



July 10, 2019

VIA E-FILING & EMAIL

[REDACTED VERSION]

The Honorable Richard B. Solum
2950 Dean Parkway, #2502
Minneapolis, MN 55412

Re: *In re the Estate of Prince Rogers Nelson*
Court File No. 10-PR-16-46

Dear Judge Solum:

We are writing on behalf of Comerica Bank & Trust, N.A. ("Personal Representative"), in response to your requests on July 5, 2019, for additional information regarding the work of White Wiggins & Barnes (WWB).

Request Nos. 1-2: Objections to accountings or requests for discharge by the Second Special Administrator, former Special Administrator, and Personal Representative.

We are not aware of any objections filed by WWB to any actions taken by the Second Special Administrator, Peter Gleekel.

On behalf of Alfred Jackson, WWB objected to the district court's October 17, 2018 Amended Order & Memorandum Granting Bremer Trust, N.A.'s Motion to Lift Stay of Discharge and Approve Payment of Attorneys' Fees and Costs and filed an emergency motion to stay the Order. The Court denied the motion. Mr. Jackson's Emergency Motion and Objection and the Court's Order are attached hereto as Exhibit A. WWB, on behalf of Mr. Jackson, then filed an appeal of the Court's October 17, 2018 Order. Mr. Jackson ultimately abandoned the appeal and stipulated to its dismissal. The Notice of Appeal, Statement of the Case, and Order for Dismissal are attached as Exhibit B.

On behalf of Alfred Jackson and Omarr Baker, WWB filed an objection to the Personal Representative's Petition for Approval of Interim Accounting and associated request for discharge of liability. The Court overruled the objection and approved the Personal Representative's Interim Accounting. That objection and order are attached as Exhibit C.


Attorneys & Advisors
main 612.492.7000
fax 612.492.7077
www.fredlaw.com

Fredrikson & Byron, P.A.
200 South Sixth Street, Suite 4000
Minneapolis, Minnesota
55402-1425

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Request No. 3: WWB's work regarding Gregg Walker and Michael Lythcott's disclosure of confidential Estate information and the benefit to the Estate.

On February 11, 2019, WWB wrote to the Court to address several of their concerns regarding Michael Lythcott's conduct. In the letter, WWB informed the Court that WWB had learned Mr. Lythcott was disclosing highly confidential estate information to unauthorized third-parties, in violation of the Court's Orders and his non-disclosure agreement:



WWB attached a copy of the Management Presentation or "pitch book" to its letter.

Based on the revelations from WWB's letter and the confidential information in the attached pitch book, the Court issued an Order revoking Mr. Walker's status as a Court-appointed Heirs' Representative and ordered Mr. Lythcott and Mr. Walker to produce to the Personal Representative all of their communications with third parties regarding confidential Estate information. Using the documents produced by Mr. Lythcott, the Personal Representative was able to contact third parties to whom Mr. Lythcott and Mr. Walker had provided access to confidential Estate information and confirm the return or destruction of such confidential Estate information. Without WWB's disclosure of the data room and pitch book, the Personal Representative may not have been able to cut off Mr. Lythcott and Mr. Walker's access to Estate information or recover the confidential documents and information they improperly disseminated. It is difficult to measure the benefit to the Estate of WWB's disclosure in financial terms, so the Personal Representative will leave it to Your Honor's discretion to determine how much WWB should be compensated for the work related to its February 11, 2019 letter.

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Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Joseph J. Cassioppi

Joseph J. Cassioppi
Direct Dial: 612.492.7414
Email: jcassioppi@fredlaw.com

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EXHIBIT A

**STATE OF MINNESOTA
COUNTY OF CARVER**

**DISTRICT COURT
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
PROBATE DIVISION**

In re:

Estate of Prince Rogers Nelson,
Decedent.

Court File No. 10-PR-16-46
Honorable Kevin W. Eide

**ALFRED JACKSON'S OBJECTION TO
AND MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF
THE COURT'S OCTOBER 17, 2018
ORDER**

TO THE HONORABLE COURT:

Alfred Jackson, as heir to the Estate of Prince Rogers Nelson (the "Estate"), by and through his counsel, and Omarr Baker and Tyka Nelson, pro se heirs of the Estate, hereby file this Objection to, and Motion for clarification of language of the Court's October 17, 2018 Amended Order & Memorandum Granting Bremer Trust, N.A.'S Motion To Lift Stay Of Discharge and Approve Payment Of Attorneys' Fees And Costs (the "October 17, 2018 Order"). Mr. Jackson specifically objects to paragraph 2 of the Order which states the following:

The portion of the Court's March 27, 2017 Order stating the Bremer Trust and its agents are hereby discharged from any and all liability to the Estate of Prince Rogers Nelson associated with its Special Administration of the Estate is hereby reinstated.

Mr. Jackson objects to this provision and seeks clarification to the extent that this provision releases Bremer from liability for actions taken during its administration of the Estate, because a total release from liability would violate Minnesota law. In support of this Objection and Motion, Mr. Jackson respectfully shows the Court as follows:

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

On April 27, 2016 this Court appointed Bremer Trust, N.A. (“Bremer”) as Special Administrator of the Estate. *See* Order of Formal Appointment of Special Administrator at 2. In its Order of Formal Appointment of Special Administrator, the Court indicated that it would issue Letters of Special Administration (“Letters”) subject to certain limitations, including limiting the scope of Bremer’s authority to managing and supervising the Decedent’s assets and limiting the time of Bremer’s authority to the “lesser of 6 months or until...a Personal Representative is appointed.” *Id.* In its Letters, the Court indicated that Bremer’s term as Special Administrator expired on November 2, 2016. *See* Letters of Special Administration. This Court subsequently extended Bremer’s initial term to January 12, 2017 to allow for the appointment of a mutually agreeable Personal Representative. *See* Order Extending Appointment of Special Administrator.

Throughout Bremer’s Special Administration of the Estate, multiple heirs expressed their suspicion of, lack of confidence in and general unhappiness with Bremer’s conduct and decisions related to the Estate, in which the heirs have interest. In fact, even Bremer acknowledged the mounting tensions and lack of trust between itself and the heirs. In its September 27, 2016 letter to the Court, with barely five months acting into its tenure as Special Administrator to the Estate, Bremer admitted that “the mutual trust and confidence that is so critical to the relationship between the [Bremer] and the heirs appears to have substantially eroded” and noted that the fractured relationship between Bremer and the heirs hampered Bremer’s “ability to act in the best interest of the Estate.” *See* Special Administrator’s Letter to Judge Eide re Petition for Successor Special Administrator at 4. Bremer also asserted that it would neither seek an extension of its current term nor object to the appointment of a new Special administrator prior to the expiration of Bremer’s term. *Id.*

Some of the heirs continued to be dissatisfied with and distrusting of Bremer. On December 6, 2016, Tyka Nelson filed a Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator asserting her lack of confidence in Bremer and requested the Court replace Bremer immediately. *See* Petition for Appointment of Successor Special Administrator at ¶¶ 12-15. In a letter to the Court, Bremer reminded the Court that “[it] was not interested in continuing as Special Administrator after its current term expires” but objected to Ms. Nelson’s request to replace Bremer prior to the expiration of its term, despite previously indicating that it was not opposed to the same. *See* Special Administrator’s Letter to Judge Eide re Petition for Successor Special Administrator at 3-4.

On December 16, 2016, Bremer petitioned the Court for the following: (1) approval of the accountings for its administration from April 27, 2016 through December 31, 2016; (2) authorization to pay its legal fees through its termination date/date of the January 12, 2017 hearing to appoint a successor; (3) **discharge of Bremer and its agents from any and all liability associated with pending claims against the Estate**; (4) authorization to reserve \$1,000,000 from Estate assets for professional and legal fees associated with the transfer of the Estate administration to a successor **and the discharge of Bremer and its agents from any and all liability associated with the administration of the Estate**; (5) a finding that Bremer's term as Special Administrator has terminated; (6) **discharge of Bremer and its agents from any and all liability associated with its Special Administration of the Estate through December 31, 2016**; (7) authorization and distribution of the balance of Estate assets, less the amount Bremer needed to pay Petitioner's legal fees and less the \$1,000,000 reserve, to the Court-appointed successor Special Administrator or Personal Representative upon discharge of Bremer and its agents through December 31, 2016; (8) approval of the accountings from January 1, 2017

through the termination date of Petitioner's Special Administration, submitted by Bremer; (9) authorization to pay its professional and legal fees incurred after January 1, 2017, submitted by Bremer as Special Administrator; (10) **discharge of Bremer and its agents from any and all liability associated with its Special Administration of the Estate from January 1, 2017 through the date of its termination within a reasonable time after receipt by the Court of the stub accounting**; (11) authorization to distribute the balance of the \$1,000,000 reserve, after payment of professional and legal fees, to the Court-appointed successor Special Administrator or Personal Representative upon discharge of Bremer through the termination date of Bremer's Special Administration; and (12) granting such other relief as may be proper. *See* Petition for Order Approving Accounting Distribution of Assets and Discharge of Special Administrator at ¶¶ 1-12.

On December 20, 2016, Omarr Baker, as heir, filed his Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator, also asserting his lack of confidence in Bremer and requested that the Court replace Bremer immediately, rather than at the expiration of its extended term. *See* Petition for Appointment of Successor Special Administrator at ¶¶ 1-15. Bremer did not respond to Mr. Baker's Petition.

On January 4, 2017 Bremer filed the first of many "final accounting" documents, all of which, included substantial professional fees. *See* Final Accounting Through 11-30-16. The heirs objected to each one and reiterated their suspicion of, lack of confidence in and unhappiness with Bremer's conduct and decisions. Specifically, on January 19, 2017, heirs Tyka Nelson and Omarr Baker objected to the first of Bremer's final accountings, including Bremer's request for payment of professional fees to, among others, Stinson Leonard Street, LLP, asserting that the "request seeks compensation from the Estate that is not just and reasonable [n]or commensurate

with the benefit [to] the Estate.” *See* Omarr Baker and Tyka Nelson’s Objection to Special Administrator’s Request for Legal Fees Through December 31, 2016. On January 30, 2017, Mr. Baker filed an Objection to Bremer’s request for fees and cost and attorneys fess through December 31, 2016, arguing that “Bremer had not established that the requested fees and costs are reasonable or benefitted the Estate.” *See* Omarr Baker’s Objection to Special Administrator’s Request for Fees and Costs and Attorney’s Fees Through December 31, 2016. On March 13, 2017, Mr. Baker and Tyka Nelson filed their objections to Bremer and its counsels’ March 3, 2017 final accounting and fees, again reiterating their displeasure with Bremer and reasserting objections that fees were not reasonable and/or not incurred for the benefit of the estate. *See* Omarr Baker and Tyka Nelson’s Objections to Stinson Leonard Street LLP’s Fee Statements Through January 31, 2017. And on April 7, 2017, Mr. Baker and Alfred Jackson, as heir, filed objections to additional Bremer final accounting seeking approval of fees; objecting that such fees were not made for the benefit of the Estate. *See* REDACTED Omarr Baker and Alfred Jackson’s Supplemental Objections to Bremer Trust National Associations Final Accounts through January 31, 2017.

On March 27, 2017 the Court issued an Order stating that it had reviewed the relevant fee applications and objections and (1) denying discovery or an evidentiary hearing regarding the allowance of the fees of the Special Administrator and its attorneys, and approval of the Final Accounts; (2) approving the Special Administrator’s Fees and Costs through January 31, 2017; (3) approving the Special Administrator’s Attorney’s Fees and Costs through January 31, 2017; (4) ordering payment within 30 days of the Order; (5) approving Bremer’s Final Accounting; (6) approving the Original Inventory as filed on January 4, 2017; (7) **discharging Bremer and its agents from any and all liability associated with its Special Administration of the Estate;**

and (8) directing Comerica Bank to perform certain tasks. This Order, in part, mirrored the language of Bremer's December 16, 2016 petition and request. *See* Petition for Order Approving Accounting Distribution of Assets and Discharge of Special Administrator at ¶¶ 1-12.

On April 11, 2017, the Court issued an Order Staying the Discharge of Special Administrator (Bremer), on the ground that it had "learned that litigation may be forthcoming which may relate to actions taken by the Special Administrator" and staying only paragraph 7 of its above-referenced March 27, 2017 Order, which discharged Bremer and its agents of liability. *See* Order Staying Discharge of Special Administrator. Since that time, the heirs and Bremer have been engaged in sprawling dispute regarding the appropriateness of the fees incurred by Bremer and its agents and the scope of Bremer and its agents' discharge.

On October 17, 2018 this Court issued an Order reinstating paragraph 7 of its March 27, 2017 Order and "discharged [Bremer and its Agents] from **any and all liability** to the [Estate] associated with its Special Administration of the Estate" and approving the payment of additional professional fees incurred by Bremer.

Alfred Jackson, joined by Omarr Baker and Tyka Nelson, object to the language of the Court's October 17, 2018 Order on the grounds that it is ambiguous as to the phraseology of paragraph 2 of the Order, including all references to paragraph 7 of the Court's March 27, 2017 Order contained therein, because, as phrased, such language releases Bremer and its agents from any and all liability. To the extent that the aforementioned language purports to release Bremer and its agents from liability to the heirs for transactions, acts, or omissions occurring before the Court's discharge of Bremer, such language is improper and in direct contravention of the Minnesota Probate Code. Accordingly, and Mr. Jackson, joined by Mr. Baker and Ms. Tyka Nelson move this court to clarify its intentions regarding the scope of Bremer's discharge and

adopt the clarifying language offered herein.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

The language of Minnesota’s probate code is clear that “[t]ermination [of the appointment of a personal representative] does not discharge a personal representative from liability for transactions or omissions occurring before termination, or relieve the representative of the duty to preserve assets subject to the representative's control, to account therefor, and to deliver the assets.” Minn. Stat. Ann. § 524.3-608 (2002); *see also In re Estate of Stewart*, No. A04-808, 2005 WL 44462, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2005) (articulating that “[u]nder Minnesota law, the discharge of a personal representative terminates the representative's authority to represent the estate in pending or future proceedings, but it **does not** discharge the personal representative from liability for transactions occurring before the termination.”)¹ Moreover, Minnesota law clearly provides that “[i]f a personal representative breaches his fiduciary duty of acting in the estate's best interests, the beneficiaries may hold the representative responsible.” Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 524.3–703(a), 524.3–712 (1994); *see also Goldberger v. Kaplan, Strangis & Kaplan, P.A.*, 534 N.W.2d 734, 739 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). And that “if the exercise of power concerning the estate is improper, the personal representative is liable to interested persons for damage or loss resulting from breach of fiduciary duty to the same extent as a trustee of an express trust.” Minn. Stat. Ann. § 524.3-712. Thus, “a discharge only terminates the authority to represent the estate in any pending or future proceeding” and does not serve to terminate liability for conduct during the personal representative’s term. *Id.* Minn. Stat. Ann. § 524.3-608 (2002).

¹ Mr. Jackson acknowledges that unpublished opinions are not precedential, and pursuant to Minn. Stat. Ann. § 480A.08, attaches a copy of this case hereto, and suggests that the Court look to it for instructive purposes given the limited published case law available interpreting Minn. Stat. Ann. § 524.3-608.

Here, Bremer sought and was granted an Order discharging Bremer and its agents “from any and all liability to the [Estate] associated with its Special Administration of the Estate.” This is improper and contrary to Minn. Stat. Ann. § 524.3-608 because it does not limit the scope of Bremer and its agents’ discharge and may be interpreted as a release of Bremer and its agents from liability for transactions and omissions that occurred during its time as Special Administrator as to the heirs. As described in detail above, the heirs of the Estate have expressed numerous concerns with, and objected to Bremer’s conduct as Special Administrator. Though this Objection and Motion for Clarification does not seek to address the substance of these concerns and objections, some of the heirs wish to preserve their objections should a challenge of the same become necessary. In light of the contentious relationship between Bremer and the heirs it is plausible that the heirs may assert claims against Bremer that they are entitled to pursue under Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 524.3–703(a), 524.3–712 (1994); *see also Goldberger v. Kaplan, Strangis & Kaplan, P.A.*, 534 N.W.2d 734, 739 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). Accordingly, Alfred Jackson, joined by Omarr Baker and Tyka Nelson object to the October 17, 2018 Order’s language as contrary to Minnesota law and request that this Court clarify its October 17, 2018 Order to limit the scope of the discharge granted to Bremer and its agents.

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

For the foregoing reasons, Alfred Jackson, joined by Omarr Baker and Tyka Nelson object to the Court’s October 17, 2018 Order. Alfred Jackson, joined by Omarr Baker and Tyka Nelson further ask the Court to clarify the scope of the paragraph 2 of its October 17, 2018 Order and all references to its March 27, 2017 Order contained therein, and proposes that the October 17, 2018 Order be amended to strike and replace the entirety of paragraph 2 with the following language:

In accordance with Minn. Stat. Ann. § 524.3-608, this Court hereby discharges Bremer Trust, N.A. and its agents from liability to the Estate of Prince Rogers Nelson for transactions and omissions occurring after October 17, 2018. Nothing in this Order is intended to limit or restrict the rights of the heirs of the Estate to pursue claims against Bremer Trust, N.A. or its agents.

Alfred Jackson, joined by Omarr Baker and Tyka Nelson further request any such other and further relief, at law or in equity to which Mr. Jackson, Mr. Baker, and/or Ms. Nelson may show themselves justly entitled.

DATE: November 8, 2018

Respectfully submitted,

WHITE WIGGINS & BARNES, LLP

By: /s/ Nnamdi Anozie
Kennedy Barnes, *pro hac vice pending*
Ward White IV, *pro hac vice pending*
Nnamdi M. Anozie, *pro hac vice pending*
1700 Pacific Avenue
Dallas, Texas 75201
(214) 665-4150 Telephone
(214) 665-4160 Facsimile
Email: kbarnes@wwbllp.com
wwhite@wwbllp.com
nanozie@wwbllp.com

J. SELMER LAW, P.A.

Dated: November 8, 2018

/s/Marc M. Berg
James C. Selmer (Minn. #171086)
Marc M. Berg (Minn. #20979x)
Ruth A. Gebreab (#398365)
Suite 2010
500 Washington Avenue South
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55415
Telephone: (612) 338-6005
Email: jselmer@jselmerlaw.com
mberg@jselmerlaw.com
ruty@jselmerlaw.com

ATTORNEYS FOR ALFRED JACKSON

2005 WL 44462

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED AS UNPUBLISHED AND MAY
NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY MINN. ST. SEC. 480A.08(3).

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

In re ESTATE OF Janet Pauline STEWART, a/k/a Janet P. Stewart.

No. A04-808.

|

Jan. 11, 2005.

Washington County District Court, File No. P3-01-400306.

Attorneys and Law Firms

Rodney J. Mason, Jack D. Nelson, Chandler & Mason, Ltd., St. Paul, MN, for appellant Eleanor Stewart.

Timothy J. Pramas, Felhaber, Larson, Fenlon & Vogt, P.A., St. Paul, MN, for respondent Mia Stewart.

Considered and decided by KALITOWSKI, Presiding Judge; WRIGHT, Judge; and CRIPPEN, Judge. *

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

WRIGHT, Judge.

*1 Eleanor Stewart, former personal representative of the estate of Janet Stewart, challenges the district court's decision requiring her to repay the estate \$11,658.51 that she spent on attorney fees, on the ground that the expense had not been approved in the final account. Eleanor Stewart argues that a previous district court order reserving for further consideration only the distribution of "remaining funds" deprived the district court of "jurisdiction" to order the repayment of the \$11,658.51. Eleanor Stewart also argues that, even if the district court had jurisdiction, Mia Stewart waived her right to challenge the expenditure by failing to object. Alternatively, Eleanor Stewart argues that her discharge as personal representative extinguished any claim the estate might otherwise have had against her for the wrongful expenditure of estate funds. We affirm.

FACTS

Janet Stewart died in September 2001, leaving a will in which she nominated Eleanor Stewart as her personal representative and bequeathed her entire estate to her daughter Mia Stewart. The initial petition for formal probate was filed in November 2001, and the district court approved the final account in September 2003. The final account reserved \$12,000 for the payment of fees and listed the total amount on hand for distribution as \$102,970.23.

In December 2003, Mia Stewart moved to compel Eleanor Stewart to transfer all estate assets to her. On the morning of the hearing on the motion, Eleanor Stewart advised Mia Stewart that she had paid \$11,658.51 for attorney fees and that, as a result, only \$91,311.72 of the \$102,970.23 originally approved for distribution remained for distribution.

At the hearing, Mia Stewart's counsel stated on the record that, although the parties had been able to resolve most of their differences, there remained a dispute “regarding the remaining funds, [namely,] whether the personal representative [or] her attorney or accountants [were] entitled to additional expenses above and beyond those already authorized by the court.” Mia Stewart's counsel further advised that Eleanor Stewart had agreed to resign as personal representative and that Mia Stewart had agreed to replace her. The parties also agreed that Eleanor Stewart would transfer all remaining available funds into a trust account and that \$80,000 would be distributed to Mia Stewart from that account. Finally, the parties agreed that they would try to resolve their dispute over the expenditure of funds not approved in the final account. To that end, Eleanor Stewart agreed to provide Mia Stewart the documentation necessary to assess the propriety of the challenged expenditures. If the parties were unable to reach an agreement, however, they agreed to submit the issue to the district court for consideration without oral argument.

The district court directed Mia Stewart's counsel to put the parties' stipulation in writing. On January 26, 2004, the district court signed the stipulation and entered it as an order. In relevant part, the district court's order provided as follows:

*2 5. The parties shall attempt to resolve their differences concerning distribution of the *remaining funds*. If an agreement is reached, a signed Stipulation and proposed Order will be submitted to the court, closing the estate and providing for distribution of the *remaining funds*.

6. If no agreement is reached, the parties will serve and file briefs and affidavits, if desired, by February 10.... If briefs and affidavits are not served by February 10, the Court may issue an Order closing the Estate[,] and the *remaining funds* in the Trust Account may be distributed to Mia Stewart.

....

9. Eleanor A. Stewart and her counsel will provide to Mia Stewart's counsel any time records and expense records needed to assess the reasonableness and propriety of any expenditures by the Estate funds since August 1, 2003.

(Emphasis added.)

The parties were unable to resolve their differences regarding the \$11,658.51 expenditure. Accordingly, they submitted the issue to the district court for consideration. In March 2004, the district court issued an order finding that the \$11,658.51 expenditure had not been approved in the final account and requiring Eleanor Stewart to reimburse the estate for the expenditure. This appeal followed.

DECISION

I.

Eleanor Stewart argues that the district court “divested itself of jurisdiction”¹ to consider the propriety of the \$11,658.51 expenditure by issuing an order reserving for consideration only the distribution of “remaining funds.” Eleanor Stewart claims that the \$11,658.51 expenditure was not part of the “remaining funds” because it had been paid before the court issued its order. This argument is unavailing.

District courts have jurisdiction over “all subject matter relating to estates of decedents, including construction of wills and determination of heirs and successors of decedents.” Minn.Stat. § 524.1-302(a) (2002). Accordingly, a district court is authorized to “make orders, judgments and decrees and take all other action necessary and proper to administer justice in the matters which come before it.” Minn.Stat. § 524.1-302(b) (2002). The district court's authority to administer an estate formally terminates when the district court issues a decree of distribution or an order for complete settlement and

the personal representative transfers all property to the persons entitled to the property and otherwise fully discharges the duties of a personal representative. Minn.Stat. § 524.3-1001 (2002) (governing formal proceedings terminating administration of an estate). District courts also have broad discretion in issuing appropriate relief during the pendency of the court-supervised administration of an estate. Minn.Stat. § 524.3-505 (2002) (“Interim orders approving or directing partial distributions, sale of property, or granting other relief may be issued by the court at any time during the pendency of a supervised administration on the application of the personal representative or any interested person.”).

*3 The district court's January 2004 order did not formally terminate the district court's authority to continue to administer the estate because the order was not a final decree of distribution and Eleanor Stewart had not transferred all property to Mia Stewart or otherwise discharged her duties as a personal representative. *See* Minn.Stat. § 524.3-1001. Accordingly, the supervised administration of the estate continued, and the district court retained authority to issue interim orders, including orders granting relief for the wrongful distribution of estate funds. *See* Minn.Stat. § 524.3-505.

Even assuming that the district court could divest itself of jurisdiction to administer an estate by issuing an order narrowing the issues remaining for consideration, the district court's January 2004 order had no such effect. In its order, the district court recognized that a dispute remained between the parties and made alternative provisions for the resolution of the dispute. The only dispute remaining after the stipulation was the dispute over the \$11,658.51 expenditure, an expenditure that was over and above the \$12,000 reserved for fees in the final account. The district court ordered Eleanor Stewart to provide Mia Stewart the documentation necessary for her “to assess the reasonableness and propriety of any expenditures by the Estate funds since August 1, 2003.” The \$11,658.51 expenditure was made after this date. The district court did not, therefore, “divest itself of jurisdiction” to consider the propriety of the expenditure. On the contrary, it expressly reserved authority to resolve the issue if the parties were unable to reach an agreement.

Eleanor Stewart's claim that the district court lacked the authority to consider the expenditure because the \$11,658.51 were not part of the “remaining funds” lacks merit. The “remaining funds” to which the parties and the court alluded at the hearing and in the stipulated order were clearly the \$102,970.23 on hand for distribution in the final account. A different interpretation of the term “remaining funds” would render meaningless the stipulated order's provisions reserving the \$11,658.51 expenditure for the district court's consideration should the parties be unable to resolve the dispute. The district court, therefore, properly considered the issue surrounding the expenditure pursuant to the stipulated order.

II.

Eleanor Stewart argues that even if the district court retained “jurisdiction” to consider the \$11,658.51 expenditure, Mia Stewart waived her right to challenge the expenditure by failing to object to it. But the transcript of the January hearing establishes that Mia Stewart's counsel expressly stated on the record that there still was a dispute over Eleanor Stewart's claim for expenses “above and beyond” those approved in the final account. And the January 2004 stipulated order made alternative provisions for the resolution of the disputed claim and required Eleanor Stewart to provide Mia Stewart “any time records and expense records needed to assess the reasonableness and propriety of any expenditures by the Estate funds since August 1, 2003.” By stipulating to alternative ways of resolving the dispute and by seeking records from Eleanor Stewart needed to assess the propriety of the expenditure, Mia Stewart properly preserved her objection to the expenditure. Accordingly, we conclude that Eleanor Stewart's claim to the contrary is inconsistent with both the stipulated order and the hearing transcript.

III.

*4 Eleanor Stewart also argues that her discharge as the personal representative extinguished any claim Mia Stewart might have had against her for the wrongful expenditure of estate funds. We disagree.

Under Minnesota law, the discharge of a personal representative terminates the representative's authority to represent the estate in pending or future proceedings, but it *does not* discharge the personal representative from liability for transactions occurring before the termination.

Termination [of the appointment of a personal representative] does not discharge a personal representative from liability for transactions or omissions occurring before termination, or relieve the representative of the duty to preserve assets subject to the representative's control, to account therefor, and to deliver the assets. Termination does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the personal representative, but terminates the authority to represent the estate in any pending or future proceeding.

Minn.Stat. § 524.3-608 (2002). Relying on Minn.Stat. § 524.3-1001(a)(4), Eleanor Stewart argues that the discharge of a personal representative extinguishes claims that might have existed against the personal representative at the time of the discharge. The statute contains no language to that effect, however, and cannot be reasonably construed to extinguish such claims.

Section 524.3-1001 governs formal proceedings to terminate court administration of an estate. The statute authorizes a personal representative or any interested person to petition for an order of complete settlement of the estate and to apply for a decree or order of distribution. Minn.Stat. § 524.3-1001(a)(1), (2). The provision on which Eleanor Stewart relies provides: "When a decree or order for distribution is issued, the personal representative shall not be discharged until all property is paid or transferred to the persons entitled to the property, and the personal representative has otherwise fully discharged the duties of a personal representative." *Id.* (a)(4). This provision does not extinguish claims against the personal representative for transactions occurring before the termination and cannot reasonably be read to extinguish such claims.

As Mia Stewart correctly points out, the statutory interpretation Eleanor Stewart proposes would place beneficiaries in the untenable position of having to allow a personal representative to continue in that position-and thereby risk further depletion of the estate's assets-in order to preserve a claim against the personal representative for the wrongful expenditure of funds before the termination. The legislature could not have intended such an absurd result. The statute simply requires that the district court, in the course of ending court-supervised administration of an estate, refrain from discharging the personal representative before his or her duties are fully discharged and all property has been distributed. Thus, Minn.Stat. § 524.3-1001(a)(4) did not extinguish Mia Stewart's claim against Eleanor Stewart for the wrongful expenditure of estate funds.

*5 **Affirmed.**

All Citations

Not Reported in N.W.2d, 2005 WL 44462

Footnotes

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

1 We note at the outset that the United States Supreme Court has recently cautioned against the misuse of the word "jurisdictional." *Kontrick v. Ryan*, 540 U.S. 443, ---, 124 S.Ct. 906, 915 (2004). The *Kontrick* court noted: "Courts, including this Court, ... have more than occasionally [mis]used the term 'jurisdictional[.]' ... Clarity would be facilitated if courts and litigants used the label 'jurisdictional' ... only for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and

the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a court's adjudicatory authority.” *Id.*; see also *Bode v. Minn. Dep't of Natural Res.*, 594 N.W.2d 257, 259-60 (Minn.App.1999) (similarly cautioning against misuse of term jurisdictional), *aff'd*, 612 N.W.2d 862 (Minn.2000). Because when Eleanor Stewart uses the term “jurisdictional” she refers neither to the class of cases nor the persons falling within the district court's adjudicatory authority, this term is misused.

End of Document

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**STATE OF MINNESOTA
COUNTY OF CARVER**

**DISTRICT COURT
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
PROBATE DIVISION**

In re:

Estate of Prince Rogers Nelson,
Decedent.

Court File No. 10-PR-16-46
Honorable Kevin W. Eide

**ALFRED JACKSON'S EMERGENCY
MOTION FOR RELIEF AND TO STAY
THE COURTS OCTOBER 17, 2017 ORDER
FOR PAYMENT OF FEES.**

TO THE HONORABLE COURT:

Alfred Jackson, as heir to the Estate of Prince Rogers Nelson (the "Estate"), by and through his counsel, and joined by Omarr Baker and Tyka Nelson, pro se heirs of the Estate, hereby file this Emergency Motion for Relief and to Stay the Court's October 17, 2018 Amended Order & Memorandum Granting Bremer Trust, N.A.'S Motion To Lift Stay Of Discharge and Approve Payment Of Attorneys' Fees And Costs (the "October 17, 2018 Order"), as authorized by Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02. In support of this Motion, Mr. Jackson respectfully shows the Court as follows:

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

This Court should grant Alfred Jackson's request for relief from the Court's October 17, 2018 Order and grant a short stay of one-week following the Court's approval of Mr. Jackson's new counsels' Motion for Pro Hac Vice Admission in this matter because newly retained counsel have not had opportunity to adequately review unredacted substantive information relating to the Court's determination of the appropriateness and scope of Bremer Trust, N.A.'S ("Bremer") discharge as Special Administrator of the Estate, together with Bremer's counsels' associated fees. Mr. Jackson recently engaged White Wiggins & Barnes, LLP ("WWB"), in this matter on October

28, 2018. On October 31, 2018 Mr. Jackson, through his new counsel, sent a letter to the Estate's current Personal Representative, Comerica Bank & Trust, N.A. ("Comerica"), notifying Comerica that WWB has been retained in connection with Mr. Jackson's interest in the Estate and requesting, among other things, access to all documents relating to the Estate and Mr. Jackson's interest therein, including, of course, unredacted financial information and/or Court filings. In response, on November 1, 2018 Comerica, through its counsel, responded that it would provide access to the requested information once WWB is formally admitted Pro Hac Vice. Motions for admission Pro Hac Vice are currently pending before this Court for attorneys, Kennedy Barnes, Ward White IV, and Nnamdi Anozie.

On November 5, 2018 Comerica sent an electronic correspondence to Mr. Jackson indicating that Comerica would, on behalf of the Estate, "pay certain legal fees incurred by Bremer" pursuant to the October 17, 2018 Order seemingly the same day. On November 6, 2018, upon learning of Comerica's letter, Mr. Barnes contacted counsel for Comerica and notified it of WWB's intention to seek emergency relief and to stay the October 17, 2018 Order. Comerica agreed to refrain from making the payment upon the filing of this Motion, subject to further orders of this Court.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

Under Minnesota law, a party may seek relief from an order of the court for a variety of reasons, including any reason "justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(f). Though the right to be relieved of a judgment and/or order is not absolute, "the decision to vacate a judgment is largely within the trial courts discretion." *Sand v. School Service Employees Union Local 284,402* N.W.2d 183, 186 (Minn. App. 1987). Indeed, pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 the court has discretion to grant such other relief as may be just, such as the short

stay requested herein. *Chapman v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1*, 454 N.W.2d 921, 924 (Minn. 1990) (emphasizing that courts may grant relief for “any other reason justifying relief.”)

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Alfred Jackson requests that this Court grant its request for relief and order a one-week stay following the admission of Mr. Jackson’s counsel Pro Hac Vice and awarding such other and further relief, at law or in equity to which Mr. Jackson, Mr. Baker, and/or Ms. Nelson may show themselves justly entitled.

DATE: November 6, 2018

Respectfully submitted,

WHITE WIGGINS & BARNES, LLP

By: /s/ Kennedy Barnes

Kennedy Barnes, *pro hac vice forthcoming*
Ward White IV, *pro hac vice forthcoming*
Nnamdi M. Anozie, *pro hac vice forthcoming*
1700 Pacific Avenue
Dallas, Texas 75201
(214) 665-4150 Telephone
(214) 665-4160 Facsimile
Email: kbarnes@wwbllp.com
wwhite@wwbllp.com
nanozie@wwbllp.com

J. SELMER LAW, P.A.

Dated: November 6, 2018

/s/Marc M. Berg

James C. Selmer (Minn. #171086)
Marc M. Berg (Minn. #20979x)
Ruth A. Gebreab (#398365)
Suite 2010
500 Washington Avenue South
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55415
Telephone: (612) 338-6005
Email: jselmer@jselmerlaw.com
mberg@jselmerlaw.com
ruty@jselmerlaw.com

ATTORNEYS FOR ALFRED JACKSON

STATE OF MINNESOTA
COUNTY OF CARVER

DISTRICT COURT
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
PROBATE DIVISION

In the Matter of:

Court File No. 10-PR-16-46

Estate of Prince Rogers Nelson,

ORDER DENYING MOTION

Decedent.

The above entitled matter came on before the Honorable Kevin W. Eide on November 14, 2018, without a hearing, pursuant to Alfred Jackson's Emergency Motion for Relief and to Stay the Courts October 17, 201[8] Order for Payment of Fees. The referenced Order was issued after a motion filed by Bremer Trust, N.A. to Lift the Stay of Discharge and Approve Payment of Attorneys' Fees and Costs. After extensive briefing and oral arguments held on July 19, 2018, the Court took the matter under advisement. At all times therein, Mr. Jackson was represented by counsel. Now therefore, based upon the file and record herein, the Court makes the following:

ORDER

1. Alfred Jackson's Emergency Motion for Relief and to Stay the Courts October 17, 201[8] Order for Payment of Fees is respectfully DENIED.

BY THE COURT:

Date: November 14, 2018

Kevin W. Eide
Judge of District Court

NOTICE: A true and correct copy of this Order/Notice has been served by EFS upon the parties. Please be advised that orders/notices sent to attorneys are sent to the lead attorney only.

EXHIBIT B

**STATE OF MINNESOTA
COUNTY OF CARVER**

**DISTRICT COURT
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
PROBATE DIVISION**

<p>In re:</p> <p>Estate of Prince Rogers Nelson, Decedent.</p> <p>TO: Clerk of Appellate Courts 305 Minnesota Judicial Center 25 Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Blvd. Saint Paul, MN 55155</p>	<p>Court File No. 10-PR-16-46 Honorable Kevin W. Eide</p> <p>NOTICE OF APPEAL Date Order Filed: October 17, 2018</p>
--	---

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Alfred Jackson, as heir to the Estate of Prince Rogers Nelson (the “Estate”), by and through his counsel, appeals to the Court of Appeals of the State of Minnesota from the Amended Order & Memorandum Granting Bremer Trust, N.A.’s Motion to Lift the Stay of Discharge and Approve Payment of Attorneys’ Fees and Cost, filed by the Court on October 17, 2018, (1) lifting the Court’s April 11, 2017 stay of Bremer Trust, N.A.’s (“Bremer”) discharge as the Special Administrator; (2) reinstating the Court’s March 27, 2017 Order discharging Bremer and its agents of “any and all liability to the [Estate] associated with its Special Administration” of the same; and (3) approving payment of Bremer legal fees incurred by various law firms in connection with its pursuit of discharge from the Estate and in defense of certain legal claims against Bremer. Specifically, this appeal arises out of the probate court’s October 17, 2018 Amended Order & Memorandum Granting Bremer Trust, N.A.’s Motion to Lift Stay Of Discharge and Approve Payment Of Attorneys’ Fees And Costs (the “October 17, 2018 Order”) in connection with a special administration in this probate proceeding. The issue is whether the court’s approval of fees and discharge of Bremer Trust,

N.A. (“Bremer”) and its agents of “any and all liability” to the Estate of Prince Rogers Nelson (the “Estate”), is appropriate under the Minnesota Probate Code and specifically Minn. Stat. § 524.3-608, which states that the “[t]ermination [of the appointment of a personal representative] does not discharge a personal representative from liability for transactions or omissions occurring before termination, or relieve the representative of the duty to preserve assets subject to the representative's control, to account therefor, and to deliver the assets.”

Appellant assumes that Bremer Trust, National Association (counsel: Laura E. Halferty, #0311698, and David R. Crosby, #0237693, Stinson Leonard Street, LLP, 150 South Fifth Street, Suite 2300, Minneapolis, MN 55402, 612-335-1500) will appear as Respondent for this appeal.

DATED: November 16, 2018

Respectfully submitted,

WHITE WIGGINS & BARNES, LLP

By: /s/ Nnamdi Anozie
 Kennedy Barnes, *pro hac vice pending*
 Ward White IV, *pro hac vice pending*
 Nnamdi M. Anozie, *pro hac vice pending*
 1700 Pacific Avenue
 Dallas, Texas 75201
 (214) 665-4150 Telephone
 (214) 665-4160 Facsimile
 Email: kbarnes@wwbllp.com
wwhite@wwbllp.com
nanozie@wwbllp.com

J. SELMER LAW, P.A.

DATED: November 16, 2018

/s/Marc M. Berg
 James C. Selmer (Minn. #171086)
 Marc M. Berg (Minn. #20979x)
 Ruth A. Gebreab (#398365)
 Suite 2010
 500 Washington Avenue South
 Minneapolis, Minnesota 55415

Telephone: (612) 338-6005
Email: jselmer@jselmerlaw.com
mberg@jselmerlaw.com
ruty@jselmerlaw.com

ATTORNEYS FOR ALFRED JACKSON

FILED

November 16, 2018

**OFFICE OF
APPELLATE COURTS****STATE OF MINNESOTA****IN COURT OF APPEALS**

<p>CASE TITLE:</p> <p>In re:</p> <p>Estate of Prince Rogers Nelson, Decedent.</p>	<p>STATEMENT OF THE CASE OF APPELLANT ALFRED JACKSON</p> <p>DISTRICT COURT CASE NO.: 10-PR-16-46</p> <p>APPELLATE COURT CASE NO.: _____</p>
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1. Court or agency of case origination and name of presiding judge or hearing officer.

District Court for the First Judicial District, Carver County, Probate Division, The Honorable Kevin W. Eide presiding.

2. Jurisdictional Statement**(A) Appeal from District Court.****Statute, rule or other authority authorizing appeal:**

Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(j) and Minn. Stat. § 525.71(a)(5) and (15)

Date of entry of judgment or date of service of notice of filing of order from which appeal is taken:

October 17, 2018

Authority fixing time limit for filing notice of appeal (specify applicable rule or statute):

Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 104.01, subd. 1.

Date of filing any motion that tolls appeal time:

None.

Date of filing of order deciding tolling motion and date of service of notice of filing:

None.

(B) Certiorari appeal.

Not applicable.

Statute, rule or other authority authorizing certiorari appeal:

Not applicable.

Authority fixing time limit for obtaining certiorari review (cite statutory section and date of event triggering appeal time, e.g., mailing of decision, receipt of decision, or receipt of other notice):

Not applicable.

(C) Other appellate proceedings.

Not applicable.

(D) Finality of order or judgment.

Does the judgment or order to be reviewed dispose of all claims by and against all parties, including attorney fees? Yes (X) No ()

If no:

Did the district court order entry of a final partial judgment for immediate appeal pursuant to MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 104.01? Yes () No (X)

If yes, provide date of order:

If no, is the order or judgment appealed from reviewable under any exception to the finality rule? Yes (X) No ()

If yes, cite rule, statute, or other authority authorizing appeal:

Minn. Stat. § 525.71(a)(5) and (15)

3. State type of litigation and designate any statutes at issue.

This appeal arises out of the probate court's October 17, 2018 Amended Order & Memorandum Granting Bremer Trust, N.A.'s Motion to Lift Stay Of Discharge and Approve Payment Of Attorneys' Fees And Costs (the "October 17, 2018 Order") in connection with a special administration in a probate proceeding. The issue is whether the court's approval of fees and discharge of Bremer Trust, N.A. ("Bremer") and its agents of "any and all liability" to the Estate of Prince Rogers Nelson (the "Estate"), is appropriate under the Minnesota Probate

Code and specifically Minn. Stat. § 524.3-608, which states that the “[t]ermination [of the appointment of a personal representative] does not discharge a personal representative from liability for transactions or omissions occurring before termination, or relieve the representative of the duty to preserve assets subject to the representative's control, to account therefor, and to deliver the assets.”

The statute at issue is Minnesota Statute § 524.3-608.

4. Brief description of claims, defenses, issues litigated, and result below.

On April 27, 2016 the probate court appointed Bremer Trust, N.A. (“Bremer”) as Special Administrator of the Estate. Throughout Bremer’s Special Administration of the Estate, multiple heirs expressed their suspicion of, lack of confidence in and general unhappiness with Bremer’s conduct and decisions related to the Estate, in which the heirs have interest. In fact, even Bremer acknowledged the mounting tensions and lack of trust between himself and the heirs. In its September 27, 2016 letter to the probate court, with barely five months acting into its tenure as Special Administrator to the Estate, Bremer admitted that “the mutual trust and confidence that is so critical to the relationship between the [Bremer] and the heirs appears to have substantially eroded” and noted that the fractured relationship between Bremer and the heirs hampered Bremer’s “ability to act in the best interest of the Estate.” Bremer also asserted that it would neither seek an extension of its current term nor object to the appointment of a new Special administrator prior to the expiration of Bremer’s term.

Some of the heirs continued to be dissatisfied with and distrusting of Bremer. On December 6, 2016, Tyka Nelson filed a Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator asserting her lack of confidence in Bremer and requested the probate court replace Bremer immediately. In a letter to the probate court, Bremer reminded the court that “[it] was not interested in continuing as Special Administrator after its current term expires” but objected to Ms. Nelson’s request to replace Bremer prior to the expiration of its term, despite previously indicating that it was not opposed to the same.

On December 16, 2016, Bremer petitioned the probate court for the following: (1) approval of the accountings for its administration from April 27, 2016 through December 31, 2016; (2) authorization to pay its legal fees through its termination date/date of the January 12, 2017 hearing to appoint a successor; (3) **discharge of Bremer and its agents from any and all liability associated with pending claims against the Estate**; (4) authorization to reserve \$1,000,000 from Estate assets for professional and legal fees associated with the transfer of the Estate administration to a successor **and the discharge of Bremer and its agents from any and all liability associated with the administration of the Estate**; (5) a finding that Bremer's term as Special Administrator has terminated; (6) **discharge of Bremer and its agents from any and all liability associated with its Special Administration of the Estate through December 31, 2016**; (7) authorization and distribution of the balance of Estate assets, less the amount Bremer needed to pay Petitioner's legal fees and less the \$1,000,000 reserve, to the court-appointed successor Special Administrator or Personal Representative upon discharge of Bremer and its agents through December 31, 2016; (8) approval of the accountings from January 1, 2017 through the termination date of Petitioner's Special Administration, submitted by Bremer; (9) authorization to pay its professional and legal fees incurred after January 1, 2017, submitted by Bremer as Special Administrator; (10) **discharge of Bremer and its**

agents from any and all liability associated with its Special Administration of the Estate from January 1, 2017 through the date of its termination within a reasonable time after receipt by the court of the stub accounting; (11) authorization to distribute the balance of the \$1,000,000 reserve, after payment of professional and legal fees, to the court-appointed successor Special Administrator or Personal Representative upon discharge of Bremer through the termination date of Bremer's Special Administration; and (12) granting such other relief as may be proper.

On December 20, 2016, Omarr Baker, as heir, filed his Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator, also asserting his lack of confidence in Bremer and requested that the probate court replace Bremer immediately, rather than at the expiration of its extended term. Bremer did not respond to Mr. Baker's Petition.

On January 4, 2017 Bremer filed the first of many "final accounting" documents, all of which, included substantial professional fees. The heirs objected to each one and reiterated their suspicion of, lack of confidence in and unhappiness with Bremer's conduct and decisions. Specifically, on January 19, 2017, heirs Tyka Nelson and Omarr Baker objected to the first of Bremer's final accountings, including Bremer's request for payment of professional fees to, among others, Stinson Leonard Street, LLP, asserting that the "request seeks compensation from the Estate that is not just and reasonable [n]or commensurate with the benefit [to] the Estate." On January 30, 2017, Mr. Baker filed an Objection to Bremer's request for fees and cost and attorneys fess through December 31, 2016, arguing that "Bremer had not established that the requested fees and costs are reasonable or benefitted the Estate." On March 13, 2017, Mr. Baker and Tyka Nelson filed their objections to Bremer and its counsels' March 3, 2017 final accounting and fees, again reiterating their displeasure with Bremer and reasserting objections that fees were not reasonable and/or not incurred for the benefit of the estate. And on April 7, 2017, Mr. Baker and Alfred Jackson, as heir, filed objections to additional Bremer final accounting seeking approval of fees; objecting that such fees were not made for the benefit of the Estate.

On March 27, 2017 the probate court issued an order stating that it had reviewed the relevant fee applications and objections and (1) denying discovery or an evidentiary hearing regarding the allowance of the fees of the Special Administrator and its attorneys, and approval of the Final Accounts; (2) approving the Special Administrator's Fees and Costs through January 31, 2017; (3) approving the Special Administrator's Attorney's Fees and Costs through January 31, 2017; (4) ordering payment within 30 days of the Order; (5) approving Bremer's Final Accounting; (6) approving the Original Inventory as filed on January 4, 2017; (7) **discharging Bremer and its agents from any and all liability associated with its Special Administration of the Estate;** and (8) directing Comerica Bank to perform certain tasks. This Order, in part, mirrored the language of Bremer's December 16, 2016 petition and request.

On April 11, 2017, the probate court issued its Order Staying the Discharge of Special Administrator (Bremer), on the ground that it had "learned that litigation may be forthcoming which may relate to actions taken by the Special Administrator" and staying only paragraph 7 of its above-referenced March 27, 2017 Order, which discharged Bremer and its agents of liability. Since that time, the heirs and Bremer have been engaged in sprawling dispute regarding the appropriateness of the fees incurred by Bremer and its agents and the scope of Bremer and its agents' discharge.

On October 17, 2018 the probate court issued an order reinstating paragraph 7 of its March 27, 2017 Order and "discharged [Bremer and its Agents] from **any and all liability** to

the [Estate] associated with its Special Administration of the Estate” and approving the payment of additional professional fees incurred by Bremer.

On November 8, 2018, Alfred Jackson, joined by Omarr Baker and Tyka Jackson, objected to the language of the probate court’s October 17, 2018 Order on the grounds that it is ambiguous as to the phraseology of paragraph 2 of the Order, including all references to paragraph 7 of the Court’s March 27, 2017 Order contained therein, because, as phrased, such language releases Bremer and its agents from any and all liability. To the extent that the aforementioned language purports to release Bremer and its agents from liability to the heirs for transactions, acts, or omissions occurring before the Court’s discharge of Bremer, such language is improper and in direct contravention of the Minnesota Probate Code.

5. List specific issues proposed to be raised on appeal.

- (A) Does the Probate Code permit the discharge of any and all liability of a personal representative as to the heirs?
- (B) Does a discharge of a personal representative’s liability by the probate court discharge a personal representative from liability for transactions or omissions occurring before termination?
- (C) Does the language of the probate court’s October 17, 2018 Order Minnesota Statute § 524.3-608.
- (D) Were the professional fees approved by the probate court’s October 17, 2018 fair and reasonable and/or or incurred for the benefit of the Estate?

6. Related appeals.

List all prior or pending appeals arising from the same action as this appeal. If none, so state.

None.

List any known pending appeals in separate actions raising similar issues to this appeal. If none are known, so state.

None.

7. Contents of record.

Is a transcript necessary to review the issues on appeal? Yes () No (X)

8. Is oral argument requested? Yes (X) No ()

If so, is argument requested at a location other than that provided in Rule 134.09, subd. 2? Yes () No (X)

9. Identify the type of brief to be filed.**Formal brief under Rule 128.02. (X)****Informal brief under Rule 128.01, subd. 1 (must be accompanied by motion to accept unless submitted by claimant for reemployment benefits). ()****Trial memoranda, supplemented by a short letter argument, under Rule 128.01, subd. 2. ()****10. Names, addresses, and telephone numbers of attorney for appellant and respondent.****Attorneys for Alfred Jackson, Appellant**

Kennedy Barnes, *pro hac vice pending*
 Ward White IV, *pro hac vice pending*
 Nnamdi M. Anozie, *pro hac vice pending*
 1700 Pacific Avenue
 Dallas, Texas 75201
 (214) 665-4150 Telephone

James C. Selmer (Minn. #171086)
 Marc M. Berg (Minn. #20979x)
 Ruth A. Gebreab (#398365)
 Suite 2010
 500 Washington Avenue South
 Minneapolis, Minnesota 55415
 Telephone: (612) 338-6005

Attorneys for Bremer Trust, National Association, Respondent

Laura E. Halferty (MN 0311698)
 David R. Crosby (MN 0237693)
 Katherine A. Moerke (MN 0312277)
 Elizabeth C. Kramer (MN 0325089)
 Natasha A. Robertson (MN 0395590)
 Stinson Leonard Street LLP
 150 South Fifth Street, Suite 2300
 Minneapolis, MN 55402
 Tel: 612-335-1500

DATED: November 16, 2018

Respectfully submitted,

WHITE WIGGINS & BARNES, LLP

By: /s/ Nnamdi Anozie
 Kennedy Barnes, *Admitted pro hac vice*

Ward White IV, *Admitted pro hac vice*
Nnamdi M. Anozie, *Admitted pro hac vice*
1700 Pacific Avenue
Dallas, Texas 75201
(214) 665-4150 Telephone
(214) 665-4160 Facsimile
Email: kbarnes@wwbllp.com
wwhite@wwbllp.com
nanozie@wwbllp.com

J. SELMER LAW, P.A.

DATED: November 16, 2018

/s/Marc M. Berg
James C. Selmer (Minn. #171086)
Marc M. Berg (Minn. #20979x)
Ruth A. Gebreab (#398365)
Suite 2010
500 Washington Avenue South
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55415
Telephone: (612) 338-6005
Email: jselmer@jselmerlaw.com
mberg@jselmerlaw.com
ruty@jselmerlaw.com

ATTORNEYS FOR ALFRED JACKSON

FILED

December 7, 2018

**OFFICE OF
APPELLATE COURTS**

**STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS**

In the Matter of the Estate of:

ORDER

Prince Rogers Nelson, Decedent

#A18-1871

**BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND UPON THE
PARTIES' STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: THIS
APPEAL IS DISMISSED.**

Dated: December 7, 2018

BY THE COURT



Edward J. Cleary
Chief Judge

EXHIBIT C

STATE OF MINNESOTA
COUNTY OF CARVER

DISTRICT COURT
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
PROBATE DIVISION

In Re:

Estate of Prince Rogers Nelson,
Decedent.

Case Type: Special Administration
Court File No.: 10-PR-16-46
Judge: Kevin W. Eide

**ALFRED JACKSON AND OMARR
BAKER'S OBJECTION TO COMERICA
BANK & TRUST'S REQUEST FOR
DISCHARGE OF LIABILITY**

INTRODUCTION

Alfred Jackson ("Jackson"), by and through counsel, and Omarr Baker ("Baker") submit this objection to Comerica Bank & Trust ("Comerica") request for discharge from any and all liability associated with its administration of the Estate from February 1, 2017, through January 31, 2018, filed on September 7, 2018.

Comerica's request for discharge through the above dates is premature and unnecessary for multiple reasons. Jackson and Baker request that any discharge for Comerica be stayed until they have completed a final accounting and are no longer serving as Personal Representative. See §524.3-608 (stating a Special Administrator cannot be discharged from liability without providing a full accounting) If the court were to allow Comerica a discharge from liability now it could have significant negative effects on the entirety of the Estate. There are multiple unresolved issues that need to be addressed before Comerica is granted any discharge from liability including specifically the entering into of the Common Interest Agreement between Comerica and the prior Special Administrator, Bremer Trust, N.A. ("Bremer"), which was objected to at the time by attorneys for Mr. Baker. The Common Interest Agreement has caused significant unnecessary expenses to the Estate because Comerica is unable to defend the Estate against Bremer, its agents, or third parties

associated with Bremer and thus have been unable to completely perform their fiduciary duties. These expenses include, but are not limited to, the need for appointing a Second Special Administrator to investigate wrong doings by Bremer, it's agents, and other third parties and to bring claims on behalf of the Estate.

Jackson and Baker now ask the court to stay any discharge requested by Comerica until a time after they have concluded their role as Personal Representative, a final accounting has been completed and the extent of monetary damages can be calculated regarding The Common Interest Agreement among other possible issues.

It is also premature to grant Comerica a discharge before any and all claims against Bremer have been resolved because, as we have seen in this case, a Special Administrator or Personal Representative's liability cannot be fully ascertained until the administration of the Estate is turned over to another party.

Further, Mr. Jackson and Mr. Baker object to any discharge on the basis that IRS has not completed their tax audit on the Estate, which was filed by Comerica. Until the IRS has made a final determination in regards to taxes it is premature to discharge Comerica from any liability.

On a final note, the heirs are skeptical about the timing of this request by Comerica as it comes shortly after the majority of the Heirs terminated their attorneys and started acting Pro Se. The Heir's objective by acting Pro Se was to eliminate administrative costs to the Estate and to try and streamline any issues and concerns they have with Comerica. This has also included entering into mediation with Justice Gilbert on multiple issues, which has seemed to have the desired effect of cost savings. Now, this request for a discharge of liability and the way it was presented does nothing but further alienate the Heirs from Comerica and has made many of them question the actual motivations behind Comerica's discharge request.

If the court decides a hearing is necessary in these circumstances Mr. Jackson and Mr. Baker request that the parties hold a mediation to resolve this issue with the least expense to The Estate possible.

Dated: September 21, 2018

Decerto Law

By /s/ Justin A. Bruntjen
Justin A. Bruntjen (#392657)
501 Carlson Parkway #529
Minnetonka, MN 55305
Justin@b2lawyers.com

Attorney for Alfred Jackson

Omarr Baker

By /s/ Omarr Baker
Pro Se

STATE OF MINNESOTA

DISTRICT COURT

COUNTY OF CARVER

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
PROBATE DIVISION

In the Matter of:

Court File No. 10-PR-16-46

Judge Kevin W. Eide

Estate of Prince Rogers Nelson,

Decedent.

**ORDER & MEMORANDUM
GRANTING COMERICA
BANK & TRUST, N.A.'S AMENDED
PETITION TO APPROVE INTERIM
ACCOUNTING**

The above-entitled matter came before the undersigned on November 29, 2018, upon Comerica Bank & Trust, N.A.'s Amended Petition to Approve Interim Accounting. Appearances were as noted in the record.

The Court, having considered the Amended Petition and the interim accounting for the period of February 1, 2017, through January 31, 2018, filed therewith, makes the following findings of fact:

1. The Amended Petition is complete.
2. The Petitioner has declared that the representations contained in the Amended Petition are true and complete to the best of Petitioner's knowledge.
3. The Petitioner has filed a complete interim accounting with the Court for Petitioner's administration of the Estate of Prince Rogers Nelson from February 1, 2017, through January 31, 2018.
4. The Petitioner has complied with all orders and decrees of the Court and with the provisions of law applicable to this Estate and to Petitioner as Personal Representative of the Estate.

In accordance with these findings of fact and Minn. Stat. §§ 524.3-505 and 524.3-1001, the Court makes the following:

ORDER

1. The interim accounting for February 1, 2017, through January 31, 2018, submitted by Comerica Bank & Trust, N.A. as Personal Representative of the Estate is approved.
2. Except as noted below, all acts and doings of Comerica Bank & Trust, N.A. set forth in the interim accounting from February 1, 2017, through January 31, 2018, are approved, ratified, and confirmed.
3. For this accounting period, and for future periods, the Court determines that objections that could have been raised and have not been raised are waived. Objections that may come to light based on information that was not known at the time of the Petition for the interim accounting are preserved.
4. Except as provided for in this Order, nothing herein is intended to restrict, limit or alter the applicable limitations period for any claim(s) that may arise or be filed by the Heirs or beneficiaries of the Estate.
5. Omarr Baker's motion for the Estate to fund, in part, the cost of a forensic audit is respectfully denied.

Dated: December 7, 2018

BY THE COURT:

Kevin W. Eide
Judge of District Court

NOTICE: A true and correct copy of this Order/Notice has been served by EFS upon the parties. Please be advised that orders/notices sent to attorneys are sent to the lead attorney only.

MEMORANDUM

The Personal Representative has suggested to the Court and the parties that it is wise and a good use of judicial resources to submit interim accountings on an annual basis for review and approval. This would ensure that there is adequate oversight of the Estate by the Court and the Heirs. It also requires the Court and the Heirs to address concerns about the administration of the Estate in increments when the information is somewhat current and fresh, and in “chunks” that are a manageable size. The other alternative is to wait and review an accounting when the Estate is closed. This would mean that some information would be 4, 5 or more years old, and it would be such a large mass of information and data that it would be difficult to address. The Court adds that it has presided over the administration of this Estate for two and one-half years but there is no guarantee that one judge will preside over the Estate for its entire administration. It is likely that this Estate will be open for several more years to resolve disputes, to resolve issues relating to the determination of the amount of estate taxes, and to raise the money necessary to pay off those taxes. It would be almost impossible for another judge to address objections raised about events or conduct that occurred years before without the necessary historical context.

The Heirs do not wish to waive, nor the Court to bar, objections that would not otherwise be barred by the applicable limitation period for making claims. The Court concludes that the reasons for submitting interim accountings for approval and confirmation are substantial and necessary for proper estate administration. The Court will bar objections or claims that an heir (or party) knew or should have known of at the time of the petition for approval of an annual accounting. However, this Order does not restrict any applicable limitation period for any objection or claim that was not reasonably known at the time of the petition.

K.W.E.