EN BANC CALENDAR

Before the Minnesota Supreme Court

December 2005

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES

Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office.

 

Monday, November 28, 2005, 9:00 a.m., Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol

 

            State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Quanartis DaLee Turnage, Appellant – Case No. A04-2419:  On appeal from his convictions for kidnapping and first-degree murder, appellant Quanartis Turnage presents the following issues for review:  (1) whether the district court erred in admitting copies of recorded telephone conversations where the person who made the copies was unable to verify that the copies were accurate reproductions of the original recordings; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict; and (3) whether the district court erred in its instructions on kidnapping.  (On appeal from Dakota County District Court.)

 

            In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Eric A. L. De Rycke, Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 22299 – Case No. A04-417:  Attorney discipline matter that presents the issue of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based upon the facts of the matter. 

 

Tuesday, November 29, 2005, 9:00 a.m., Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol

 

            State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Tyree Leland Jackson, Appellant – Case No. A05-66:  On appeal from his conviction for first-degree murder, appellant Tyree Jackson presents the following issues for review:  (1) whether the prosecutor engaged in misconduct warranting a new trial; and (2) whether Jackson is entitled to a new trial based on the district court’s submission of interrogatories on an aggravating factor and its failure to submit verdict forms to the jury on lesser-included offenses. (On appeal from Hennepin County District Court.)

 

            State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. James Evans Johnson, Appellant – Case No. A04-385:  At his trial for second-degree intentional murder, appellant James Johnson presented evidence that the victim physically attacked him and shot him in the head before he shot and killed the victim.  The district court denied Johnson’s request for the jury to be instructed on heat-of-passion manslaughter and self-defense.  Johnson was convicted and the court of appeals affirmed.  The issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in denying the requested instructions. (On appeal from Hennepin County District Court.)

 

Wednesday, November 30, 2005, 9:00 a.m., Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol

 

            State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Jeffrey Lamar Young, Appellant – Case No. A04-613:  On appeal from his conviction for first-degree murder, appellant Jeffrey Young presents the following issues for review:  (1) whether the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Young intended to cause the death of the victim; (2) whether the prosecutor engaged in misconduct warranting a new trial; (3) whether the district court erred in denying Young’s motion to suppress an identification made from a photo array; (4) whether the district court erred in denying Young’s motion to remove for cause a juror who stated that he would be guided by “divine wisdom;” (5) whether the district court erred in its evidentiary rulings; and (6) whether the district court erred in denying the jury’s request to review testimony from a state’s witness during deliberations.  (On appeal from Anoka County District Court.)

 

            Daniel Deegan, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A05‑24:  Appellant Daniel Deegan pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and kidnapping and received a presumptive sentence of 360 months.  Deegan did not file a direct appeal but later filed a petition for postconviction relief.  The district court denied the petition.  Deegan appealed and moved for the appointment of a public defender to assist him in the appeal.  The court of appeals denied the motion on the ground that under Minn. Stat. § 590.05 (2004) Deegan did not have a right to representation by a public defender in his postconviction appeal because he pleaded guilty and received a presumptive sentence.  The issue on appeal is whether Minn. Stat. § 590.05, which permits the State Public Defender’s Office to decline representation in a postconviction appeal of an indigent defendant who did not file a direct appeal if the defendant pleaded guilty and received a presumptive sentence, is unconstitutional.  (On appeal from St. Louis County District Court.)

 

Thursday, December 1, 2005, 9:00 a.m., Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol

 

NONORAL:  Thomas Carroll Rubey, Appellant vs. Valerie Ann Vannett, Respondent – Case No. A05-310:  The district court entered a dissolution judgment and decree dissolving the parties’ marriage on June 21, 2004.  Appellant Thomas Rubey filed a post-trial motion for amended findings and/or a new trial on July 23, 2004, and scheduled a hearing on the motion for September 17, 2004, which was after the 60-day period required by Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.03 for post-trial motions.  After the 60-day period expired, respondent Valerie Vannett moved to dismiss Rubey’s post-trial motion on the ground the district court no longer had jurisdiction to consider the motion.  The district court granted Vannett’s motion and dismissed Rubey’s post-trial motion.  Rubey appealed from the judgment and decree and the order dismissing his post-trial motion.  The court of appeals dismissed the appeal on the ground the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Rubey’s post-trial motion because the 60-day period for such motions had expired and Rubey never obtained an order extending the time for the post-trial motion.  The court of appeals further held that Rubey’s untimely post-trial motion did not extend the time to appeal from the judgment and decree and therefore the time for appealing from the judgment and decree expired before his appeal was filed.  The issues on appeal are:  (1) whether the district court’s failure to hear a post-trial motion within the 60-day period required by Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.03 is a jurisdictional defect that deprives the district court of jurisdiction to consider the motion; and (2) whether the district court’s failure to hear Rubey’s post-trial motion within 60 days of the dissolution judgment and decree rendered the motion untimely under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 104.01, subd. 2, which provides that the time for an appeal from the order that is the subject of a timely and proper posttrial motion begins on the date of service of the order disposing of the posttrial motion.  (On appeal from Washington County District Court.)

 

NONORAL:  Eugene Francis Cuypers, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A05-644:  On appeal from an order denying his petition for postconviction relief from his conviction for first-degree murder, appellant Eugene Cuypers presents the following issues for review:  (1) whether Cuypers received ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (2) whether the indictment for first-degree murder was legally insufficient because it failed to identify the victim by name; and (3) whether the life sentence imposed on Cuypers violates due process.  (On appeal from St. Louis County District Court.)

 

Monday, December 5, 2005, 9:00 a.m., Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

 

Gail Lewis-Miller, Respondent vs. Christopher Ross, Appellant – Case No. A04-2224:  Following the death of her sister, respondent Gail Lewis-Miller petitioned for third-party custody of her sister’s minor children.  The children’s father, appellant Christopher Ross, opposed the petition.  The district court dismissed Lewis-Miller’s petition on the ground the petition failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Lewis-Miller had a substantial relationship with the children or that the required statutory grounds for third-party custody were present.  The court of appeals reversed, holding that at the petition stage of a third-party custody proceeding, the petitioning party need only allege sufficient facts that, if true, would entitle the third party to custody and that if this burden has been met, the district court shall conduct an evidentiary hearing at which the petitioning party will be required to prove by clear and convincing evidence statutory grounds for awarding third-party custody.  The issues on appeal are:  (1) whether the third-party custody statute, Minn. Stat. § 257.03 (2004), requires the two-step procedure adopted by the court of appeals; and (2) whether Lewis-Miller presented “competent evidence” as required by Minn. Stat. § 257.03, subd. 2(B) (2005) to support her petition for third-party custody.  (On appeal from Hennepin County District Court.)

 

NONORAL:  Carol Dreyling, et al., Relators vs. Commissioner of Revenue, Respondent – Case No. A05-970:  In their state income tax returns for the years 1998 through 2000, relators Carol and Roger Dreyling claimed that Roger was a resident of Alaska, a state with no income tax.  Following an audit, respondent Commissioner of Revenue concluded that Roger had been a Minnesota resident for the periods in question for income tax purposes and assessed additional income taxes, penalties for understatement of income and fraud, and interest.  The Dreylings challenged the assessment and the Tax Court affirmed.  The issues on appeal are:  (1) whether the Commissioner erred in concluding that Roger Dreyling was a Minnesota resident for state income tax purposes for the years 1998 through 2000; and (2) whether the Commissioner erred in assessing a fraud penalty against the Dreylings.  (On appeal from the Tax Court.)

 

Tuesday, November 6, 2005, 9:00 a.m., Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

 

In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Richard G. Day, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 21659 – Case No. A04-1046:  Attorney discipline matter that presents the issue of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based upon the facts of the matter.

 

NONORAL:  Kmart Corporation, Relator vs. County of Becker, Respondent – Case No. A05-1069:  Relator Kmart Corporation challenged the assessed value of its store in Detroit Lakes for the tax years 2002 through 2004.  The Tax Court ruled that the fair market value of the property was approximately $2.7 million, which was more than the value determined by Kmart’s expert but less than the value determined by respondent County of Becker’s expert.  The issue on appeal is whether the Tax Court erred in its determination of the fair market value of the property.  (On appeal from the Tax Court.)