EN
BANC CALENDAR
Before
the Minnesota Supreme Court
November
2015
SUMMARY
OF ISSUES
Summaries
prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office
Monday, November 2, 2015
Courtroom 300,
Minnesota Judicial Center
State of
Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Maureen Ndidiamaka Onyelobi, Appellant – Case No. A15-0267: Appellant Maureen Onyelobi was indicted for
first- and second-degree murder in connection with the March 2014 shooting
death of Anthony Fairbanks. The evidence
at trial established that Onyelobi helped Maurice Wilson and David Johnson plan
and carry out the killing. Onyelobi was
found guilty following a jury trial and was sentenced to life in prison without
the possibility of release.
On
appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether
the district court’s aiding-and-abetting instruction plainly and materially misstated
the law; (2) whether the police had probable cause to arrest Onyelobi; and (3) whether
the State’s reasons for exercising peremptory strikes of three of four
potential African-American jurors were pretextual. (Hennepin County District Court)
Ali M. Shire,
Respondent, vs. Rosemount Inc., Self-Insured/Berkley Risk Administrators
Company, LLC, Relator, Twin Cities Orthopedics, P.A., Crosstown Surgery Center,
and Minnesota Department of Human Services/BRS, Intervenors – Case No. A15-0856: Relator Rosemount Inc. held an
employee-appreciation event during respondent Ali Shire’s normal work hours. Rosemount considered attendance at the event
“voluntary.” Because the event was
during his work hours, Shire was given the option of attending, taking vacation
leave and not attending, or taking leave without pay and not attending. Shire attended, injured his ankle while
participating in a laser-tag activity during the event, and sought workers’
compensation benefits.
Rosemount
contended that Shire’s injury was not compensable because the injury was incurred
while participating in an employer-sponsored, but voluntary recreational
program. The compensation judge granted
Shire’s petition for benefits, and the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals
(“WCCA”) affirmed, both concluding that Shire’s participation in the event was
“involuntary” because attendance was the only means available to avoid “a
forfeiture of pay or benefits.” The WCCA
declined to consider whether Shire’s participation in laser tag was
“voluntary,” noting that the statute does not require an individual activity
assessment.
On
appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether Shire’s
injury is excluded from coverage because his participation in the employer-sponsored
employee-recognition event was voluntary within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 176.021,
subd. 9 (2014); and (2) whether Shire’s injury is excluded from coverage
because his participation in laser tag at the employee-recognition event,
during which he sustained an injury, was “voluntary” within the meaning of Minn.
Stat. § 176.021, subd. 9. (Workers’
Compensation Court of Appeals)
Tuesday, November 3,
2015
Courtroom 300,
Minnesota Judicial Center
Jamy Hegseth
f/k/a Jamy Jager, Appellant, vs. American Family Insurance Group, Respondent –
Case No. A14-1189: Appellant Jamy Hegseth was injured in a
motor-vehicle accident that occurred in March 2007 when a truck turned in front
of the vehicle in which she was a passenger.
Hegseth sought uninsured motorist (“UM”) benefits from the insurer of
the occupied vehicle. After reaching a
settlement with that insurer, Hegseth sought excess UM benefits from her own
insurer, respondent American Family Mutual Insurance Group. American Family denied Hegseth’s claim in
September 2012, and Hegseth brought an action against American Family in July
2013. The district court granted
American Family’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the action is
time-barred because Hegseth commenced the action more than 6 years after the
accident occurred. The court of appeals
affirmed, rejecting Hegseth’s argument that her claim for primary UM benefits
had to be resolved before her claim for excess UM benefits became ripe.
On
appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the pursuit and resolution
of Hegseth’s claim for primary UM benefits was a condition precedent to
bringing a claim for excess UM benefits, and (2) whether the claim for excess
UM benefits accrued when the accident occurred or when the contract was
allegedly breached. (Hennepin County
District Court)
State of Minnesota,
Respondent, vs. Joshua Lee Myhre, Appellant – Case No. A14-0670: Appellant Joshua Myhre was charged with
first-degree refusal to submit to a chemical test. Myhre moved to dismiss the charge, arguing
the test-refusal statute is unconstitutional, and the district court denied the
motion. To preserve that issue for
appeal, Myhre agreed to a trial by stipulated facts. But rather than enter a plea of not guilty,
as required by Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4 (2014), Myhre entered a plea of
guilty, while acknowledging on the record that he could still appeal the
court’s finding of guilt.
On appeal to the court of
appeals, Myhre argued he was entitled to a new trial because the lack of strict
compliance with the procedure in Rule 26.01 rendered the district court
proceeding invalid. The court of appeals
affirmed Myhre’s conviction, stating the district court and the parties clearly
intended to follow, and thought they were following, the procedure for a valid
trial by stipulated facts to obtain review of a pretrial ruling. It also found that Myhre’s waiver of his
trial-related rights was valid. The
court concluded that the procedural defects were not substantial enough to
invalidate the district court proceedings altogether. The court treated the guilty plea as a
not-guilty plea with stipulated facts, reviewed the district court’s pretrial ruling,
and denied relief.
On
appeal to the supreme court, the following issue is presented: whether Myhre’s
conviction must be reversed and the case remanded because the parties did not
comply with the procedure required by Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, to
obtain review of a dispositive pretrial ruling and instead entered an invalid
conditional guilty plea. (Houston County
District Court)
Wednesday, November 4,
2015
Courtroom 300,
Minnesota Judicial Center
Minnesota Energy
Resources Corporation, Relator, vs. Commissioner of Revenue, Respondent,
Commissioner of Revenue, Relator, vs. Minnesota Energy Resources Corporation,
Respondent – Case Nos. A15-0422, A15-0438: Minnesota Energy
Resources Corporation (“MERC”) objected to the Commissioner of Revenue’s
2008-2012 valuations of its natural gas pipeline network and related facilities. Following a trial, the tax court concluded
that MERC had rebutted the prima facie validity of the commissioner’s
valuations and assessments. The tax
court decreased the commissioner’s assessed values for each year except 2012, for
which it increased the valuation.
MERC
and the commissioner each separately appealed, and the appeals have been
consolidated. On appeal to the supreme
court, MERC presents the following issues:
(1) whether, in calculating the capitalization rate under the income
approach, the tax court erred by failing, inter
alia, to account for additional company-specific risk, explain its beta
determination, and incorporate the build-up method in determining the cost of
equity; and (2) whether, in calculating the market valuation under the cost
approach, the tax court erred in failing to recognize a deduction for economic
obsolescence. The commissioner raises
the following issues: (1) whether the tax court erred in deducting, from the
income indicator of value, arbitrary amounts the court attributed to income
purportedly contributed to MERC’s income stream by unidentified intangible
property and working capital, when MERC produced no objective evidence any
intangible property or working capital contributed an identifiable amount to
MERC’s income streams; and (2) whether the tax court erred by failing to
consider a recent sale of the subject property and annual valuations of the
subject property by MERC. (Minnesota Tax
Court)
Nonoral: Craig Matthew Hohenwald, Appellant,
vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A15-0487:
Appellant Craig Hohenwald was convicted of
first-degree murder for the February 2009 stabbing deaths of Larry and Lois
Steenerson. The district court sentenced
Hohenwald to two consecutive terms of life in prison without possibility of
release. On direct appeal to the supreme
court, Hohenwald argued that the indictment was invalid because it was obtained
while proceedings were suspended pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01; the evidence
was legally insufficient to find him guilty of premediated murder instead of
heat-of-passion manslaughter; the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct; and
the district court erred in admitting a witness’s out-of-court statement. The court affirmed Hohenwald’s conviction in
July 2012.
In
August 2014 Hohenwald filed a petition for postconviction relief in which he
asserted claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and newly discovered
evidence. The district court denied
Hohenwald’s claim of newly discovered evidence on the merits, holding that the
evidence was not newly discovered and/or was unlikely to produce an acquittal
or another more favorable result. It
held that the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was procedurally barred
because Hohenwald knew or should have known about all the grounds for the claim
at the time of his direct appeal.
On
appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether
the district court abused its discretion in denying Hohenwald’s petition for
postconviction relief based upon ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2)
whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Hohenwald’s petition
for postconviction relief based upon newly discovered evidence. In addition, the State has filed a motion to dismiss
the appeal which presents the following issues: (1) whether Hohenwald’s appeal
is untimely because he did not file his notice of appeal within 60 days of
entry of a final order denying postconviction relief; and (2) whether Hohenwald
seeks to appeal from a nonappealable order. (Kanabec County District Court)
Thursday, November 5,
2015
Courtroom 300,
Minnesota Judicial Center
In re Petition
for Disciplinary Action against Paul Roland Rambow, a Minnesota Attorney,
Registration No. 169389 – Case No. A14-0804: An attorney discipline
case that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate
based on the facts of the matter.
Nonoral: Daniel J. Berglund, Relator, vs. Commissioner
of Revenue, Respondent – Case No. A15-0957: This is an
appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Minnesota Tax Court. The
Commissioner of Revenue made and filed returns on behalf of relator Daniel
Berglund, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 270C.33, subd. 3 (2014), for tax years
in which Berglund had not filed returns. The commissioner then notified Berglund
of the tax liability reflected in those returns. Berglund filed an
appeal with the tax court, relying on Minn. R. 8160.0620 (2013) to assert that
the returns cannot be considered “filed” because they lack a manual signature.
The tax court granted the commissioner’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings.
On
appeal to the supreme court, the following issue is presented: did the tax court
correctly determine that the commissioner-filed returns were valid. (Minnesota Tax Court)
Monday, November 9, 2015
Courtroom 300,
Minnesota Judicial Center
Steven J. Jaeger, Respondent, vs. Palladium Holdings, LLC,
Appellant, Franklin Financial, LLC, et al., Defendants – Case No. A14-0803: Respondent Steven
Jaeger owned a townhouse in St. Louis Park, but he worked in Wisconsin. After Jaeger became delinquent on association
dues, the property was sold at a sheriff’s sale. Appellant Palladium Holdings, LLC, ultimately
acquired the property. In this action,
Jaeger claims that the sheriff’s sale is void due to the failure to provide
lawful notice of the sale under Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(a) (2014), which provides
that notice may be left “at the individual’s usual place of abode with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein.” The district court found that notice of the
foreclosure sale was left at Jaeger’s townhouse with Jaeger’s 25-year-old son,
who was living at a separate address, and that Jaeger did not have actual
notice of the sale. The district court
declared the sheriff’s sale void on the ground that Jaeger’s son was not a
person “then residing” at the townhouse for purposes of substitute service
under Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(a). The
court of appeals affirmed.
On
appeal to the supreme court, the following issue is presented: whether the served individual must live at
the property for substitute service to be effective pursuant to Minn. R. Civ.
P. 4.03(a). (Hennepin County District
Court)
Nonoral: Jason Lee
Bolstad, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A15-0564:
Appellant Jason Bolstad was convicted in April 2003 of first-degree
murder for the shooting death of his half-brother Gary Bolstad in April
1996. The district court sentenced him
to life in prison. On direct appeal to
the supreme court, Bolstad argued there was insufficient evidence to support
the conviction, the district court abused its discretion when it refused to
allow him to recall a witness, and the prosecutor committed prejudicial
misconduct. The court affirmed Bolstad’s
conviction in September 2004. Bolstad
filed a petition for postconviction relief in July 2007, asserting claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence, which the
district court denied following an evidentiary hearing.
Bolstad
filed a second petition for postconviction relief in October 2014, in which he
maintained that the district court’s supplemental jury instructions on
first-degree felony murder had the effect of directing a guilty verdict. The district court denied relief without a
hearing, holding that Bolstad’s petition was time-barred under Minn. Stat. § 590.03,
subd. 4(a), (b) (2014); his claims were procedurally barred because they were
known at the time of Bolstad’s direct appeal; and Bolstad failed to demonstrate
his actual innocence.
On appeal to the supreme court, the
following issues are presented: (1) whether the district court abused its
discretion in denying Bolstad’s petition for a new trial based on an erroneous
jury instruction; and (2) whether Bolstad should be granted a new trial in the
interests of justice. (Kanabec County
District Court)
Tuesday, November
10, 2015
Courtroom 300,
Minnesota Judicial Center
Yvette Ford,
Respondent, vs. Minneapolis Public Schools, Appellant – Case No. A13-1072: Respondent Yvette Ford was employed by
appellant Minneapolis Public Schools (“MPS”).
After MPS eliminated Ford’s position, she brought an action that
included a claim for violation of the Minnesota Whistleblower Act, alleging
that MPS had retaliated against her for reporting illegal conduct. The district court granted summary judgment
to MPS and dismissed the whistleblower claim as untimely under the 2-year
statute of limitations “for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment,
or other tort resulting in personal injury,” Minn. Stat. § 541.07(1)
(2014). The court of appeals reversed, concluding
that the whistleblower claim is timely under the 6-year statute of limitations
for an action “upon a liability created by statute,” Minn. Stat. § 541.05,
subd. 1(2) (2014).
On
appeal to the supreme court, the following issue is presented: whether a statutory whistleblower claim
alleging retaliation for reporting illegal conduct is subject to the 2-year
statute of limitations under Minn. Stat. § 541.07(1) or the 6-year statute
of limitations under Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2). (Hennepin County District Court)
In re Petition
for Disciplinary Action against Timothy J. Oliver, a Minnesota Attorney,
Registration No. 0121393 – Case No. A15-1285: An attorney discipline case in which the
issue presently before the court is whether respondent Timothy Oliver should be
temporarily suspended pending final determination of the disciplinary
proceedings pursuant to Rule 16, Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility.
Nonoral: Harry Jerome Evans, Appellant, vs.
State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A15-0792: Appellant Harry Evans was convicted in January
2006 of first-degree murder of a peace officer for the shooting death of St.
Paul Police Sergeant Gerald Vick. He was
sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of release. The sentence included a requirement that
Evans pay restitution in the amount $7,500.00 to the Crime Victims’ Reparations
Board. On direct appeal, Evans
challenged the conviction on numerous grounds, but he did not challenge the
sentence. The supreme court affirmed the
conviction in October 2008.
Evans
filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief in August 2009 in which he
asserted claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, newly
discovered evidence, and recanted witness testimony. The district court denied relief and the
supreme court affirmed in a decision issued in August 2015. Meanwhile, in April 2015, Evans filed a pro
se petition for correction of sentence pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03,
subd. 9 (2014), in which he asserted that the restitution order was
unlawful. The district court treated the
claim as a petition for postconviction relief and denied relief. The court held that Evans’ claim was untimely
because Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(b) (2014), requires that a
challenge to an order for restitution must be made within 30 days of receiving
notice of the amount of restitution, or within 30 days of sentencing, whichever
is later.
On
appeal to the supreme court, the following issue is presented: whether the
district court abused its discretion in denying Evan’s restitution challenge as
untimely. (Ramsey County District Court)