't drink, or drink responsibly. Since you may find yourself in unfamiliar situations and territory, you'll need a clear mind to make good decisions related to your personal security. If you become "tipsy" or outright drunk, you'll become an easy mark for robbery, rape or worse. It doesn't make a good impression of the interpreting profession to have hotel staff carry you to your room during a national conference.



Food for Thought:

When on assignment at a new location, take a moment to get your bearings. Upon arrival take note of:

- ! The nearest police station
- ! The nearest hospital or emergency room
- ! The nearest gas station (if traveling by car)

You may need this information at a time when you are not able to research it, so be prepared!

Overseas Travel

Security principles related to overseas travel are perhaps some of the most important concepts for you to understand. It's almost impossible to acquire the necessary language skills to pass the certification examinations required to practice as a certified court interpreter without life experiences in a foreign country. Many court interpreters are foreign citizens, naturalized U.S. citizens or "dual nationals." Therefore it's common for the court interpreter to have strong personal ties and family at overseas locations.

It will come as no news to the court interpreter that United States laws do not extend outside of the physical jurisdiction of this country. If you visit or live in a foreign country you are subject to their laws (or lack of them). Even if you travel overseas on a "black passport" (diplomatic passport), there is no guarantee that it will protect you, as some former hostages from Iran and Lebanon could attest.

If your spouse is in the military, or a civilian employee of the United States Government working overseas, you may travel on a "brown passport" (official passport). These passports only protect military members from local laws and only within the limits of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the host country and the United States Government. Even then, the United States may allow the host country to prosecute a military member in certain instances. Military dependents and civilian employees of the United States Government are subject to the laws of the host nation.

Most court interpreter will travel overseas on a "blue passport" (tourist passport). In some cases citizens of foreign countries and dual nationals will travel with a

foreign passport. In all cases the traveler will be subject to the laws of the host country while outside this country.

If you're a dual national, be aware that some countries will subject you to their conscription laws. United States citizens born of one or both parents of foreign citizenship could also be subject to the other country's citizenship laws (including military service). Obtain specific information from the U.S. State Department site or from the U.S. Embassy in the country you'll be visiting before your departure (Citizenship Laws of the World 5).

Before you travel, you'll need to assess the risks posed by the country you'll be visiting. In some cases, especially if you have family overseas, you'll disregard all information and warnings and proceed with your trip. Even if this is your situation, you'll benefit by doing some fact finding on the current situation in countries you'll visit.

It would be impossible, in this manual, to provide current information on specific countries throughout the world. For example, in Nuevo Laredo a few months ago the streets were, for all intents and purposes, lawless. The murder rate in this city on the Mexico-U.S. border was appalling. Then things improved for a few weeks. Now things seem to be descending again into chaos. Next week, who knows?

On the Border

Risks to the court interpreter do not begin when you enter a foreign country.
(Inside ICE 1-2)



Weapons cache seized February 3, 2006 in Laredo, Texas



Improvised Explosive Devices, Laredo, Texas, February 3, 2006
(Photos courtesy Immigration and Customs Enforcement – ICE.)

The first, and most important, source of current country information for the court interpreter is the U.S. State Department. If, for some reason, you prefer a different point of view, I've provided additional links in the For Further Information section for the governments of Australia and Great Britain.



Register Your Overseas Trip

If you are a United States citizen with a U.S. passport, register your travel plans with the U.S. State Department online. It's quick and easy and it will help your family and government officials locate you in case of an emergency or disaster in the host country. Visit:

<https://travelregistration.state.gov/>

Since the website is "secure" make sure to add the "s" – <https://>

The U.S. State Department essentially issues three important pieces of information for the traveler: the "Country Background Notes," "Consular Information Sheets" and "Travel Warnings." Basically, the Background Notes offer general information on the country, including a brief history, political situation, foreign relations, etc. Consular Information Sheets, on the other hand, provide more specific information on medical care, road conditions, crime and political concerns and contact information for embassies and consulates. A Travel Advisory, in most cases, warns of a specific concern in a country; a public health issue, for example. The State Department issues Travel Warnings to advise travelers of serious

situations. A typical warning may advise travelers to defer or cancel travel to a country or region of a country.

Your next cyberspace stop should be the site of the Overseas Security Advisory Council, Bureau of Diplomatic Security at:

www.osac.gov

Here you'll find data and news on specific worldwide incidents, as well as "warden messages" for countries throughout the world. The advice and information located at this site is useful for both the visitor and expatriate alike.

After you review the current information from the U.S. State Department, another excellent source of current information is through the "news search" feature on many popular search engines. This will provide up-to-the-minute news information on what's occurring in a specific country. The foreign language editions of search engines also have news search capabilities.

Now that you have the current information, you'll need to assess your personal risk related to your travel plans and the goals of the trip. Let's use the following example: You are a staff interpreter for the U.S. Courts in Southern California. For the past six months, most of your interpreting duties have centered on cases involving the prosecution of members of the Arellano Felix Cartel. One day you decide to take a quick swing across the border to Tijuana to buy a wrought iron wine rack for a friend's birthday gift. Your first question should be: "Is this a good idea?" Only you can answer this question.

The city of Tijuana is the base of the Arellano Felix Cartel. You may be recognized and, as we've noted before, they may not understand your role in the

courts, or they may not care. The border cities in Mexico have U.S. State Department advisories for drug and drug cartel related criminal activities. All this risk for a wine rack...

Texas-based interpreters run the same risks by entering Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, as well as numerous cities throughout Latin America.

Since one of the two languages certified by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts is Haitian Creole, it's worth noting that Haiti is considered one of the most dangerous countries in the world and the most dangerous country in the Western Hemisphere (Banay).

If you opt to continue with your travel plans, make sure you register with the U.S. State Department online. If you forget, you can always do it over the phone or in person when you arrive at your destination.

As you pack for your trip don't forget to review the list of prohibited items from the TSA's list, as well as anything prohibited by the countries you'll be visiting. For example, if you pack a costly SCUBA diving knife in your luggage, customs authorities in some Middle Eastern countries will seize it on entry.

If you are a staff interpreter, especially an employee of the U.S. Courts, strongly consider leaving all documents that could identify your work with the government, including credit cards that may be issued through government-related credit unions, at home. Do not take any building security-related passes or swipe cards. The only documents usually required for overseas travel are a passport with any necessary visas, an international driver's license, state driver's license, traveler's checks and

credit cards. Make photocopies of all your documents and keep them safe (Safe Travel Begins with You 3-4).

The TSA locks that work for domestic travel won't work overseas. Don't be surprised if the locks are missing when you get your luggage at your overseas destination.

After your airport arrival it's important to check your bags and pass through security as quickly as possible. Never leave your bags unattended. Apply the same principle at overseas airports. Passengers are most vulnerable outside the screening areas. On December 27, 1985 attacks carried out at the check-in areas of El Al in Rome and Vienna killed 19 and wounded 113; the fatalities included five Americans (Tagliabue A1). The incident at the Los Angeles International Airport in 2002, as well as the 1985 attacks, underscore the importance of this practice.

The possibility of a hijacking on a major commercial airliner is small, especially after the events of 9/11. Prior to that date, conventional security wisdom stated that the victims should follow the practices noted in Unit 6 for hostage situations. Everyone is now fully aware of the horrific consequences of allowing hijackers to take control of an aircraft to use as a weapon. Let your conscience be your guide. No further commentary on this point is necessary.


On your trip and during your stay overseas, it's important to keep a low profile, especially about any work-related subjects. Since you're a court interpreter, language topics are usually not an issue. Be especially alert overseas and practice the same security principles you would practice in the United States. Some extra

tips include (Safe Travel Begins with You 13-14):

1. Avoid ground floor hotel rooms and rooms with easy access to balconies.
2. Avoid hotels in or near high-crime areas.
3. Keep important papers and your passport in the hotel safe; get a receipt.
4. While you are out keep a TV or radio on and put out a "Do not disturb" sign.
5. Have the maid service clean your room while you are present.
6. Keep your room key with you – don't leave it at the desk.
7. Plot out an escape plan in case of fire or another emergency (many countries do not require a posted evacuation plan).
8. Don't leave valuables or laptop computers in your room while you're out.

While driving in foreign countries, remain alert to carjackings – anybody approaching your vehicle is a potential threat. Window washers, flower vendors, everyone is suspect. As with domestic driving, keep your windows up and cars locked. Use the same precautions as you would for commuting and domestic travel.

Enjoy your travels, but always stay alert for potential threats. Proper planning and a personal security assessment will increase the odds that you'll have a safe trip overseas.



For Further Information

National Safety Council

1121 Spring Lake Drive
Itasca IL 60143-3201

info@nsc.org
www.nsc.org

630-285-1121

Transportation Security Administration

601 South 12th Street
Arlington VA 22202-4220

www.tsa.gov
TSA-ContactCenter@dhs.gov

866-289-9673

U.S. Department of State

2201 C Street NW
Washington DC 20520

travel.state.gov

202-647-4000 (Main Switchboard)
202-647-5225 (Travel Hotline)

Overseas Security Advisory Council

Bureau of Diplomatic Security

U.S. Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20522-2008

www.osac.gov

571-345-2223

***Australian Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade***

R.G. Casey Building
John McEwen Crescent
Barton, ACT
0221 Australia

www.smartraveller.gov.au

61-2-6261-1111

***Government of the United Kingdom
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Travel Advice***

King Charles Street
London SW1A 2AH

www.fco.gov.uk/



Questions, Activities and Scenarios

1. Why do most planned attacks on commuters take place during the morning?

2. If you notice that a vehicle is following you, why should you never drive home?

3. What is the importance of preparation and awareness when commuting to work or during domestic/international travel?

4. Activity:

Before your next out-of-town assignment, create a travel security checklist. Use the material in this unit to design a list highlighting precautionary measures and security reminders to help your next trip be safer. The following items may serve as starters for your list:

- ! Essential phone numbers for reporting lost or stolen personal documents
(kept separately from your documents)
- ! Information for your point of contact at your travel destination
- ! Travel flight itinerary

5. Activity:

Visit the State Department websites (listed in the For Further Information section) and conduct research on a country that you visit frequently or have visited in the past. Locate information on crime and political issues of concern, and check for travel advisories or warnings. Then, use your favorite search engine to investigate news events of importance.

6. Scenario:

On your way home from court, you discover that a vehicle is following you. What is the best course of action?

7. Scenario:

You are working at a court located in the Rio Grande Valley, and acquaintances invite you across the border to go sightseeing after work. The case for which you are interpreting involves a foreign national accused of being a manager or organizer in a Mexican drug cartel. Should you accept the invitation? Explain your position.

UNIT 10

EMERGENCIES AND DISASTERS



***"A week before Hurricane Katrina hit
Louisiana it does not even exist."***

(Smith 2)

Unit 10



Target Objectives of this Unit Include:

- 1. Developing and implementing proper planning for an evacuation, including escape routes, transportation, supplies, records management and refuge.**
- 2. Obtaining information and making preparations for severe weather events.**
- 3. Preparing for natural disasters and knowing how to respond in the event of a natural disaster during a court interpreting assignment.**
- 4. Familiarizing interpreters with situations in the court or correctional setting that could lead to civil unrest and providing strategies to reduce their exposure.**
- 5. Increasing knowledge and preparedness in dealing with terrorist attacks.**

Evacuation Preparation

You'll need to look no further than the hurricane season of 2005 to understand the importance of advanced evacuation planning. Hurricane Katrina led to the largest relocation of our population since the American Civil War (Borochoff 1). The number of hurricanes forming in the Atlantic was unprecedented in the record books and storms affected states from Texas to Florida. Interpreters, evacuated from many states along the Gulf of Mexico, may never return to their homes.

Anyone who has worked with the United States Government or been a military dependent overseas is familiar with the Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) planning and exercises that take place at military bases. Evacuations called due to political instability in various countries seem to occur yearly. Massive evacuations have also occurred in natural disasters such as the 1991 eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines.

If you live far away from the Gulf of Mexico, you may consider advance evacuation preparations to be nothing more than a case of the "Chicken Little" syndrome. Take note that hurricanes are not the only cause for evacuations in the United States. Frequently, evacuations take place for things as common as a chemical spill or gas leak. Brush fires disrupt life in California and recently in Texas and Oklahoma. Preparation for an evacuation may mean the difference between a personal inconvenience or a major disruption in one's life.

How would you respond to the immediate evacuation of your home? What would you do? Are you prepared?

Since a large segment of the interpreting population resides in states along the

Gulf Coast and along the Atlantic Seaboard, it's important to locate routes for hurricane evacuations in advance. Keep in mind that revisions of evacuation plans occur frequently, so know your route in advance of trouble.

Proper planning for any evacuation includes:

1. Route of escape
2. Reliable transportation
3. Supplies for people and pets
4. Important records
5. Safe refuge

The route of escape may be the result of long-term planning from a state emergency management agency, as in the case of hurricane routes. It may be spur of the moment, as in the case of a chemical spill on a highway near your home. Follow the directions of officials in the event of any evacuations. A shortcut may put you and your family in a harmful or deadly situation.

Reliable transportation is a must. Don't allow your gas tank to get below one-half tank, especially during the hurricane season. I'm confident most of you viewed what occurred during the evacuation for Hurricane Rita in Texas. It wasn't a pretty sight.

Make sure you have enough supplies to last everyone (including your pets) for three to five days. Evacuations deplete important supplies along the evacuation route. Don't wait until the last minute. Many supplies like bottled water and canned foods can be rotated throughout the year. Keep some ready-packed boxes for an evacuation in a closet.

Don't forget medications and emergency supplies. If your vial of insulin is almost

empty, or the emergency flashlight has dead batteries, you may be out of luck. Keep a comfort margin with all critical supplies and, if you do require refrigeration for medication, consider the purchase of a vehicle refrigerator. Ice is a rare commodity during an evacuation. Take prescription records with you.

Records management is a critical aspect of any evacuation. During overseas evacuations, of course, it's important to take every shred of paper with you. In many cases evacuees from a foreign country never return. In domestic evacuations, with only a few recent exceptions, evacuees return home within days or weeks of the event. Interpreters should consider renting a safe deposit box at a local financial institution to protect important records, including interpreter certification documents, birth certificates, passports, deeds, contracts, financial records and other important papers. Bank vaults are impervious to unimaginable forces - if you evacuate with important documents, theft or loss is a possibility.

If you have pets, make sure you take their vaccinations records with you. Depending on the situation, boarding pets may become difficult without the required rabies certificate and other records. Ask your veterinarian for prescriptions for any required medications prior to evacuation.

Remember documents on your computer. You may have extensive records including invoices, payments, business records and other important information on a computer. If you are computer savvy, use a second hard drive in your computer and back up all documents frequently. In the event of an evacuation, remove the drive and place it in an anti-static container and take it to the vault. If a second drive is not practical, external "hard drives" are relatively inexpensive and easy to use.

Part of your records should include a personal property inventory. An initial inventory of your property may be time-consuming. Keep your records up to date by adding or deleting property in the inventory. Use a digital camera to record the condition of your home, the contents of your residence and your personal vehicles. If you have an office for your interpreting business, do the same at that location. A personal property inventory is an excellent resource to document any insured losses.

Finally, plan for your safe haven before officials call an evacuation. If you have pets, plan for their care too. Make sure your destination, if a hotel, will permit pets. During evacuations many hotels waive their no-pet policy, but call ahead to make sure. Pet boarding facilities at your destination are a practical alternative.



Electronic Records Can Save Space

Some new scanners and “all-in-one” computer printers offer free software to scan documents into Adobe® Portable Document Format (PDF) files. It’s a great way for you to back up paper documents and records by saving them to your back-up hard drive.

Weather Events

We’ve already discussed the problems presented with hurricane evacuations. It’s important to note that severe weather may occur outside the zones they are typically expected. Tornadoes have occurred in almost every state in the United States, from Maine to California. Not with the frequency of a state like Texas or Oklahoma, but they do occur everywhere. From 1950-1994 Hawaii reported 28 tornadoes, while Vermont reported 32 for the same period (Tornado Numbers, Deaths, Injuries, and Adjusted Damage 1950-1994).

Deadly floods may occur where expected, in places like North Carolina, but they also occur, without warning, in the Nevada desert. If you travel from state to state for interpreting assignments, never assume that unexpected weather events will never happen. In turn, if you are a court interpreter based in Los Angeles called to do an event in Omaha in the spring, know what to do in the event of severe weather.

The United States National Weather Service issues alerts based on the probability that something may occur and events in progress or soon to occur. All weather events are categorized by (Severe Weather Watches and Warnings Definitions):

- ! Advisory - Alerts the public of a weather event that may require precautions.
- ! Watch – A significant weather event may occur in the near future and the public should make emergency plans and monitor future weather announcements.
- ! Warning – A significant weather event is in progress or in the immediate future. Follow emergency procedures for the event.



Out of the Blue

A severe weather event may occur anytime and anywhere, without warning. Even with modern satellites and Doppler weather radar, tornados still form and touch down with little or no notice until sighted on the ground. If something doesn't look or "feel" right, use your best judgment.

An excellent resource for the court interpreter is a portable weather radio that uses the National Weather Service's ***Specific Area Message Encoding (SAME)*** technology. Once programmed for a specific county the radio will alert you to

emergency events, including “Amber Alerts” (NWR Specific Area Message Encoding [SAME]).

If an investment in a SAME radio is not practical, you may wish to consider receiving alerts through the Emergency E-mail Network® found at:

www.emergencyemail.org

They’ll send you severe weather and other warnings via e-mail to your cell phone, home computer, or laptop.

Remember: Use of electronic devices are severely limited or prohibited in the courtroom. Security screeners may confiscate some of these items. All courthouses and other facilities have emergency weather procedures and alert systems in place. Follow the directions of CSO’s and other supervisory staff during severe weather events.

Take the opportunity to check out some of the resources in the For Further Information section of this unit. These resources will provide more specific information and preparations necessary for each weather emergency.

Natural Disasters

Besides the weather, other natural disasters are a possibility in every area of the United States. Like severe weather, some natural disasters can occur in unexpected places. Although earthquakes are most frequent in the western states, some of our country’s most severe earthquakes have occurred in places like South Carolina, Missouri and Texas (U.S. Earthquake Information by State). Volcanic activity is common in Alaska and, to a lesser degree, California, Oregon and Washington. The

coastal areas of the United States, particularly states on the Pacific Ocean, are at risk for tsunamis. Wildfires are a possibility anywhere in our country.

The common factor in most non-weather related natural disasters is that they can come with little or no warning. While volcanic activity provides days, weeks or months of advance warning, it's impossible to predict an earthquake. The advance warning of a tsunami is dependent on the location of the earthquake. An earthquake along some faults near states like Oregon would provide less than 30 minutes warning of a tsunami (Oregon Emergency Management 15-16).

An earthquake while working in a courtroom or correctional facility will be a particularly traumatic event. Not only does security staff need to worry about the dangers presented by the quake, they're also responsible for the physical security of prisoners. Keep in mind that breached walls, windows and cells are a possibility – prisoners could walk off in the aftermath of an earthquake.

If you don't think you're at risk from earthquakes in a courtroom or correctional facility, take a look at the photos taken after the 2001 6.8 Nisqually earthquake in Washington or the 1971 6.7 San Fernando Valley earthquake in California. Earthquakes can and do affect judicial centers and detention facilities. Prepare!

Public buildings including courthouses, jails and correctional facilities, particularly in regions with frequent earthquakes, have emergency procedures in place in case of a temblor. Research emergency procedures now! Don't wait for the first shock waves to figure out how to respond.

At the first sensation of an earthquake follow the basic rule (FEMA Recommends Drop, Cover, and Hold On):



Drop – Get on the ground.



Cover – Get under a table or get into a prone position and lock your hands behind your head.



Hold – Hold on to a table to maintain your cover.

In an earthquake never make a “run for it.” Most fatalities during earthquakes occur by falling objects outside buildings. Staying put and taking cover improves your chances for survival.

After an earthquake, follow the directions of security personnel and other authorities. Remember, as in the case of a hostage crisis or exchange of gunfire, they may not know who is friend or foe. Use extreme caution and don’t make any threatening moves. You may be terrified, but try to stay calm.

After the immediate crisis, offer your assistance within the scope of your abilities and skills. If they don’t need your help, stay clear of rescue operations.

Earthquake Risks are Real



Damaged courtroom, King County, Washington Nisqually earthquake, February 28, 2001. (Photo courtesy King County, Washington State.)



Damaged courthouse stairwell, King County, Washington Nisqually earthquake, February 28, 2001. (Photo courtesy King County, Washington State.)



San Fernando Valley Juvenile Hall damaged by a 1971 earthquake. (Photo courtesy U.S. Geological Survey, credit E.V. Leyendecker.)

Civil Unrest

As a court interpreter, exposure to incidents of civil unrest in the vicinity of courthouses or other public buildings is a possibility. On rare occasions, however, courtroom issues have the power to descend major cities into chaos. Take, for example, the Rodney King trial in 1992. The riots that occurred in the aftermath of that verdict resulted in 50 fatalities, 4,000 injuries, 12,000 arrests and \$1 billion in property damage (The Los Angeles Riots, 1992).

After the Los Angeles riots, governments and law enforcement came to realize that the courtroom results of important social issues could impact entire cities. Precautions may include increased police force presence for complete cities as occurred in 2003, in advance of a verdict for two police charged with the beating of a handcuffed African-American youth (Hung Jury, Acquittal in Video Case).

Localized civil unrest is certainly the greatest risk for court interpreters. Of particular concern are protests staged in the vicinity of the courthouse or correctional facility over controversial issues. Be alert for any of the following:

1. High-profile cases with extensive media coverage
2. Cases concerning sensitive social issues
3. Death penalty cases and executions
4. Civil rights cases
5. Civil cases involving widespread fraud
6. Political cases

In addition to the risk of civil unrest and protests, cases of this nature carry the risk of violent incidents. The case may have nothing to do with your assignment at the courthouse or correctional facility, so you'll need to keep informed on current events related to the venue through the docket or local/national media.

Security personnel are acutely aware of the specific risks posed by the content of court cases. It's typical to observe increased security, including more CSO's on duty, increased screening and an increased scrutiny of the courthouse parameter. If procedures change, don't complain and be professional. The security climate around the courthouse may frequently change due to several factors. Help the security staff do their job and offer your complete cooperation.

Here are a few hints to help you reduce your exposure to protests and civil unrest in the vicinity of the courthouse or correctional facility:

1. Be aware of local and national events, including sensitive cases and scheduled executions.
2. Prepare to arrive early and depart late to avoid crowds; bring some interpreter resources to study in case of delays.
3. Park your vehicle in a secure location and away from possible protest areas.
4. If permitted, enter and/or exit the courthouse via an alternative route.
5. If caught in a crowd, don't panic and withdraw to a safe location.
6. Cooperate - follow the advice and directions of security personnel.

With proper planning you can avoid crowds, protests and other forms of civil unrest.

Acts of Terrorism

The odds of a court interpreter becoming a victim of terrorism are small, but the events of 9/11 alerted everyone to the consequences of complacency in our country. If there's one thing I've hoped to convey is that knowledge and preparedness never hurts. Many of the preparations made for the event of a terrorist attack are the same for a tornado or other disasters, with some slight variations.

In prior units we've covered some topics on recognizing and avoiding possible explosive devices near a court, correctional facility or in the mail. Transport systems, covered under Unit 9, are a primary target for terrorists, since they are both symbolic and economic. Experts believe the greatest terrorist threat is explosives (Personal Protection Measures Against the Terrorist Threat 7).

Besides hijackings, kidnappings and bombings, another major threat from terrorists are **chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN)** attacks; the term **nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC)** is another term for this threat.

The risk from a nuclear attack is small and the possibility that a terrorist group could produce or deliver a device that would cause widespread damage and destruction is even more remote. Experts, however, are concerned with the possible use of radioactive material mixed with explosives called "dirty bombs."

Recently the United States Department of Homeland Security, in conjunction with the United States Department of Energy's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, began testing equipment at the Nevada Test Site. The equipment, when perfected,

will detect radioactive devices or materials (nuclear or dirty bomb grade) before they enter the country or before terrorists use them (Department of Energy 1-2).

If you have been in the vicinity of any explosion, move out of open areas to limit exposure. Homeland security experts will evaluate the site to check for potential radiation risks. In general, keep the following in mind to reduce your risk from a dirty bomb (Be Informed: Nuclear Blast):

1. Increase your **shielding** by getting as much material between you and the potentially radioactive material.
2. Increase your **distance** from the blast site, as this will reduce your exposure to radioactive material.
3. Reduce your **time** of exposure to any radioactive materials.



Listen to and follow the directions of homeland security officials via the media. They'll advise you to stay in place or to evacuate to another location. You'll also receive specific information on the threat and how best to minimize injury to yourself and your family.

Biological and chemical attacks have many of the same precautions, although

attacks of these types are highly unlikely, since it's difficult to disperse these agents in a form to cause injuries to large numbers of people. Biological agents, for example, would require dispersion through the air or ingestion. Many infectious agents don't survive long in the environment to spread or, as noted in prior units, some diseases don't spread through airborne or ingestion methods.

Of the two hazards, chemical attacks would be the most immediately recognizable. Biological agents may take several days to show their exposure through symptoms. In both cases, experts agree that the most likely method would be through an airborne agent and therefore it's important to protect your respiratory system (Responding to a Biological or Chemical Threat in the United States 1).

Biological attacks using food are not unknown. In 1984 the Rajneeshee Cult used salmonella to poison salad bars in Oregon. Although 750 people became ill, there were no fatalities (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 198).

Due to the variety of chemical or biological agents it's almost impossible to provide information for every agent (Responding to a Biological or Chemical Threat in the United States 2).

There are numerous resources available for specific information to prepare you and your family for the threat of terrorist attacks using various agents. Please visit some of the resources at the end of this unit for more information.



For Further Information

National Weather Service Storm Ready

Awareness Materials:

www.stormready.noaa.gov/awareness.htm

California Seismic Safety Commission

1755 Creekside Oaks Dr Ste 100
Sacramento CA 95833-3657

www.seismic.ca.gov
celli@stateseseismic.com

916-263-5506

American Red Cross Disaster Services

2025 E Street NW
Washington DC 20006

www.redcross.org/services/disaster/0,1082,0_501_,00.html

202-303-4498

American Red Cross The Oregon Trail Chapter Prepare for Life

P.O. Box 3200
Portland, OR 97208

www.prepareforlife.org/oregon.html
info@redcross-pdx.org

503-284-1234

**Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA)**
500 C Street, SW
Washington DC 20472

www.fema.gov
FEMAOPA@dhs.gov

202-566-1600

**The Humane Society of the
United States (HSUS)**
2100 L Street NW
Washington DC 20037

www.hsus.org/disaster/

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Washington DC 20528

www.ready.gov
www.dhs.gov
ready@dhs.gov

202-282-8000

Central Intelligence Agency
Office of Public Affairs
Washington DC 20505

703-482-0623

Terrorist CBRN Materials and Effects:

http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/terrorist_cbrn/terrorist_CBRN.htm

Chemical/Biological/Radiological Incident Handbook (October 1998):

http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/cbr_handbook/cbrbook.htm



Questions, Activities and Scenarios

1. What five steps will ensure proper planning in the event of an evacuation?

a. _____

b. _____

c. _____

d. _____

e. _____

2. Investigate what emergency procedures are in place for disasters in the locations where you most frequently work. If you receive written instructions, insert them in the back of this manual.

3. What special precautions will you need to take if you are evacuating from your home with your pets?

4. For weather events, what is the difference between a watch and a warning?

5. Which three things should you keep in mind in the event of a dirty bomb attack?

a. _____

b. _____

c. _____

6. Activity:

Consider the area of the country you live in and research the correct precautions and evacuation procedures for your location.

7. Activity:

Prepare a personal property inventory. Use a digital or video camera to capture the condition of your property.

8. Scenario:

Your interpreting assignment involves a sentencing in a high-profile capital murder case. The local news media has announced that groups advocating and opposed to the death penalty plan on demonstrating in front of the courthouse where you'll be working on the day of the sentencing. What steps can you take to protect yourself in this situation?

UNIT 11

LOCAL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES



Insert Local Policies and Procedures Here

APPENDIXES



Insert Appendixes Here

ACRONYMS




Acronyms

ABC	Antecedent-Behavior-Consequence model
AOUSC	Administrative Office of the United States Courts
ASL	American Sign Language
BOP	United States Bureau of Prisons
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CIPA	Classified Information Protection Act of 1980 (PL96-456)
CPR	Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation
CPTED	Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
CSO	(1) Court Security Officer (2) Court Security Officer designated to protect and manage classified documents under the Classified Information Protection Act (3) Contract Security Officer
DDC	Defensive Driving Course
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DMV	Department of Motor Vehicles
DOD	Department of Defense
DOL	Department of Labor
EDS	Explosive Detection System
EEOC	Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
FCCI	Federally Certified Court Interpreter
FLRB	Federal Labor Relations Board

ICE	Immigration and Customs Enforcement
IOSS	Interagency OPSEC Support Staff
ISOO	Information Security Oversight Office
ISP	Internet Service Provider
IT	Information Technology
JPS	Judicial Protective Services
MER	Maximum Effective Range
MRSA	Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus
NAC	National Agency Check
NACI	National Agency Check with Inquiries
NACIC	National Agency Check with Inquiries and Credit
NAJIT	National Association of Judiciary Interpreters and Translators
NBC	Nuclear, Biological or Chemical
NCIC	National Crime Information Center
NCIX	National Counterintelligence Executive
NCJIT	Nationally Certified Judiciary Interpreter and Translator
NCSC	National Center for State Courts
NLRB	National Labor Relations Board
NEO	Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
NSA	National Security Agency
OAH	Office of Administrative Hearings
OCR	Office of Civil Rights, U.S. Department of Education

OPM	Office of Personnel Management
OPSEC	Operations Security
OSHA	Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PDF	Portable Document Format
PIO	Public Information Officer
PMC	Prisoner Management Classification System
RAD	(1) Rape Defense System (2) Resisting Aggression with Defense
SAME	Specific Area Message Encoding
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SSA	Social Security Administration
SSBI	Single Scope Background Investigation
SSBI-PR	Single Scope Background Investigation with Periodic Reinvestigation
TSA	Transportation Security Administration
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USMS	United States Marshals Service

GLOSSARY



Glossary

21-Foot Rule: A rule stating that the distance an individual, armed with an edged weapon, can travel, before a law enforcement officer can draw a weapon and fire two “body mass” shots to stop an assailant, is 21 feet. The average time is 1.5 seconds under ideal circumstances.

Airborne Diseases: Contagious diseases that spread through the air and range from common colds and flu to pneumonia and tuberculosis.

Antecedent-Behavior-Consequence (ABC): A model of behavior which states that there is a situation or precursor to a behavior (the antecedent), the action (behavior), then what happens after the behavior (the consequence).

Assault Cycle: A five-phase model for aggression consisting of a triggering phase, an escalation phase, a crisis phase, a recovery phase, and a post-crisis depression phase.

Bailiff: A security officer whose duties include witness and juror management in the courtroom.

Biometrics: Technology that uses your fingerprints, facial recognition, or retina pattern for access to secure sections of a facility.

Body Language: The physical movements and gestures of one’s body used to communicate.

Bump-and-Run: A variation of carjacking. A car will pull up behind you and tap your rear bumper. When you get out to check the damage, a second person gets in your car and drives off.

Chunking: See Gassing.

Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA): Public Law 96-456 (Title 18, U.S.C. App III) outlines the procedures for handling classified information in the United States Courts.

Clear/Clearing: The process of searching rooms and neutralizing potential threats in a hostile environment.

Close Combat: Hand-to-hand combat.

Closed Hearing: A sealed hearing, the contents of which are secret.

Close Security: A prisoner risk level classification used for higher-risk, long-term offenders.

Common Vehicle Transmission Diseases: Illnesses which occur through ingestion and which include cholera and hepatitis.

Contract Security Officer (CSO): Security officer contracted by the government from a private firm.

Court Family: The group of people who work in a court setting, including judges, attorneys, clerks, court reporters, interpreters, security personnel, and others who work in the service of justice.

Court Security Officer (CSO): A security officer whose responsibilities include perimeter security, screening operations, courtroom security duty, prisoner security and transportation, witness and juror management, electronic monitoring, crowd control, warrant service, judicial detail security, administrative assignments and other duties as assigned.

Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED): The concept of using building architecture and landscaping to deter criminal activity and increase the security of buildings and other physical locations.

Cross-Cut Shredder: A shredder that cuts paper in both horizontal and vertical directions, reducing documents to small bits.

Direct Contact Diseases: Diseases which involve physical contact by touching or by contact with bodily fluids, and include bacterial and viral diseases, such as impetigo, chicken pox and meningitis.

Droplet Diseases: Diseases transmitted by the infected droplets from coughing, sneezing or talking. They include respiratory infections, such as bronchitis.

Dumpster Diving: The practice of looking through someone's trash, or through the trash of a company, for personal information.

Duress Alarm: An alarm which sends a signal to a central location to alert security staff to an incident in progress at a given location.

Edged Weapons: Knives or improvised bladed weapons.

Elicitation: The collection of information in bits and pieces in casual conversation without the intent being obvious.

Explosive Detection System (EDS): Devices that can detect trace elements of explosives through the use of a surface swab or by sampling the air around a person or object.

Firewall: An anti-intrusion system designed to protect a computer from unauthorized entry through a network.

Fluoroscope: The x-ray machine that screens your purse, briefcase, etc. at a court or other secure facility.

Friendly Fire: Weapons fire from law enforcement personnel.

Gag Order: An order, issued by a judge, directing the parties involved not to reveal the details of a case to the public.

Gassing: The hurling of containers of feces, urine and other body fluids as a method of assault by an inmate in a correctional facility.

Government Wipe: A three-pass U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) or a seven-pass National Security Agency (NSA) process which erases files by overwriting them with random 1's and 0's the specified number of times.

Hard Target: A target provided a high level of protection.

Improvised Weapons: Weapons created from common objects.

In Camera: A hearing or proceeding held in a judge's chambers.

Indirect Contact Diseases: Bacterial, viral and fungal diseases that can be spread by contact with an infected surface, such as a tabletop, a handrail, or office equipment. Some diseases commonly spread by indirect contact include ringworm and conjunctivitis.

Judicial Protective Services (JPS): Group of personnel under the U.S. Marshals Service, which administers the Court Security Officer program, requests contract services, and provides support to Senior Inspectors and Senior Deputy Marshals at the district level.

Layering: Protecting a potential target by providing one security layer after another. This process limits and isolates an incident to a specific layer.

Level I: See Minimum Security.

Level II: See Medium Security.

Level III: See Close Security.

Level IV: See Maximum Security.

Lock Down: The procedure of physically securing access ways of a courthouse or correctional facility during an incident to contain a problem.

Lock Pick: Objects that can serve to pry open a lock, such as the lock on a set of handcuffs.

Magnetometer: The large metal detector that you walk through to enter a court or other secure facility.

Maximum Effective Range (MER): Distance at which a weapon is effective, which ranges from a few feet for sharp-edged weapons to in excess of a thousand yards for high-powered rifles. MER is measured by both “point target” (aimed target) accuracy and by “area target” (large area target).

Maximum Security: The highest level of prisoner risk level classification, used for high-risk, long-term offenders.

Medium Security: A prisoner risk level classification used for medium-level, medium-risk offenders.

Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA): A type of staph infection resistant to most antibiotics.

Minimum Security: A prisoner risk level classification used for lower-level, lower-risk offenders.

National Agency Check (NAC): A search of records from agencies like the FBI, DoD, IRS, etc.

National Agency Check and Inquiries (NACI): A search of records from national agencies with character inquiries sent to former/current employers and references.

National Agency Check, Inquiries and Credit (NACIC): A search of records from national agencies with character inquiries sent to former/current employers and references, plus a report of your credit history.

National Crime Information Center (NCIC): A computerized system that allows the retrieval of records such as criminal convictions, wants and warrants, missing persons, etc.

Need to Know: The principle in information management by which the basis for access to information is by an individual's need to know that information to complete their operational duties.

Non-Sensitive Positions: Positions in which employees do not have access to sensitive or classified material.

Operations Security (OPSEC): Process to deny potential adversaries information (especially non-classified) that could be used against our government – in this case, the court family.

Panic Button: See Duress Alarm.

Perimeter Security: The protection and patrolling of the area immediately surrounding a courthouse or other secure facility.

Phishing: Internet fraud schemes seeking to steal personal information, such as someone's name, Social Security Number, driver's license number, and bank and credit card numbers, for criminal use.

Physical Barrier: A material obstacle designed to provide security.

Presumption of Innocence: The concept by which a defendant is innocent until proven guilty, and which is one of the cornerstones of our country's judicial system.

Prisoner Management Classification System (PMC): Evaluation system that divides prisoners into facilities based on risk assessment and a matrix of other factors.

Psychological Barrier: The mental message of deterrence given by a physical barrier to a potential assailant.

Recidivism: An offender's tendency to return to criminal behavior.

Restraints: Physical devices and instruments used to manage defendants and inmates.

Sallyport: An enclosed area where defendants and inmates enter and exit prisoner transport vehicles.

Sealed Hearing: See Closed Hearing.

Senior Inspector: In the U.S. Marshals Service, the Senior Inspector is the district-level court security supervisor with a wide range of administrative and functional responsibilities, including coordination of high-profile cases and the review of operations for each courthouse in the district.

Sensitive Positions: Exposed to classified information.

Sensitive Positions (High Risk): Positions in which employees have access to national security information at the Secret level.

Shank: A makeshift knife or bladed weapon, devised by an inmate in a correctional facility, from objects such as glass shards, metal or plastic.

Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI): Includes all check included in the NACIC, plus in-person interviews with neighbors, employers and references.

Single Scope Background Investigation - Periodic Reinvestigation (SSBI-PR): The SSBI that reoccurs on a regular basis (e.g., five or ten years).

Social Engineering: A common way for hackers to gain access to secure computer networks by obtaining information through casual conversation.

Soft Target: a target with a lower level of protection or no protection.

Specific Area Message Encoding (SAME): Technology from the National Weather Service for portable weather radios that provides alerts for emergency events in a specific county.

Supervisory Deputy Marshal: The Supervisory Deputy Marshal is responsible for the day-to-day operations at the court division (building) level in the federal court system.

Swipe Card: Magnetic cards selectively programmed to open a door, in order to permit access to restricted areas of a facility.

Target: Anything an assailant wants to attack, including people, buildings and transportation.


Target Hardening: The process of making it more difficult for an assailant to attack a potential target.

Threat Assessment: Assessing the risk posed for targeted violence against an individual or facility based on several factors.

Warden Message: Alert messages issued by the U.S. State Department on security concerns in overseas countries.

Weapons of Opportunity: Common objects used as weapons.

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Abstract

Recent acts of courthouse violence have raised awareness on the part of the court family to improve security and provide training to increase the survivability of these events. A review of the literature, however, indicates an absence of practical court security training material for members of the court family, including court interpreters. Since court interpreters work in close proximity of defendants, matched only by that of the defense attorney, it's imperative that interpreters become informed of the hazards and trained in survival techniques in this working environment. Major topics include basic security concepts, information security, and specific hazards of in and out of court events.

Biography

Lorena Martin was born and raised in the former Panama Canal Zone. She is a graduate of Bates College in Lewiston, Maine with a dual major in French and Biology.

Her professional memberships include the American Society for Training and Development (ASTD), the National Association of Judiciary Interpreters and Translators (NAJIT) and the American Translators Association (ATA).

She is a Federally Certified Court Interpreter (FCCI), a Nationally Certified Judiciary Interpreter and Translator (NCJIT) and is a certified educator by the State of New Mexico in the areas of Science, Modern and Classical Languages and Bilingual Education.

Lorena began her professional career as an interpreter/translator with the U.S.

Government's Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Panama Bureau during the regime of Manuel Antonio Noriega. Her working languages are English, Spanish, Portuguese and French.

Lorena's security-specific background includes living and working in combat zones in the Republic of Panama, the Republic of El Salvador and the State of Bahrain. She's received training in Non-Combatant Evacuations Operations (NEO) at various overseas sites and Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Mission Oriented Protection Posture (NBC/MOPP) training at the U.S. Navy's Administrative Support Unit, Bahrain (ASU) during Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

Lorena has survived numerous natural disasters including several typhoons, and the direct eye passage of a "super typhoon" with winds of 195 miles per hour and a 7.9 earthquake in the Western Pacific.

In addition to her research in the field of court security, her interests include financial crimes and forensic accounting. She has presented with the U.S. Attorneys' Office in Washington D.C. on the topic of financial crimes for court interpreters. Her article on the topic will appear in the May 2006 issue of the ATA Chronicle.