EN BANC CALENDAR
Before the Minnesota Supreme Court
December
2015
SUMMARY
OF ISSUES
Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court
Commissioner’s Office
Monday, November
30, 2015
Courtroom 300,
Minnesota Judicial Center
Melrose
Gates, LLC, Respondent vs. Chor Moua, et al., Appellants – Case No. A14-1131: Appellant tenants leased an apartment from
respondent Melrose Gates. A fire that
started in appellants’ apartment damaged the apartment building in which it was
located, causing significant damage to appellants’ apartment and another
apartment. Respondent’s insurer, State
Farm, paid for the damage to both units, and then brought a subrogation claim
against appellants, seeking to recover the amounts it had expended. The district court applied the test set out
in RAM Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rohde, 820
N.W.2d 1 (2012), which directs the court to consider whether based on the lease
as a whole, along with any other relevant and admissible evidence, the landlord
and tenant reasonably anticipated that the tenant would be liable to a
subrogation claim. The district court
found that Melrose Gates and appellants did not reasonably anticipate such
liability and dismissed the subrogation claim.
The court of appeals reversed, reasoning that it was able to determine
from the lease alone that the parties expected that appellants would be liable
to a subrogation claim, and that the same result would be required after
consideration of other relevant evidence.
On appeal to the supreme court, the
issue presented is whether the parties to this case reasonably anticipated that
appellants would be liable to a subrogation claim. (Hennepin County)
Nonoral: Keith Richard Rossberg, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota,
Respondent – Case No. A15-1205: Appellant
Keith Rossberg was convicted of first degree murder, and the supreme court
affirmed his conviction on direct appeal.
State v. Rossberg, 851 N.W.2d
609 (Minn. 2014). In June of 2015,
appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming he was entitled
to a new trial. The petition
acknowledged it was filed without factual support. Appellant also moved to stay the
petition. After assignment of the case
to a district judge, appellant made a motion for the assigned judge to recuse. The court denied the motions for a stay and
to recuse and dismissed the petition for postconviction relief.
On appeal to the supreme court, the
following issues are presented: (1) whether appellant’s claims for postconviction
relief are barred by State v. Knaffla,
309 Minn. 246, 243 N.W.2d 737 (1976); (2) whether appellant’s postconviction
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was properly dismissed when
appellant did not make any factual allegations to support it; (3) whether the
district court judge should have recused; and (4) whether the district court
abused its discretion when it denied appellant’s motion for a stay. (Wright County)
Tuesday, December
1, 2015
Courtroom 300,
Minnesota Judicial Center
Mark
R. Zweber, Appellant vs. Credit River Township, et al., Respondents – Case No.
A14-0893:
In September of 2012, appellant Mark
Zweber sued respondents Credit River Township and Scott County, alleging that
conditions imposed by respondents in 2006 on the approval of a preliminary plat
application amounted to an unconstitutional taking of his property without
proper compensation, in violation of the United States Constitution and 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Respondents moved for
summary judgment. The district court
denied respondents’ motion, but the court of appeals reversed, ruling that
Zweber’s claims related to quasi-judicial decision-making and should have been
asserted by writ of certiorari to the court of appeals within 60 days of the
challenged action, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 606.01 (2014). Therefore, the court of appeals concluded,
the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear Zweber’s claims.
On appeal to the supreme court, the
issues include: (1) whether respondents’ decision was a quasi-judicial one
reviewable under Minnesota law only by writ of certiorari; and (2) whether
federal law preempts the 60-day period in Minn. Stat. § 606.01 (2014) for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
(Scott County)
In
re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Steven L. Handevidt, a Minnesota
Attorney, Registration No. 004307X – Case No. A15-0740: An attorney discipline matter
that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based on
the facts of the matter.
Monday, December
7, 2015
Courtroom 300,
Minnesota Judicial Center
In
the Matter of the Welfare of: C.J.H., Child – Case No. A14-1810: The State filed a delinquency petition against
C.J.H. The State later agreed to
continue the matter for dismissal under Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 14.01. As part of the continuance for dismissal,
C.J.H. stipulated to facts that would be submitted to the court if he was not
successful on probation. When C.J.H.
violated his probation 9 months later, the juvenile court adjudicated him
delinquent. The court of appeals vacated
the juvenile court’s order, explaining that the juvenile court’s jurisdiction
over C.J.H. expired 3 months before the juvenile court issued its delinquency
order because C.J.H.’s stipulation transformed the continuance for dismissal
into a continuance without adjudication under Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issue
presented is whether C.J.H.’s stipulation to the existence of facts that
established the elements of the charged offense transformed the continuance for
dismissal into a continuance without adjudication. (Itasca County)
In
re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Jeffrey H. Olson, a Minnesota
Attorney, Registration No. 82004 – Case No. A15-0223: An attorney discipline matter
that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based on
the facts of the matter.
Tuesday, December
8, 2015
Courtroom 300,
Minnesota Judicial Center
Patrick
M. Figgins, Appellant vs. Noah Wilcox, et al., Respondents – Case No. A14-1358:
In a dispute arising from a lender-borrower relationship, appellant
Patrick Figgins initiated an action against respondents Grand Rapids State Bank
and chief executive officer Noah Wilcox.
The complaint alleged that Wilcox orally informed Figgins that he did
not need to make a scheduled balloon payment on one of his loans while the
parties were negotiating a refinance of the loan, that Figgins relied on this
statement and did not make the balloon payment, and that Figgins’ application
for a loan from a different bank was subsequently denied because of Wilcox’s
false statement to the other bank that Figgins had a poor payment history and
was seriously delinquent on his loans.
As a result of these actions, Figgins asserted that he was forced to
refinance with Grand Rapids State Bank at above-market interest rates.
The district court granted respondents’
motion to dismiss under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. The
court of appeals affirmed. The court of
appeals concluded that Wilcox’s oral statement that Figgins would not have to
make the scheduled balloon payment “constitutes an unwritten credit agreement
on which any action by a debtor is barred” by the statute of frauds in Minn.
Stat. § 513.33 (2014). The court of
appeals also rejected Figgins’ argument that his promissory estoppel claim
stands outside the statute of frauds in section 513.33.
On appeal to the supreme court, the
following issues are presented: (1) whether Figgins sued to enforce a
“credit agreement” within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 513.33,
subd. 1(1); and (2) whether a claim of promissory estoppel and other
claims are barred by Minn. Stat. § 513.33.
(Itasca County)
Michael
Harlow, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota Department of Human Services, et al.,
Respondents – Cases Nos. A14-1342, A14-1343: Appellant Michael Harlow is a former employee
of the Minnesota Security Hospital in St. Peter where he worked as a
psychiatrist. In November of 2011 he was
involved in an incident with a patient who was acting violently. Respondent Department of Human Services,
which operates the Security Hospital, conducted an employment investigation,
which concluded in December of 2011.
Shortly thereafter, appellant’s employment was terminated. Meanwhile DHS’s Division of Licensing
conducted a separate investigation, which did not conclude until the end of May
2012. In the interim, individual respondents
made statements to the press and by e-mail to DHS employees about the November
incident and appellant’s role in it.
Appellant sued, claiming respondents’ statements both (1) communicated
private data in violation of the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act (MGDPA)
and (2) were defamatory.
Respondents moved for summary judgment,
arguing that (1) their statements were based only on information included in
the employment investigation, which became public when the report was released,
not the ongoing, private licensing investigation, and (2) they were entitled to
absolute or in the alternative, qualified privilege for their statements. The district court denied the motion, finding
that issues of material fact prevented summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed. It ruled that there were no genuine issues of
material fact that respondents’ comments were based only on public data from the
employment investigation, which did not lose its public character even if the
same information was also classified as private in the context of the licensing
investigation. And it ruled that the
individual respondents were sufficiently high-ranking officials to qualify for
absolute privilege, that their statements were made in the scope of their job
duties, and that their statements touched on a matter of public concern.
On appeal to the supreme court, the
issues presented are whether issues of material fact exist as to (1) the MGDPA claim,
and (2) individual respondents’ absolute immunity. (Ramsey County)
Wednesday, December
9, 2015
Courtroom 300,
Minnesota Judicial Center
Curtis
G. and Stacy S. Marks, Respondents vs. Commissioner of Revenue, Relator – Case
No. A15-1145:
Minnesota law provides that a “resident”
is “any individual domiciled in Minnesota” and that resident “also means any
individual domiciled outside the state who maintains a place of abode in the
state and spends in the aggregate more than one-half of the tax year in
Minnesota.” Minn. Stat. § 290.01, subd. 7(a), (b) (2014). Respondents Curtis and Stacy Marks
moved from Minnesota to Florida in 1999, but continued to maintain a home in
Minnesota and spend significant time in Minnesota. Respondents re-established domicile in
Minnesota on August 1, 2007, and they were physically present in Minnesota for
the remaining 153 days of 2007. Prior to
August 1, respondents were physically present in Minnesota for 104 days in 2007,
for a total of 257 days. When
respondents filed their 2007 tax return, they claimed they were part-year
Minnesota residents. The Commissioner of
Revenue audited respondents’ return and determined they were full-year
Minnesota residents in 2007, assessing them back taxes, interest, and
penalties.
Respondents filed an administrative
appeal, and the Commissioner upheld the assessment. Respondents then appealed to the Tax Court,
which ruled that respondents were not full-year residents in 2007 because they
were not domiciled in the state for the entire year, and during the time they
were not domiciled in the state, they did not spend 183 days or more in the
state. The Tax Court ruled that to the
extent Minn. R. 8001.0300, subp. 8 provided otherwise, it was contrary to Minn.
Stat. § 290.01, subd. 7.
On appeal to the supreme court, the
issue presented is whether respondents were full-year residents of Minnesota in
2007. (Minnesota Tax Court)
Nonoral: Robert Marlyn Taylor, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota,
Respondent – Case No. A15-0398: Appellant
Robert Taylor’s first trial ended in a hung jury, and he was tried a second
time and found guilty of premeditated first-degree murder in January of
2001. Appellant was sentenced to life in
prison. The supreme court affirmed the
conviction on direct appeal. State v. Taylor, 650 N.W.2d 190 (Minn.
2002). Appellant filed a first petition
for postconviction relief in 2003; that petition was denied, and the supreme
court affirmed. Taylor v. State, 691 N.W.2d 78 (Minn. 2005). In 2004, the supreme court removed and
retired the judge who presided over appellant’s second trial. Appellant filed his second petition for
postconviction relief in October of 2014, arguing he was entitled to a new
trial based on the removal and retirement of the judge who presided over his
second trial and ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the petition.
On appeal to the supreme court, the
following issues are presented: (1) whether appellant’s claims for
postconviction relief are barred by Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4 (2014); and (2)
whether appellant’s claims for postconviction relief are barred by State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 243
N.W.2d 737 (1976). (Hennepin County)
Thursday, December
10, 2015
Courtroom 300,
Minnesota Judicial Center
State of Minnesota, Appellant vs. Jimmy
Dawayne Lester, Respondent – Case No. A14-0431: On October 26,
2011, a Minneapolis police officer received a call from a confidential reliable
informant (CRI), who stated that a man, nicknamed “J.,” would be delivering
heroin in approximately 10 minutes to a specific location in Minneapolis. Within minutes of receiving the tip, the
police went to that location and saw a parked car with a passenger who matched
J.’s description. The police drove the
CRI past this car, and he confirmed the passenger was J. Respondent Jimmy Lester was the driver of this
car. Lester drove to a nearby gas
station, and he and J. went inside. When the men emerged from the gas station,
J., while talking on his cell phone, crossed the street and walked around a
parking lot. A car pulled into that parking lot, and J. got in and drove
away. Meanwhile, Lester parked his car
in a location of the gas station parking lot where he could see J. and remained
in the car. The police then arrested Lester and during a search of his car,
found heroin hidden behind a panel in the car’s center console.
Appellant State
of Minnesota charged Lester with second- and third-degree controlled-substance
crime. Lester filed a motion to suppress the drugs found in the car. At a contested omnibus hearing, the
Minneapolis police officer testified that based on his training, experience,
and observations of J. and Lester, he believed that both J. and Lester and were
involved in drug dealing. The district court denied the motion to suppress,
concluding there was probable cause to believe Lester was assisting J. in a
heroin sale and to search his car under the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement. Lester was later convicted of third-degree controlled-substance
crime.
The court of
appeals reversed Lester’s conviction. It concluded that the police did not have
probable cause to arrest Lester and that it was not reasonable to believe
evidence of drug dealing would be found in Lester’s car.
On appeal to
the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the warrantless search of
Lester’s car was justified under the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement because, based on the totality of circumstances, there was probable
cause to believe that Lester’s car contained evidence of drug dealing.
(Hennepin County).
Nonoral: Toby Earl Johnson, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent
– Case No. A15-0698:
Appellant Toby Johnson pleaded guilty to
both aiding and abetting premeditated intentional murder, and to second-degree
intentional murder, under a plea agreement that provided he would only be
convicted on one count or the other. The
district court convicted him of aiding and abetting premeditated intentional
murder and sentenced him to a mandatory life sentence. Johnson petitioned for postconviction relief,
seeking to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis that the plea agreement
violated the separation of powers. The
postconviction court denied the petition, and the supreme court affirmed. Johnson
v. State, 641 N.W.2d 912 (Minn. 2002).
In April 2010, Johnson filed a motion to correct or reduce his sentence
pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9.
The district court granted Johnson’s motion in part, but treated the
remainder of it as a petition for postconviction relief and denied it as
untimely and barred by State v. Knaffla,
309 Minn. 246, 243 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1976).
The supreme court affirmed. Johnson v. State, 801 N.W.2d 173 (Minn.
2011).
In February of 2015, Johnson filed a
second motion to correct or reduce his sentence pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P.
27.03, subd. 9, arguing that his sentence was contrary to law because its
length violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The district court treated the motion as a
petition for postconviction relief and denied it as untimely and Knaffla-barred.
On appeal to the supreme court, the
following issues are presented: (1) whether Johnson’s motion was properly
brought under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9; and (2) whether Johnson’s
motion escapes the Knaffla bar
because it is a novel claim. (McLeod
County)